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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Beyond Myth and Ceremony?:  
An Examination of Corporate Responses to Climate Change 
 
by 
 
Krista Katherine Badiane 
 
 
Co-Chairs: Rebecca D. Hardin and Andrew J. Hoffman 
 
 
The focus of this dissertation is on corporate responses to climate change. Using three 
empirical studies, I examine the gap in corporate words and actions when it comes to 
addressing climate change through three empirical studies.  The first study uses critical 
theory to analyze how firms decouple climate change discourse and actions through an 
examination of Environmental Protection Agency Climate Leaders participants.  The 
second study uses textual analysis of sustainability reports to examine the underlying 
logics of corporations addressing climate change. Finally, I present an ethnographic and 
historical case study of Ford Motor Company and their journey from symbolic to 
substantive climate change response to better understand the mechanisms and tensions 
underlying such change. Throughout the three chapters, the themes of opportunity and 
belief in the science of climate change stand out as important motivating factors driving 
substantive corporate response to the issue. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The focus of this dissertation is on corporate responses to climate change. In the 
words of Meyer and Rowan (1977), I ask: when does firm responses to climate change 
constitute “myth and ceremony” and when do their responses constitute substantive 
action? To answer this question, I examine corporate discourses and actions related to 
climate change, the gap between words and actions, and the reasons that may explain the 
existence and size of this gap.  
An investigation of corporate responses to the issue of climate change is 
particularly timely given recent events. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) released its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) confirming the unequivocal warming 
of the climate system (IPCC, 2013), the U.S. Government released a national assessment 
of climate impacts, the U.S. and China (the worlds largest contributors to greenhouse gas 
emissions) agreed to reduce carbon emissions and the People’s Climate March in New 
York City drew over 300,000 demonstrators. Furthermore, industry is the largest 
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions making it an important empirical setting (IPCC, 
2014).  
All of these events call into question the role of the corporation in society, 
particularly when addressing urgent, complex global challenges requiring multi-sectoral 
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responses such as climate change. I thus situate this dissertation within what must be a 
very brief review of the broad social developments surrounding the rise of corporations 
and corporate responsibility. I include as well a more contemporary review of the 
literature on environmental and social sustainability in organizations and climate change. 
(A review of other relevant literature such as institutional theory and institutional 
ethnography can be found in the following chapters). 
As stated by Padro (2014): “While corporations are arguably the world’s most 
influential institutions, this influence is accompanied by deep public skepticism about the 
nature of the corporation, the motivations of its leadership, and its ability to advance the 
public good. CEOs are among the least trusted leaders in society.” The question of the 
market and the firm in society is of historical relevance, but is also salient today given the 
pervasive nature of corporations (Welker et al., 2011), their contribution to environmental 
and social challenges as well as the global multi-sectoral governance response required to 
address many of these challenges (Braudel, 1982; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Perrow, 
1991; Polanyi, 1944; Smith, 1994 [1776]). Climate change is one such challenge. 
 
The Rise of Corporations and Corporate Responsibility 
 
Are markets natural?  
 
Understanding markets as physical and socially constructed spaces is a central 
question of social theory and is a prominent feature in the classic writing of Adam Smith, 
Karl Polanyi, and Fernand Braudel among others. Taking a socio-theoretical and 
historical approach Polanyi and Braudel each call into question Smith’s central 
proposition that the “invisible hand” of markets forces are natural, and it is human 
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tendency to “truck, barter and exchange” (Braudel, 1982; Polanyi, 1944; Smith, 1994 
[1776]). Using examples of the kula ring from the Trobriand Islands, Polanyi argues that 
there are a wide range of market types and successes, and that the current market society 
is due to state and other social interventions, e.g. economic action emerges from social 
practice (Braudel, 1982; Polanyi, 1944). Braudel focuses on the markets and stock 
exchange of Europe to illustrate the cyclical, ritualized diffusion of market structures and 
argues that the “wheels of commerce” are really unstoppable (Braudel, 1982). It is worth 
noting that Braudel himself worked as an historian in a tradition of the Annales school of 
French historians, within which some of the first detailed studies of long term climate and 
environmental processes at regional scales emerged in Europe. We thus see that the 
question of environmental impacts on human institutions, and vice versa, enjoys a long 
and illustrious history when it comes to chronicling the emergence and development of 
capitalist systems. 
The rise of the large corporation 
 
 As an extension of market theorization, the rise of the corporation has also 
received considerable classic and contemporary consideration from Karl Marx, Max 
Weber and more recently Talcott Parson (W. R. Scott and Davis, 2006b). Various 
functionalist, historicist, legal and organizational explanations are presented to account 
for the rise of the large corporation in the late twentieth century, many centering around 
the impact of the railroad.  
In The Visible Hand, Chandler’s central thesis is that large corporations 
proliferated when technology made it more efficient for the “visible hand” of 
management to coordinate functions once performed by the invisible hand of the market.  
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Chandler defines the modern business enterprise as having two distinct characteristics: “it 
contains many distinct operating units and it is managed by a hierarchy of salaried 
executives” (Chandler, 1977, p. 1).  Through eight propositions he further explores the 
modern enterprise with an emphasis on administrative coordination, technology, 
consumer demand and efficiency (Chandler, 1977).   
Critics acknowledge Chandler’s contribution to our understanding of business 
history, however they also point to several gaps. They argue that in Chandler’s treatment 
of historical events, items of social significance and the role of government as exogenous 
forces leads to several empirical problems: First “Chandler leaves no room for selective 
adaptation of technologies, and workplace arrangements by “managers” (e.g. declining 
innovation and efficiency), second, “…He fails to examine…the goals these managers 
pursue. He puts into the background the question of market control as a prime 
objective…” and third, “ He effectively denies us the means by which we might assess 
the impact of the corporate system on the population at large and the socials costs 
produced…” (DuBoff and Herman, 1980, p. 92; Roy, 2001). 
In Organizing America: Wealth, Power and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism, 
Perrow presents an organizational interpretation of the rise of large corporations.  Perrow 
argues that two interrelated circumstances led to a unique corporate structure in the U.S. 
First, a weak state that allowed for concentration of wealth and power and did not provide 
regulation, and second, organizational reasons (e.g. organizations shaping the state with 
the dissolution of limited liability). Furthermore a non-homogenous elite, centralized 
capital, and an available wage dependent immigrant labor force were key to the formation 
of Perrow’s organizational society (Perrow, 2005).  
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Finally, it is important to note the corporation is viewed as a special legal 
personality particularly in the United States: “the corporation is far better viewed as an 
immortal being with a soul, its existence and its personality distinct from that of both the 
individual and the state” (O'Melinn, 2006, p. 2).  Historically, the legal debate has been 
centered around the concept of the corporation as a concession, e.g. property of the state 
and responsible for public good, vs. the corporation as a contract, e.g. an agreement 
among private parties with a primary goal of maximizing profit.  Although the original 
mandate for U.S. corporations was to serve the public interest, the 1919 case of Dodge vs. 
Ford set a legal precedent for corporations to maximize shareholder value (O'Melinn, 
2006; W. R. Scott and Davis, 2006b). This, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
creates the conditions for new forms of activism, and for social debates about the creation 
and management of value by corporations for shareholders, in relation to wider societal 
costs. 
Friction, or Why Corporations Exist 
 
 As a final point of reference, it is also relevant to understand why firms exist, and 
how they determine their organizational boundaries. According to Scott and Davis, “A 
central theme in answering the question of why firms exist is the friction that arises 
between two organizations when they are mutually dependent” (W. R. Scott and Davis, 
2006a, p. 234). Anthropologist Anna Tsing defines friction differently in her prize 
winning book by that title (2005), in terms of the sparks that are shed in the tensions 
between state and corporate interests and the social movements such as environmentalism 
(in her cases, forest conservation in Indonesia) that enable or constrain particular types of 
capital investment schemes. She describes social fields across which new forms of 
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environmental politics emerge, in turn shaping new possibilities and obstacles. This 
dissertation considers the more specific field of organizational and corporate theory in 
relation to wider anthropologies of environmental change within organizations, but also 
applies a particular ethnographic tool kit to the question of how and why firms are able to 
address broader social challenges. 
In his classic work, “The Nature of the Firm,” Coase aims to define the firm, and 
explain its existence given the presumed rationality of Adam’s Smith’s “invisible hand” 
(Coase, 1937). Coase defines the firm as “the system of specialized relationships which 
comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” 
instead of the market price mechanism (Coase, 1937, p. 393).  Coase continues on to 
explain the existence of the firm as a response to the costly process of transacting (e.g. 
forming contracts) rendering the entrepreneur and internal economic transactions more 
efficient than the external market. The boundaries of the firm, and decisions about what 
to do inside a firm are based on these transaction costs: “a firm will tend to expand until 
the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of 
carrying out the same transaction by mean of an exchange on the open market or the cost 
of organizing in another firm” (ibid, p. 395).   
Building on Coase’s argument, Williamson further develops the determinant role 
of transactions costs in forming organizational boundaries (Williamson, 1987). 
Williamson equates transactions costs to friction in the economic system that can take the 
form of ex ante or ex post costs. His focus is on the contractual man including behavioral 
assumptions and corresponding dimensions of transactions costs. Williamson’s explicit 
behavioral assumptions as related to transaction cost economics are bounded rationality 
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and opportunism. Bounded rationality suggests that actors are “intendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so” (March and Simon, 1958, p. xxiv). Williamson defines his second 
assumption, opportunism, to be “self interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1987, p. 
47). Williamson argues that without these behavioral assumptions the world of 
transactions would be vastly different because information would be transparent or 
contracts could be governed by rules. The dimensions of transactions costs include asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency. Williamson argues that higher uncertainty and 
greater frequency of transactions increase costs and often make it more efficient for an 
organization to bring that transaction “in house.”  However, he emphasizes that asset 
specificity is the most important and costly element of the three dimensions as it results 
in organizational vulnerability due to investments in technologies that are not 
redeployable.  Essentially asset specificity creates a “fundamental transformation” where 
an organization moves from having many potential suppliers to more of a bilateral 
relationship with a single supplier (ibid, p. 61). Williamson notes further that asset 
specificity can include site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, 
and dedicated assets.  
In his seminal article, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness,” Granovetter argues “that most behavior is closely embedded in 
networks of interpersonal relations and that such an argument avoids the extremes of 
under-and oversocialized views of human action” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 68). More 
specifically, Granovetter focuses on economic behavior and the problems of trust and 
malfeasance.  He places his argument in direct contrast with the transaction cost 
economists perspective as articulated by Williamson. Granovetter criticizes Williamson’s 
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arguments as representing an “undersocialized,” atomistic view of human nature as well 
for its functionalist tendencies (Granovetter, 1985). 
The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
 Notably absent from much of the literature related to the rise of the corporation, 
and organization of the corporate form is the externalization of social and environmental 
costs that accompanied the rise of large corporations.  As recently as 1970, the social 
responsibility of corporations is to produce shareholder profit in Milton Friedman’s 
words (Friedman, 1970).  Although this paradigm has held important sway for decades 
other economists and corporate practitioners, have argued that business does have a 
greater role to play in society particularly in recent years. Henry Ford believed that “a 
business that makes nothing but money is a poor business,” and even Jack Welch, former 
CEO of General Electric heralded as an exemplar of shareholder value theory, has 
recently come to be a strong critic of shareholder value calling the pursuit of short-term 
profits in the absence of a view of long-term value for a company “the dumbest idea in 
the world” (Denning, 2013). This duality of corporate purpose is nicely captured by 
Padro (2014): 
Throughout history, the corporate form has been used for constructive and 
remarkably diverse purposes: establishing settlements in the New World 
(Massachusetts Bay Company), building America’s first railroads (The Granite 
Railway Company and The Baltimore and Ohio Railway Company, among 
others), bringing the automobile to the masses (Ford Motor), treating diabetes 
(Novo Nordisk), making air travel affordable (Southwest Airlines), and making 
the world’s information accessible and useful (Google). However, an equally 
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powerful narrative of the corporation views it as an engine of income inequality 
and a threat to the sustainability of our natural environment and the civic 
institutions charged with protecting society’s interests. Both of these narratives 
hold a fair share of truth and are deeply rooted in historical experience. And yet 
both assessments are incomplete on their own.  
 
While corporate philanthropy is not new, corporations increasingly view issues of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or sustainability, as strategic business issues 
(Garsten and Hernes, 2008; Hart, 1995; Hoffman, 2001a; Porter, 2006). For example, the 
potential value gained vis-à-vis CSR related activities such as climate actions and 
reporting for corporations includes carbon and associated energy savings, reputational 
advantages and potentially new revenue streams (Hart, 1995; Hoffman, 2001a). 
Furthermore, climate change- as with other preeminent CSR issues- is an environmental 
problem of global urgency and companies are increasingly responding to societal and 
governmental calls for action on the topic via new forms of hybrid governance (Jagers 
and Stripple, 2003; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006).  However, the emergence of CSR 
activities has not always been voluntary. In many instances, external shocks such as 
Greenpeace protests to the sinking of Brent Spar for Shell, consumer boycotts of labor 
practices at Nike or publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring for the Chemical 
Industry have provided the impetus for coordinated activity (Hoffman, 2001a; Porter, 
2006).  
Yet much remains to be studied about how CSR actually works, particularly from 
an economic standpoint (Lyon and Maxwell, 2008; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
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Reinhardt, Stevens, and Vietor, 2008).  Furthermore, it is unclear whether CSR related 
actions and disclosure are material (Davis and Anderson, 2008; Lyon and Maxwell, 2008; 
Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Reinhardt, et al., 2008). Recent review articles capture the 
relatively long history of scholarship on organizations, corporate social responsibility and 
the natural environment (Bansal and Gao, 2006; Margolis and Walsh, 2003).  The 
landscape has changed considerably from the beginning when theorists advocated for 
fundamental change in they ways that organizations acted in order to reduce their 
impacts, to a focus on the business case for environmental actions to a more normative 
conversation (Gladwin, Kennely and Krause, 1995; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; 
Hoffman, 1999; Howard-Grenville, 2012; Lounsberry, 2001; Porter and VanLinde, 1995; 
Reinhardt, 1999; Sharma, 2000; Shrivastava, 1995). The studies included here explore 
nuances in corporate discourse, underlying assumptions and aspirations that shape their 
action, and circumstances that determine chronologies of action by a given company (in 
this case, Ford) with many broader social consequences, particularly where the corporate 
economy in question dwarfs some national scale economies.  
 
Climate Context 
To understand corporate responses to climate change one must understand several 
key facts about contemporary causes and perceptions of climate change, understandings 
of which are shifting rapidly.  
First, both conventional and greenhouse gas emissions are on the rise as a result 
of human consumption of nonrenewable fossil fuels.  1 
                                                
1 In the terms of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2013 pg. 5 and 17):  
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Second, in addition to increasing corporate attention to the issue, public 
awareness of climate change and its associated impacts is also changing. Public 
perception is particularly important, as related consumer pressures and reputation 
moderate corporate attention to the issue of climate change. In particular, 2007 and 2008 
were pivotal years for public and corporate perception of climate change, arguably more 
so than any previous years until this past year. On one hand, numerous events prompted 
more action and public awareness. The Nobel Prize was awarded for climate change 
work, Al Gore won an Oscar for his climate change documentary, “An Inconvenient 
Truth,” the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued its fourth 
assessment of the risks related to climate change, and oil prices passed $100 per barrel 
creating a tipping point for the already growing consumer interest in the issue of climate 
change. Seventy-one percent of U.S. citizens said they believed in the science of climate 
change at the beginning of 2008 (Pew Research Center, 2009). However, this increase in 
attention also marked the beginning of renewed skepticism and debate about climate 
                                                                                                                                            
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and 
ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, 
and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased… Each of the last three 
decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade 
since 1850. In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983–2012 was likely the warmest 30-year 
period of the last 1400 years (medium confidence)…It is extremely likely that human 
influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th 
century. 
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change, especially in the United States (Hoffman, 2011). A series of events “galvanized 
the climate denier movement and created confusion within the general public” (Hoffman, 
2011): starting with “climategate” that charged scientists had manipulated data about 
climate change and continuing with ethical concerns about the IPCC reports and 
leadership.  These events led to greater mobilization of the climate denier movement and 
a decrease in public belief in climate change. Belief in the science of climate change 
declined from 71 to 57 percent among Americans between April 2008 and October 2009 
(Pew-Research-Center, 2009).  It is also worth noting that even more recently a national 
study of American public opinion on climate change found that belief in climate change 
was on the rebound, with 62 percent of Americans believing that temperatures on the 
planet were increasing and 26 percent opposing this view.  Lest we conclude that this 
reflects new or widespread openness to scientific research, it seems that half of 
Americans believe that climate change is occurring as a result of their personal 
experiences with temperature changes and weather (Rabe, B. et al. 2012).  
However derived, the diversity in understanding of, commitment to address, and 
public alignment around climate change exists globally as well.  For example significant 
public debate is ongoing in several countries, with resistance to international legislation 
coming from developed and developing countries alike, and uncertainty about global 
cooperation on the issue remains. Given this lack of broader alignment, public 
stakeholder pressure on companies about whether and how to address climate change is 
diverse, at times conflicted, and inconsistent.  This places corporations at a challenging 
crossroads: do they take action to address climate change? If so, how do they talk about it 
publicly? More importantly what do they do in response?   
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Although each chapter represents an independent study, there are two themes that 
run through the dissertation: climate change, and corporate responses to it. The empirical 
studies in the dissertation examine the “words-and-action” gap in corporate efforts to 
address climate change.  First, I do so through a study of Environmental Protection 
Agency Climate Leaders participants examining predictors of decoupling in climate 
change discourse and actions. Based on constructs developed in this first study, I then 
broaden the lens through which to examine the issue with analysis of the logics through 
which corporations view climate change as reflected in their sustainability reports. 
Finally I present a case study of Ford Motor Company and their journey from symbolic to 
substantive climate change response to better understand the mechanisms and tensions 
underlying such change. Ford is also a recipient of the EPA’s Climate Leaders Award.  
Throughout all of these chapters, the themes of opportunity and belief in the science of 
climate change stand out as important motivating factors driving substantive corporate 
response to the issue. These studies are described in more detail below. 
Chapter 2: Decoupling Discourse and Actions: A Study of Environmental Protection 
Agency Climate Leaders’ Participants 
 
This study examines how firms decouple climate change discourse and actions. It 
does so by analyzing surveys and interviews with firms participating in the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Climate Leaders program. The paper situates 
its arguments in the existing literature on decoupling that has examined a variety of 
contexts in which actions of firms diverge from their statements. The study provides an 
assessment of when and why firms are likely to decouple climate discourse and action. 
Little prior research examines decoupling in the context of broad sustainability 
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challenges. We find that market opportunity and belief in the science of climate change 
are predictors of positive climate change action (or coupling), and mere risk perception is 
insufficient to motivate action and predicts decoupling. Our analysis suggests that 
voluntary programs such as the Climate Leaders play a useful role in encouraging early 
climate action, but are not able to sustain substantive climate action on their own. This 
limitation suggests a concurrent need for regulation.  
Chapter 3: The formation of multiple institutional logics: An examination of corporate 
climate change reporting 
 
In this study we use sustainability reports to examine the underlying logics of 
corporations addressing climate change. We explore these logics over time as addressing 
climate change emerges as a legitimate corporate action. We find that there are four 
logics that guide corporate responses to climate change: efficiency, opportunity, risk 
avoidance, and conservation.  The efficiency and opportunity logics co-exist with each 
other, complementing various potential strategies.  On the other hand, the risk avoidance 
and conservation logics are more exclusive and offer competing views of climate change 
and the role of corporations in addressing it. This work contributes to our understanding 
of how multiple logics are formed, compete and transform over time, and translate into 
potential future corporate reactions to climate change.  
 
Chapter 4: Changing Corporate Cultures: Ford Motor Company’s Response to Climate 
Change 
 
 In this chapter I draw on institutional ethnography and institutional theory along 
with theories of corporate change to understand Ford’s response to climate change over 
time, and its movement from symbolic to more substantive action. It articulates Ford’s 
how and why over the course of a decade the company moved from issue acceptance, to 
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recognition of their role and finally opening up to opportunity and scaling of solutions. 
Findings are used to develop a model of change that both expands and refines previous 
theory. I advance a model of change from decoupling to coupling, and symbolic to 
substantive action that is emergent, ongoing and pluralistic, resulting from multiple 
interactions within the firm, with stakeholders, and external conditions that are 
characterized by friction. 
 In sum, the three studies respond to calls for problem-centered organizational 
research (Davis and Marquis 2005). They also aim to address the gap in the literature 
focused on whether corporate social responsibility leads to enhanced financial 
performance (Margolis, Elfenbein and Walsh, 2009). By positioning climate change as a 
cultural issue rather than focusing on economic and technical aspects of the problem, 
these studies provide a better understanding of the deep cultural forces impacting 
organizational response (or non-response) to climate change. In this way, these studies 
contribute to our understanding of the elements that influence organizational responses to 
climate change and possibly lead to culture change. 
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Decoupling Discourse and Actions: A Study of Environmental Protection Agency 
Climate Leaders’ Participants 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an early, foundational article on institutional theory, Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
show that organizations can separate, or decouple, their formal structure from their actual 
work activities to enable greater operational flexibility. Decoupling allows organizations 
to maintain legitimacy with important stakeholders when facing uncertainty. Despite the 
importance of decoupling to institutional theory, there is relatively little research on the 
subject (Scott, 2001; Westphal and Zajac, 2001).  
The paucity of research that identifies when and why organizations decouple their 
actions from their public pronouncements is also visible in writings on climate change, 
despite the growing scholarship on the subject. The present study addresses this gap in 
the literature, and analyzes surveys and interviews with participants in the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Climate Leaders Program to examine firms’ 
decoupling of climate change discourse and actions. 
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Observing decoupling means understanding not only how plans and policies are 
developed, but also the subtle ways in which companies disconnect their practices from 
those policies. The latter step can be difficult, and thus previous studies of decoupling are 
primarily qualitative in nature (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). Early studies examine the 
decoupling of formal procedures from everyday teaching and administrative routines in 
educational institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977), and decoupling of affirmative action 
policy statements from actual hiring practices in a small liberal arts college (Edelman et 
al., 1991). Westphal and Zajac (1994 and 2001) conducted the first large scale 
investigations of decoupling, examining chief executive officer (CEO) incentive 
programs and stock repurchase plans. They find that CEO power relative to the Board of 
Directors is an important determinant of decoupling for incentive programs (Westphal 
and Zajac, 1994). This finding remains true for stock repurchase programs, and is also 
influenced by experiential learning and social awareness (Westphal and Zajac, 2001). 
Climate change provides a generative context to study decoupling because of the 
high level of uncertainty for businesses about the appropriate course of action, despite the 
scientific consensus about the urgency of the problem. There are no federal regulatory 
standards in the U.S., leaving only voluntary mechanisms such as EPA Climate Leaders 
program. But although federal regulation is mostly absent, there are growing regulatory 
pressures at the state level and increasing pressure from investors, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and consumers. Climate change has been broadly acknowledged as 
potentially leading to a market transition that will create both threats and opportunities 
for organizations (Hoffman 2005; Kolk and Hoffmann 2007). This study seeks to explain 
why and when decoupling is more likely to be observed amongst a group of companies 
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participating in the EPA’s Climate Leaders Program. This study also aims to contribute to 
the larger body of knowledge concerning when, why, and how decoupling works in 
organizations, in general. 
Participation in the EPA Climate Leaders program was voluntary, but 
participating companies were required to commit to annual greenhouse gas emissions 
accounting and reporting and to setting reduction goals. However, the program did not 
require participants to specify scientifically determined emissions reduction goals, or 
even to meet such goals. Therefore, participating in the Climate Leaders program did not 
guarantee implementation of and action on climate goals and strategies. It could, 
however, alleviate pressure from NGOs, investors and government regulation by 
signaling climate leadership. Participating was therefore at least partially symbolic, and 
can be viewed as indicative of decoupling, since participating companies were 
encouraged to develop new discourse (on climate change) without needing to “prove” 
subsequent actions related to that discourse. Therefore, this study seeks to address the 
following research questions: Why do some firms who have signed up for a voluntary 
initiative like EPA Climate Leaders and espouse concern still avoid taking action, while 
others substantively implement climate actions? When is decoupling likely to occur in 
this situation? And, what is the role of voluntary programs like the EPA Climate Leaders 
in promoting sustained climate action? 
 
THEORY 
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Insights from three sets of literature are useful for the analysis of decoupling  – 
that from institutional theory, studies of organizational and industry self regulation, and 
work on organizational responses to climate change. 
 
Institutional theory 
 
Neo-Institutional theory (referred to as NIT or Institutional theory in this paper) 
focuses on the way that organizations are shaped by social, political, and cultural forces. 
More specifically, Institutional theory addresses the role of norms, regulations and 
culture in promoting orderly behavior in institutional systems2 (Scott and Davis, 2006). 
The result is that within organizations, products, services, techniques, policies and 
programs are institutionalized and social processes take on a rule-like status (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). 
Institutional theory is built on the concept that organizations have vested interests 
in survival. Survival is predicated on the attainment of resources based on the support of 
a constituency, e.g. the organization must be viewed as legitimate by its constituency to 
gain the resources necessary to survive. Legitimacy3 is created via myths and ceremonial 
activities, including the creation of narratives that fit within larger socially accepted 
scripts (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
Institutional theory also predicts that organizations adopt practices that are viewed 
as legitimate to reduce uncertainty: “organizations tend to model themselves after similar 
                                                
2 Scott defines institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with 
associated activities, provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 2001, p. 48).  
 
3 Legitimacy "is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) 
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organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152). In this conception of corporate structure, firms 
converge and begin to look alike, similar to plants in the ecological sense of 
isomorphism, based on their quest for legitimacy rather than purely on competitive bases. 
Isomorphism is most commonly conceived as mimetic, but may also be coercive or 
normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Adherence to institutions, however, can hinder efficiency, according to Meyer and 
Rowan (1977): “…quite apart from technical efficiency, organizations which innovate in 
important structural ways bear considerable costs in legitimacy.” Organizations may 
therefore “decouple these formal structures from actual, ongoing practices in the 
organization to buffer internal routines from external uncertainties, thus enhancing 
flexibility while still maintaining legitimacy with important external constituents” 
(Westphal and Zajac, 2001). Furthermore, as long as an organization can convince its 
constituency of its legitimacy with mythical storytelling and ceremonial acts, decoupling 
(or inconsistency of narrative and action) is irrelevant. To maintain efficiency, as well as 
“ceremonial conformity” organizations can decouple their formal structure and their 
actual work actual activities, such that the formal structure reflects the “myth of 
institutions” rather than the demands of work activities. Behind this myth, the formal 
structure is loose, rules are violated, and decisions are often unimplemented (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  
Westphal and Zajac (2001) draw attention to a variety of ways companies actively 
use symbols to influence the perception of external constituencies:  
 
 
25 
Symbolic action can range from relatively extreme forms of institutional 
decoupling, such as the non-implementation of formal policies that affect the 
technical core of the organization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), to relatively subtle 
forms of decoupling that involve taking actions that are inconsistent with the spirit 
of a formal policy, although perhaps still consistent with the letter of the plan.  
 
Although prior research has not directly examined organizational decoupling in 
the context of climate change, several studies find no direct correlation between firms’ 
carbon intensity and response to climate change. Instead, firms opt for short-term 
solutions and strategic flexibility to mitigate perceived uncertainty (Hoffman, 2007). This 
historic lack of alignment between climate performance and response suggests potential 
decoupling by firms (Bansal and Clelland 2004). These authors argue that institutional 
pressures (i.e., the need to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of constituents) matter when 
motivating organizations to respond to climate change, even more so than the issue itself  
(Bansal and Clelland 2004). 
 
Organizational responses to climate change  
Studies of corporate environmental discourse and actions suggest that businesses 
have responded to climate change in many different ways. Virtually all studies 
acknowledge that businesses accept climate change as an important global issue but differ 
in both the intensity of their expressed concern, and the tools needed to combat potential 
negative effects of climate change.  
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For much of the 1990s, businesses adopted a “wait and see” approach to climate 
change; by the 2000s, companies were increasingly aware of the issues, but still had little 
desire to overhaul their business strategies and plans in favor of low-carbon business 
models and this is still primarily true today (Ihlen, 2009). Among companies that seek to 
act on climate change, Kolk and Pinske (2004) find there are two types: those that focus 
on innovative ways to reduce emissions (“improvements in processes, products, product 
or product/market combinations”), and those that focus on compensation (“external or 
internal emission trading, and other forms of offsets”). They also find that companies 
differ in terms of how they attempt to achieve these objectives, whether at the individual 
company level and within their own supply chain, or with other companies in different 
sectors. 
Ihlen (2009) finds that the simple recognition of the climate change issue may 
serve to legitimate a business. Since corporations are often seen as part of the problem, 
citing scientific studies and rhetorically purporting to “act in line with the scientific 
consensus” ameliorates that view. One of the primary forms of this corporate recognition 
of the climate issue is through accepted disclosure mechanism, such as reporting. Kolk et 
al (2001) find that a decade ago reports of positions on environmental issues were only 
conducted when required. Reporting conventions are, however, rapidly changing and in 
2013, ninety-three percent of the 250 largest companies in the world issued sustainability 
or corporate responsibility reports, with over a quarter (27 percent) of these companies 
being headquartered in the U.S. and two-thirds of the non-reporting companies being in 
the U.S. (KPMG, 2013). Further, while industrial firms (e.g., mining, utilities, 
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electronics, automotive, and forestry) report the most, reporting is now the norm for all 
sectors included in a recent KPMG survey (2013). 
While reporting is a critical step (and often the first one that companies take) in 
acknowledging climate change as an important issue, Cogan (2006) argues that 
corporations must also reduce the “governance gap” whereby actions and policies are 
made for the short-term and long-term climate implications are ignored. Governance 
within a company related to climate change is also lacking as revealed by the CDP 
(formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) in a 2008 report:  “climate change is still not a 
regular agenda item for most Boards. It is commonly discussed two to four times a year 
at formal meetings, rather than being a routine Key Performance Indicator.” The absence 
of Board level discussions about climate change performance through long-term 
planning, precisely illustrates the governance gap as a form of decoupling. 
Similarly, Makovsky and Company’s 2008 survey of senior Fortune 1000 
executives finds a disconnect between executives’ personal beliefs that climate change is 
real and requires action, and their company’s actions to address it (e.g. educating its 
employees and cutting emissions rates). They call this the “green gap.” Yet another study 
revealed that while 80 percent of the U.K. FTSE 100 identified climate change as a 
business risk in their corporate responsibility report, the majority of these businesses had 
yet to develop an actual target of emissions reductions (Carbon Neutral Company report, 
see Armstrong, 2006). This pattern is widespread (Kolk and Hoffman 2007).  However, 
at odds with executive views on climate change, several studies on individual managers’ 
perceptions of risk suggest that the issue of climate change, with all of its uncertainties, is 
not viewed as a salient issue (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Hill and Thompson, 2006). It is 
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possible that these gaps, which are essentially another form of decoupling, result from 
larger issues of leadership; after all, decision-making tools do not make decisions, 
managers do (Hill and Thompson, 2006). As expanded upon in the discussion section, the 
findings of this paper are relevant to the observed green gap and governance gap in the 
literature; decoupling provides a possible explanation of these gaps.  
 
Organizational and Industry Self-Regulation  
 
Finally, in order to address our third research question and better understand the 
role of voluntary programs, like the EPA Climate Leaders, in promoting sustained 
climate action we turn to the literature on voluntary, market based programs and self-
regulation. Over the past twenty years, increasing international mandates have resulted in 
stricter greenhouse gas emissions requirements. Most notably, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change devised the Kyoto Protocol to cap 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels. However, the United States and others (e.g., 
India and China) have refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol, 2008). However, the United Nations 
negotiated additional mandates in 2011, which are due to be adopted in 2015. In the 
meantime, many developed nations are already setting substantial emissions targets of 
their own, surprisingly and most recently including the U.S. and China. However, these 
targets are often not adhered to strictly. In sum, the lack of formal or mandated climate 
policies at the international level and federal level in the U.S. has, opened the door for 
alternative ways for corporations to participate in socially responsible business. The 
proliferation of voluntary, market-based mechanisms suggests that international 
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agreements are no longer the “only game in town” (Jagers and Stripple, 2003; Lemos and 
Agrawal, 2006). According to Short and Toffel (2010, pg. 361): 
 
The existing literature provides a rich empirical and theoretical account of how 
and why…“self-regulatory” structures emerge and diffuse broadly across 
organizational fields but leaves unanswered the key question of whether they 
actually change organizational behavior to conform to legal or normative ideals. 
This question has become especially pressing as corporate internal compliance 
structures are increasingly integrated into twenty-first-century regulatory design. 
In an era of mounting regulatory demands and shrinking regulatory budgets, 
government agencies have encouraged companies to adopt self-regulatory 
structures in the hope that they will increase compliance and achieve regulatory 
goals.  
 
There is general consensus in the literature that self-regulation can both 
institutionalize norms and act as a vehicle for undermining regulation (Selznick, 1992). 
And, it is the question of when one should expect one vs. the other outcome that we are 
interested in addressing in this paper. Previous studies of corporate environmental 
discourses and actions suggest that industry self-regulation and voluntary programs are 
viable solutions to the lack of political consensus on addressing climate change (Brunner 
and Klein, 1999; Clinton and Gore, 1993). For example,  self-regulatory structures can 
create a “corporate conscience” by institutionalizing norms in institutions (Selznick, 
1992, pg. 352; Stone, 1975). Furthermore, voluntary compliance programs are 
supplemented by external monitoring and reporting to reduce information asymmetry 
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between groups and encourage accurate assessment of risk Katz et al (2009). Seong-Gin 
(2008) found that in the early stages of a voluntary program, corporations are driven by 
the potential to gain “a green reputation.” Those that join voluntary programs later are 
driven by institutional motives, including the desire to improve relationships with 
regulatory agencies and avoid the embarrassment of looking “environmentally 
unfriendly.” This suggests, for example, that we might expect more decoupling among 
late joiners of the EPA Climate Leaders who are looking to avoid negative pressure from 
regulators, than those that joined early because they saw reputational opportunities. Other 
authors argue that self-regulatory structures allow companies to circumvent and 
undermine the law (Edelman, Fuller, and Mara-Drita, 2001). This work points to the need 
for external regulation and compliance requirements for voluntary programs to have a 
systematic effect, and suggests that voluntary programs do not have a systematic effect in 
the absence of external constraints.  
 
SETTING 
EPA Climate Leaders 
 
Begun in 2002, The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Climate Leaders 
program was an incentive based, voluntary program with over 200 participating 
companies. Under the program the agency provided services to participating companies 
including free technical assistance with setting greenhouse gas reduction goals, public 
recognition, and peer networking opportunities at an annual conference. In exchange, 
companies committed to reducing scope one and two emissions by completing annual 
greenhouse gas emissions accounting and reporting and setting reduction goals. As 
described by the EPA, Climate Leaders was an: 
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…industry-government partnership that works with companies to develop 
comprehensive climate change strategies. Participating companies commit to 
reduce their impact on the global environment by completing a corporate-wide 
inventory of their greenhouse gas emissions based on a quality management 
system, setting aggressive reduction goals, and annually reporting their progress 
to EPA. Through program participation, companies create a credible record of 
their accomplishments and receive EPA recognition as corporate environmental 
leaders. (EPA Climate Leaders, 2010) 
 
The program was originally designed for large commercial operations. However, 
increased membership of small businesses occurred in the later years of the program, and, 
over time, some exceptions to membership were made for government organizations such 
as the EPA to participate in its own program. The EPA declined membership to NGOs, 
academic institutions and others non-commercial organizations due to a lack of resources 
and a declining budget. 
On top of the technical nuts and bolts of the program, the EPA aimed to advance a 
“big picture theory of change” according to a program official (interviewed by Krista 
Badiane and Arun Agrawal, February 24, 2010). Public recognition was a key incentive 
of the Climate Leaders program. While companies often joined the program for technical 
assistance, they later wanted the EPA “good housekeeping seal of approval.” The EPA 
recognized companies who set and achieved goals in a relatively modest way by drawing 
public attention to their accomplishments through their website and press releases. The 
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EPA wanted companies to compete for EPA recognition as a climate leader. According to 
the official: 
 
We want to have an impact not only on companies’ climate footprint, but the 
sector as a whole. For example one of the [Climate Leaders] partners is Kohl’s. 
They have pledged to go carbon neutral – maybe Walmart will want to follow. 
We would like to see that kind of impact. The program is about a notion of 
leadership, and that is why the EPA imprimatur is important. We don’t care what 
the sector is…we want companies to compete with each other for the EPA “good 
housekeeping seal of approval”. 
 
While the EPA was interested in motivating companies to undertake significant 
greenhouse reductions, the technical focus of the program remained on setting emissions 
goals and an annual inventory and reporting. Goal setting, a key component of the 
program, varied considerably among members. The EPA accepted both absolute and 
normalized goals for membership to Climate Leaders. However, in 2010 they were 
aiming to move towards only absolute goals despite debate and opposition from member 
companies. The goal-setting process began with the company completing a standardized 
goal-setting form and submitting it to EPA. The proposed goals were tested against an 
EPA model of emissions in the company’s sector, and compared to other company goals 
as well as projected growth. The EPA often discussed whether the goals were stringent 
enough with the company, and occasionally companies who did not want to set more 
aggressive goals opted to not join the Climate Leaders. 
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According to the EPA official, “the experience of the program is mixed.” Of the 
over 200 members in 2010, the EPA official estimated that approximately 130 were 
doing a pretty good job or an exceptional job reducing their carbon emissions. However, 
not all companies participating in the program were climate leaders, according to the 
official. They stated that some companies were laggards, and were likely to get tossed out 
of the program– maybe a dozen in the quarter following our interview in 2010. They 
pointed as an example to the different ways that companies staffed their climate 
programs, with some companies devoting staff resources and doing a great deal, while 
others were doing significantly less. 
The Climate Leaders program was phased out in 2011, and the EPA encouraged 
participating Climate Leaders companies to transition to state or non-governmental 
programs. In a September 2010 announcement the EPA stated their reason as the creation 
of “many new… regulatory and voluntary programs that address greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, including the first-ever mandatory greenhouse gas reporting rule that took 
effect on January 1, 2010. In addition, several states and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) now offer climate programs that are now robust enough to serve companies in 
the Climate Leaders program.” (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). The EPA 
committed to staying involved in initiatives to support companies’ actions to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions through programs such as Energy Star and the Green Power 
Partnership. The agency also stated that they will continue to “promote, support, and 
recognize climate leadership” (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). 
Climate Leaders is an interesting study subject, even in its now-defunct state, as it 
provides insight into decoupling of climate discourse and actions by companies. It is one 
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of the oldest voluntary programs for addressing climate change. Understanding 
decoupling is particularly interesting in this case given the voluntary nature of the 
program, and the agency recognized leadership of the companies involved. Furthermore, 
the demise of the program allows us to gain a better perspective on the program than 
would have been possible during the time it was functioning, and allows us to have more 
confidence in interview reports about how respondents considered the issue of 
decoupling, since the now-former participants presumably could speak with more 
honesty about their participation because they were no longer at risk of being asked to 
leave the Program. 
 
 
METHODS  
 
We designed an online, 30-question survey using Qualtrics and subsequently 
revised the survey based on feedback from the Director of the Climate Leaders program. 
We distributed the survey via an email and hyperlink in April 2010 to approximately 200 
companies participating in the EPA Climate Leaders program and 38 respondents 
completed the survey. Respondents are from a variety of sectors and sizes, and include a 
mix of program maturity. Therefore they are likely to be representative of the broader 
Climate Leaders population. The final question on the survey asked respondents if we 
could contact them for an interview.  
We conducted semi-structured, open-ended interviews with 10 company 
representatives and an EPA official from the Climate Leaders program via phone 
between February and September 2010. Company representatives participating in 
interviews were primarily from the Environmental Health and Safety or Sustainability 
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Office and ranged from management level to Vice-President. Interviews averaged one 
hour for each participant. The purpose of the interviews was to develop a descriptive 
account of the views of corporate actors and decision makers – particularly those in the 
environmental sustainability units of the relevant companies – about their firms’ climate 
related challenges and opportunities and related actions.  
Subsequently, we analyzed the bivariate relationships in STATA using chi-square 
and Fisher’s exact tests to examine relationships between corporate climate related 
discourse and actions. Inductive content analysis was completed using interview data. As 
the interviews elaborate on the survey questions, we present both sets of data together, for 
each of the following: discourse, actions, and the relationship between discourse and 
actions. While discourse has a weighted history and use, here we use it to describe a 
firm’s narrative of climate change including statements, perspectives, and 
representations. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Survey respondent demographics, a summary of discourse and action variables 
and key findings are provided in the tables below. 
Survey Respondent Demographics 
Ninety-five percent of the respondents were based in North America, and 70 
percent were male. Table 2.1 describes respondents’ education, sector, and tenure. 
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Discourse 
Nearly half of the respondents viewed climate change as the top environmental 
issue affecting their company, and 92 percent of respondents viewed climate change as 
one of the top three environmental issues affecting their company. Over half of 
respondents viewed climate change and how to respond to it as one of their company’s 
biggest challenges. While the majority of respondents see climate change as already 
affecting their businesses, almost 20 percent of leaders do not see climate change as 
affecting their business for 10-20 years.   
 Respondents overwhelmingly saw climate change-related opportunities for their 
company in energy efficiency, reputation and competitive advantage. Eighty-two percent 
of respondents believe that their company faces regulatory risk related to climate change. 
Interview respondents frequently cited regulation and physical risks as the greatest risks 
facing their company related to climate change. However, few respondents believed that 
they were currently constrained by regulation - regulation was more commonly framed as 
Table 2.1 
Survey Respondent Characteristics 
 
Education  Tenure 
41%   BA/BS  47%   >5 years 
51%   MA/MBA 11%   6-9 years 
 8%    PhD  32%   10+ years 
 
Sector 
29%   Transportation/manufacturing   
18%   Oil, energy, chemicals  
16%   Aerospace/IT  
13%   Consumer goods  
5%    Health, pharmaceutical  
3%    Forest products  
16%   Other/unknown 
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a burden or bureaucratic challenge, rather than a real motivation to change actions.  
Interview respondents most frequently cited finances as their primary constraint, while 
viewing new market opportunities in a low carbon economy as the greatest opportunity. 
Finally, 78 percent of respondents believed that scientific findings of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) merit actions by both the 
government and their own corporation.   
What we learned from EPA for air regulation is true to carbon. And regulation 
drives innovation. A single regulation for greenhouse gases provides clarity. We 
would prefer one regulation.-- Company E 
We believe in climate change. We think that there is enough science out there and 
enough things we have seen with our own eyes that man does have an impact on 
the environment. We will make every effort to address climate change while still 
making money. For the time being our decisions are made to reduce or change 
materials to reduce climate change within financial constraints…we might get to a 
point where this is no longer possible…at this point climate change will win.-- 
Company B 
 
I wouldn’t say [we are] constrained [by regulation]. I think that I personally and 
the company feel that the proliferation of regulations around the world and their 
increased frequency and demand are hard to remain current on and are a challenge 
for our operating objective…The biggest [climate related] risk would be not 
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setting yourself up for regulation that comes and inhibits your competitiveness.-- 
Company A 
 
 While financial and regulatory pressures directly related to climate change are not 
yet promoting climate action, other pressures may act to inhibit climate action. Several 
interview respondents referred to shareholder pressure, and the need to find projects that 
had a 3-year return on investment as reasons for not implementing certain climate 
actions. Other respondents referred to the need for regulation to “level the playing field” 
among their competitors.  
I feel that we are aware of it [climate change], somewhat proactive, but not as 
proactive as we could be. The primary reason for that is the economy. When I 
came onboard in July 2008 it was full steam ahead, I had a healthy budget and 
support and within 6 months that all went away because the economy tanked. But 
it will come, it’s just a matter of time and priorities for our company.-- Company I 
 
If I were chairman I would go even further; I might do some solar projects and 
some wind projects that wouldn’t pay back in a timely manner. Why would I do a 
project that didn’t pay back in 3 years? Because if there is another oil shock I 
would be laughing all the way to the bank.-- Company D 
 
Until there is a regulatory mandate [for climate action] publicly traded companies 
need to show the business benefits of the actions. You have to be competitive in 
the marketplace. So unless all companies are affected equally through regulation 
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or tax on carbon you can only do things that make you more competitive.-- 
Company C 
 
Actions 
There is some confidence in the effectiveness of respondent’s company’s current 
efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change: 54 percent somewhat agree and 29 
percent completely agree that their company’s business strategy will successfully 
mitigate the effects of climate change. Moreover, 32 percent completely agree and 62 
percent somewhat agree that their company is taking all of the appropriate steps to 
address climate change. However, when it comes to corporate governance 46 percent of 
respondents indicated that climate change rarely comes up in executive meetings; 43 
percent said that it comes up regularly while only 8 percent said that it comes up in every 
meeting.  
Companies are undertaking a variety of actions to address climate change. The 
five most common actions taken to address climate change include office and 
manufacturing energy use reductions, measuring greenhouse gas emissions, reporting, 
setting greenhouse gas targets, and conducting a greenhouse gas emissions inventory. A 
summary of corporate actions and related frequencies can be found in Table 2.2, based on 
respondent selections from a list of actions provided in the survey. Sixty-eight percent of 
respondents indicated that their company produces a public report of climate change 
practices. Over half (57 percent) of respondents have a small department (1-5 persons) 
responsible for climate change issues, while nearly a quarter of respondents (24 perent) 
have multiple departments working on the issue together.  Similar to survey findings, 
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interview respondents described processes for maintaining corporate-wide dialogue and 
action related to climate change including cross-departmental teams responsible for 
managing climate change reporting to executive committees.  Most respondents stated 
that the greatest climate related impacts for their company result from operating their 
facilities. Interview respondents demonstrated a great deal of awareness about the source 
of their companies’ impacts, and referred to consistent measuring (of scope 1 and 2 
emissions), auditing, monitoring and reporting of these impacts. Respondents most 
commonly addressed these impacts through facilities management such as efficiency 
improvements, energy saving technology, product innovation, employee engagement, 
travel reduction and purchasing offset. One company was carbon neutral as a result of 
these combined actions.   
We’ve institutionalized this [climate action] and live it day to day; we have green 
police in every facility; hopefully everyone has the habit now; but at least once a 
month we find things that don’t belong in recycling.-- Company G  
All interview respondents described their company as having a formal 
environmental, health and safety (EHS) policy. These policies were primarily broad and 
global in scope, and commonly focus on water, waste and energy.  Most companies did 
not have formal sustainability or climate change policies in place. However respondents 
indicated that climate change and sustainability are a more recent part of the broader EHS 
policy. 
Table 2.2 
Climate change actions 
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Action Count(Percent) 
Office energy use reduction/use of recycled 
material 37 (100) 
Measuring greenhouse gases against a 
baseline 34 (92) 
Participation in voluntary reporting 
practices 32 (86) 
Setting future greenhouse gas targets 31 (84) 
Conducting greenhouse gas inventory 30 (81) 
Manufacturing innovations/energy 
reductions 28 (76) 
Technological changes 26 (70) 
Networking/sharing best practices 26 (70) 
Innovative products 25 (68) 
Changes in supply chain 22 (59) 
Environmental advising/committee 
established 16 (43) 
Business travel reduction 15 (41) 
Donations to environmental groups 15 (41) 
Registering emissions savings and offsets 13 (35) 
Other 2 (5) 
 
Climate action strategies are primarily focused on cost saving and incremental 
improvement measures rather than transformational change. A few companies that were 
privately held or family owned appeared to be taking a longer-term strategic view of 
climate change. Unlike Kolk and Pinske (2004), we found that companies do not fall into 
two types; rather most of them undertake a combination of conservation, innovation and 
purchasing offsets, suggesting a movement towards more inclusive climate change 
strategies. All of the companies interviewed are tracking their operating emissions, 
setting targets and reporting their progress in sustainability reports, to the Carbon 
Disclosure Project and the EPA. Similar to Armstrong’s (2006) findings, most companies 
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are setting relative, intensity based targets rather than absolute targets. Companies 
indicated that it was difficult to set absolute targets because of anticipated growth. 
Competitive advantage, reputation and regulations motivate respondents to 
address the issue of climate change, however the latter does not necessarily motivate 
leaders to partake in partnerships- those are driven primarily by competitive advantage 
and reputation.  Similar to survey findings, interview respondents commonly cited 
business benefits (e.g. cost savings), responding to regulation, customers, employees (e.g. 
recruitment and retention benefits), reputation, and preparing for the future as 
motivations for addressing climate change.  In addition, interview respondents cited CEO 
or ownership passion for addressing the issue, and that it was “just the right thing to do” 
as reasons for their companies’ climate actions. 
[Addressing climate change] is good for business and good for our business. We 
also believe our greenhouse gas emissions are equivalent to 30 million to the 
bottom line. The other thing is that it’s the right thing to do. Given our history of 
corporate responsibility it’s important because it’s motivating [to employees].-- 
Company E 
There is only one bottom line, and sustainability equals profitability. Being 
profitable allows you the opportunity to do things that are good…I think this 
[addressing climate change] is very important for national security and for the 
bottom line and shareholders.-- Company D 
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Thirty-six of the 38 companies stated that their company engages in at least one 
partnership that is focused on climate change, in addition to EPA Climate Leaders.  
Respondents listed government programs (EPA Climate Leaders and Department of 
Energy Save Energy Now) as well as several non-profit organizations (Chicago Climate 
Exchange, CDP, Conservation International, World Wildlife Fund, The Nature 
Conservancy, Environmental Defense Fund, World Resources Institute, Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change) and academic institutions as their primary partners. Interview 
respondents also referred to climate related partnerships as forums not only for 
networking and benchmarking but also as means of supporting corporate climate related 
actions and staying “rigorous” in their own actions. 
We participate [in climate partnerships] mostly to not only get third party 
perspective on results and performance, and how we are performing and to 
support the work of others. These [partnerships also] keep us rigorous.-- 
Company F 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 provide a summary of the key discourse and action variables 
and measures of interest for this study.  
Table 2.3 
Discourse variables and measures of interest 
 
Variable (variable 
name)[description] Response Count (Percent) 
Sector 
(sector)[categorical 
variable with 7 
levels] 
Transportation/ 
manufacturing 11 (29) 
Oil, energy, 
chemicals 7 (19) 
Aerospace/IT  6 (16) 
Consumer goods  5 (13) 
Health, 2 (5) 
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pharmaceuticals  
Forest products  1 (3) 
Other/unknown 6 (16) 
Discourses   
Climate change as a 
top environmental 
issue (top 
issue)[categorical 
variable with 4 
levels] 
Rank 1  17 (48) 
Rank 2 12 (32) 
Rank 3 6 (16) 
Not Ranked 3(8) 
Perceived 
opportunities 
(opportunities) 
[binary variables] 
Energy efficiency 33 (87) 
Competitive 
advantage 32 (84) 
Reputation 28 (74) 
Product innovation 28 (74) 
Cost savings 27 (71) 
Other 3 (8) 
Perceived risks 
(risks)[binary 
variables] 
Regulatory 31 (82) 
Consumer 19 (50) 
Physical 12 (32) 
Other  6 (16) 
IPCC findings merit 
action (IPCC) 
[categorical 
variable with 3 
levels: yes, no, I 
don't know for 
various actors] 
Government  30/2/6 (79/5/16) 
Your corporation 30/2/6 (79/5/16) 
Corporations 29/2/7 (76/5/18) 
Individual consumers 25/3/10 (66/8/26) 
Affect of climate 
change 
(affected)[categoric
al variable with 5 
levels] 
It never will be 0 
It already is 27 (73) 
Within the next 2-5 
years 7 (19) 
Within the next 10-20 
years 3 (8) 
Far into the future=0 0 
 
Table 2.4 
Action variables and measures of interest 
 
Variable (variable 
name)[description]  Response Count (percent) 
Climate change 
discussions in executive 
meetings 
Never  1 (3) 
Rarely 17 (46) 
Regular basis 16 (43) 
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(executives)[categorical 
variable with 4 levels] Every meeting 3 (8) 
Size of the department 
devoted to climate 
change 
(department)[categorical 
variable with 5 levels] 
No specialized 
person or 
department  3 (8) 
Small (1-5 
persons) 21 (57) 
Medium (6-10 
persons) 4 (11) 
Large (more than 
10 persons) 0 
Multiple 
departments 9 (24) 
Reporting (reporting) 
[binary variable] 
Yes 25 (68) 
No 12 (32) 
Partnerships 
(partnerships) [binary 
variable] 
Yes 35 (95) 
No 2 (5) 
Climate action index 
(action) [Action is an 
index of actions based 
on a count of actions 
treated as a categorical 
variable] 
2 actions  1 (3) 
3 actions 1 (3) 
4 actions 0 
5 actions 2 (5) 
6 actions 1 (3) 
7 actions 3 (8) 
8 actions 4 (11) 
9 actions 6 (16) 
10 actions 4 (11) 
11 actions 4 (11) 
12 actions 6 (16) 
13 actions 4 (11) 
14 actions 2 (5) 
 
Discourse-Action Relationships 
We found several statistically significant relationships between discourses and 
actions in our data. There is a positive relationship between companies who ranked 
climate change as a top environmental issue with the size of the department devoted to 
addressing climate change (Fisher’s exact pvalue=.017 see table 2.5), with most 
companies having small departments or multiple departments working together. There is 
also a marginally significant relationship between these companies and climate change 
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reporting, in which those that rank climate change as a top issue are more likely to 
conduct reporting (Fisher’s exact pvalue=.097 see table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.5 Relationship between department size and climate change as a top issue 
Size of department 
devoted to climate 
change 
Climate Change as a top 
environmental issue 
Total 
Rank 
1 
Rank 
2 
Rank 
3 
Not 
ranked 
No Specialized person 1 0 0 2 3 
Small (1-5 persons) 12 4 4 1 21 
Medium (6-10 persons) 0 4 0 0 4 
Multiple departments 4 4 2 0 10 
Total 17 12 6 3 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.017 
 
 
Table 2.6 Relationship between reporting and climate change as a top issue 
Reporting Climate Change as a top environmental issue Total 
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Not Ranked 
No 6 1 3 2 12 
Yes 11 11 3 1 26 
Total 17 12 6 3 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.097 
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To assess the relationship between the total suite of actions corporations 
undertake to address climate change and discourses, we created an action index based on 
a count of actions using STATA. We treated this index as a categorical variable and, 
given the small sample size, used Fisher’s exact tests to compare the action index to 
variables of interest. There exists a positive relationship between the action index and 
perceived opportunities for energy efficiency, product innovation, reputation as well as 
other opportunities (Fisher’s exact pvalue=.006, .1,.1 and .1 respectively see Tables 
2.7,2.8,2.9 and 2.10) .  
Table 2.7 Relationship between action and energy efficiency opportunities 
Action Index Energy Efficiency Opportunities  Total 
No Yes 
2 0 
 
 
1 1 
3 1 0 1 
5 2 0 2 
6 0 1 1 
7 1 2 3 
8 0 4 4 
9 0 6 6 
10 0 4 4 
11 0 4 4 
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12 0 6 6 
13 1 3 4 
14 0 2 2 
Total 5 33 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.006 
 
Table 2.8 Relationship between action and product innovation opportunities 
Action Index Product Innovation Opportunities  Total 
No Yes 
2 1 
 
 
0 1 
3 1 0 1 
5 1 1 2 
6 1 0 1 
7 0 3 3 
8 2 2 4 
9 1 5 6 
10 0 4 4 
11 0 4 4 
12 1 5 6 
13 2 2 4 
14 0 2 2 
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Total 10 28 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.1 
 
 
Table 2.9 Relationship between action and reputation opportunities 
Action Index Reputation Opportunities  Total 
No Yes 
2 1 
 
 
0 1 
3 1 0 1 
5 1 1 2 
6 1 0 1 
7 0 3 3 
8 2 2 4 
9 1 5 6 
10 0 4 4 
11 0 4 4 
12 1 5 6 
13 2 2 4 
14 0 2 2 
Total 10 28 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.1 
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Table 2.10 Relationship between action and other opportunities 
Action Index Other Opportunities  Total 
No Yes 
2 1 
 
 
0 1 
3 1 0 1 
5 1 1 2 
6 1 0 1 
7 0 3 3 
8 2 2 4 
9 1 5 6 
10 0 4 4 
11 0 4 4 
12 1 5 6 
13 2 2 4 
14 0 2 2 
Total 10 28 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.1 
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A positive relationship also exists between the action index and a belief that IPCC 
findings merit actions by corporations generally and their corporation (Fisher’s exact 
pvalue=.1 and .045 respectively see Tables 2.11 and 2.12).  
Table 2.11 Relationship between action and belief that IPCC findings merit general 
corporate action 
Action Index IPCC Findings Merit Action By Corporations Total 
No Yes Don’t know 
2 0 
 
 
0 1 1 
3 0 1 0 1 
5 1 1 0 1 
6 1 0 0 1 
7 0 3 0 3 
8 0 2 2 4 
9 0 4 2 6 
10 0 3 1 4 
11 0 4 0 4 
12 0 6 0 6 
13 0 3 1 4 
14 0 2 0 2 
Total 2 29 7 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.1 
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Table 2.12 Relationship between action and belief that IPCC findings merit direct 
corporate action  
Action Index IPCC Findings Merit Action By Your Company Total 
No Yes Don’t know 
2 0 
 
 
0 1 1 
3 0 1 0 1 
5 0 1 0 1 
6 1 0 0 1 
7 0 3 0 3 
8 0 2 2 4 
9 0 4 2 6 
10 0 4 0 4 
11 0 4 0 4 
12 0 6 0 6 
13 0 3 1 4 
14 0 2 0 2 
Total 2 30 6 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.045 
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Interestingly, there is not a significant relationship between the action index and 
perceived risks. However, the relationships between sector and perceived regulatory risk, 
approaches significance (Fisher’s exact pvalue=. 072 see Table 2.13), with transportation 
and manufacturing sectors perceiving the most regulatory risk. And, risk does appear to 
result in action in the form of executive leadership attention. The relationship between 
perceived regulatory risk with discussions of climate change in executive meetings also 
approaches significance (Fisher’s exact pvalue=.1 see Table 2.14). 
Table 2.13 Relationship between sector and perceived regulatory risk 
Sector No 
Regulatory 
risk 
Regulatory 
Risk 
Total 
Transportation/manufacturing 2 9 11 
Oil, energy, chemicals 0 7 7 
Forest products  0 1 1 
Consumer goods  0 5 5 
Health, pharmaceuticals  0 2 2 
Aerospace/IT 1 5 6 
Other/unknown 4 2 6 
Total 7 31 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.072 
 
Table 2.14 Relationship between perceived regulatory risk and executive attention 
Regulatory risk Executive Meetings Total 
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Never Rarely Regular 
basis 
Every 
meeting 
No Regulatory risk 1 4 1 1 7 
Regulatory Risk 0 14 15 2 31 
Total 1 18 16 3 38 
Fisher’s exact pvalue=.1 
 
We found no relationship between respondents’ ranking of climate change as a 
top environment issue and sector, whether climate change is discussed in executive 
meetings, or whether respondents feel their company is currently affected by climate 
change or will be affected in the future.   
Table 2.15 provides a summary of key significant findings. In summary, first, 
opportunities and science drive corporate actions towards climate change, e.g. result in 
less decoupling. Second, those corporations that view climate change as a top 
environmental issue are devoting staff resources but there is only a marginal relationship 
with reporting suggesting some decoupling. Third, risk tends to be related to sector, and 
regulatory risk, in particular, drives internal governance of climate change as 
characterized by executive discussions on the issue however it is not related to action, 
and is therefore a predictor of decoupling. 
 
Table 2.15 
Significant findings 
 
Variable Comparison Fisher's Exact p-value Chi-square (df) 
Top issue and department size 0.017*** 26.6461 (9)  
Top issue and reporting 0.097* 5.7614 (3) 
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Action index and opportunities 
for energy efficiency .006*** 25.6020(11) 
Action index and opportunities 
for product innovation .1* 16.5119 (11) 
Action index and opportunities 
for reputation .1* 16.5119 (11) 
Action index and IPCC meriting 
action by corporations .1* 40.0123 (22) 
Action index and IPCC meriting 
action by your corporation .045** 42.4333 (22) 
Regulatory risk and Sector 0.072* 12.6932 (6) 
Regulatory risk and discussion 
in executive meetings .1* 6.6228 (3) 
(*** indicates p<. 01, **indicates p<. 05, *indicates p<.1) 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
We began this research by asking, why do some firms who have signed up for a 
voluntary initiative like EPA Climate Leaders and espouse concern still avoid taking 
action, while others substantively implement climate actions? And, when is decoupling 
likely to occur in this situation? The answers lie in the perception of opportunities: 
decoupling is less likely to occur and corporations are more likely to take action related 
to climate change when opportunities are perceived. Specifically, companies are 
motivated to take action by opportunities to save money through energy efficiency 
improvements as well as product innovation and reputational advantages. This is 
consistent with findings by Hoffman (2005) and Sharma (2000) that opportunity is an 
important predictor of corporate climate change action. This suggests that decoupling is 
more likely to occur when climate change is connected with the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) frame. In this case, rather than being viewed as a marginal issue 
related to public relations, climate change is viewed as a strategic issue that affects a 
corporation’s core product and technological opportunities. 
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In addition to opportunity, we also find that belief in the science of climate 
change predicts corporate climate action, e.g. there is coupling of corporate climate 
discourse and action when companies believe that IPCC findings merit action by their 
company. This suggests that maintaining corporations’ trust in the scientific peer review 
process and the scientific credibility of the IPCC findings in particular is critical to 
corporations’ willingness to pursue climate related actions. Conversely, we argue that if 
the credibility of science (and the IPCC in particular) is questioned, it could be damaging 
to the progress that corporations have made towards addressing climate change as well as 
inhibiting future actions. This is particularly salient in the wake of the 2009 “climate 
gate” scandal where scientists at the University of East Anglia were accused of 
manipulation of data disproving the severity of climate change by climate deniers and the 
media. The scientific community has faced further scrutiny in 2010 based on apologies 
for inaccurate claims from the IPCC and accusations that the organizations chair has 
financial conflicts of interest (Hoffman, 2011). 
Our interview data do not support Westphal and Zajac’s (2001) findings that CEO 
power and networks predict decoupling. Rather, in this instance, companies cited CEO 
leadership and passion for environmental issues as reasons that their firm was taking 
climate action. They also suggested that participation in climate networks led to more 
robust climate action. Because our findings are based on a small sample of interviews, 
this relationship needs further exploration. 
While corporate perception of climate change as a top environmental issue and as 
a predictor of action was not statistically significant at the .05 level, it came close. On one 
hand, corporations that view climate change as a major environmental concern are 
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devoting staff and resources to the issue. On the other hand, it is notable that only a 
marginal relationship exists between companies who view climate change as a top 
environmental issue and the extent of climate reporting. We expected the relationship 
between reporting and action to be stronger, given that the CDP (formerly the Carbon 
Disclosure Project) and Global Reporting Initiative are heralded as powerful forms of 
“information governance” intended to change corporate action, and the Climate Leaders 
program stressed the importance of reporting actions.  
Perception of climate risk is not related to action, and is thus associated with 
decoupling. For example, perception of regulatory risk drives internal governance of 
climate change as characterized by executive discussions on the issue however it is not 
ultimately a predictor of corporate climate actions. It is possible to interpret the lack of 
action as a way to address the uncertainty related to risk and avoid taking costly action 
before their competitors are forced to do the same. As the interview respondents 
suggested, it is often disadvantageous to take action unless there is a “level playing field.” 
Finally, we address the third research question: what is the role of voluntary 
programs like the EPA Climate Leaders in promoting sustained climate action? Interview 
data is consistent with Short and Toffel’s (2010) findings that self-regulation can be a 
useful tool for leveraging the normative motivations of regulated organizations but that it 
cannot replace traditional deterrence-based enforcement. Companies received some 
tangible benefits, such as recognition and technical assistance that allowed for the 
formation of climate goals and baseline measurement- in the very least a useful first step 
towards climate action. And, we argue that program participation did create some 
normative and institutional pressures such as internal governance actions related to 
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climate change (e.g., devoting staff to address climate change issues and discussing the 
issue in executive meetings). However, participation in the program alone, even when 
coupled with the presence of regulatory risk did not prompt climate action or even 
significant climate change reporting. Therefore, it appears that the participation in EPA 
Climate Leaders played a role in institutionalizing certain core values for some 
companies, while for others participation was a way to circumvent pressure to take 
climate action by signaling leadership.  
Further, our study offers insight into why the program itself was limited and 
ultimately phased out. Simply stated, voluntary programs such as Climate Leaders are 
beneficial in the short term because they advance “ceremonial conformity” and build a 
reputation that might be advantageous in the long-run, but they do little to sustain action 
(work activities). However, that is not to say that these programs are not useful, 
particularly in the early stages of addressing a contentious issue like climate change. 
Voluntary systems can encourage and even sustain action because they play an important 
role in providing reputational and competitive advantage opportunities. In this case, EPA 
Climate Leaders promoted action through best practice and information sharing, 
networking, supporting staff, encouraging reporting on the topic and ultimately reputation 
building. In particular, public reporting of climate practices is effective if companies feel 
that their reputation is strengthened. Further, programs like Climate Leaders that allow 
corporations to develop and “test run” climate related actions means that they can address 
environmental issues that are consistent with both company and individual employee 
values. In addition, voluntary programs can act as a stepping stone to regulatory action 
and a proactive yet gradual means to formal and enforced regulations. Companies 
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involved in these schemes are positioning themselves to be contributors in designing 
regulation, and their previous actions are likely to reduce the cost of regulatory 
compliance. However, again, volunteerism cannot be relied upon indefinitely to sustain 
substantive climate action (Seong-Gin 2008; Short and Toffel, 2010).  
Our study contributes to theory on decoupling, particularly as it relates to 
corporate responses to environmental issues. We can, however, extend (some of) our 
findings to other fields. We propose that decoupling helps explains why ‘governance 
gaps’ occur. If such gaps are to be closed, or at least narrowed, additional, external 
institutions may be needed to force complementary policy and action that consider long 
term implications, beyond the immediate motivation of opportunity or the need for 
legitimacy among constituents. It would be interesting to explore this further in future 
studies, as well as to examine the issue of decoupling beyond climate change as it relates 
to other sustainability challenges. 
Limitations 
Our study is empirically focused and does have some statistical limitations. The 
small survey response rate gave us limited power for statistical analyses and cell counts 
which were too small to conduct chi square tests in some cases. In those cases we were 
able to use Fisher’s exact test to account for small cell counts. The lack of some 
correlations may be due to this limitation. A future study might increase the survey 
sample size and compare our participants with companies not engaged in any voluntary 
climate change programs. Nonetheless, our study represents an important step forward in 
understanding the linkages of corporate discourses towards and actions to address climate 
change. 
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Future Research 
Future research could examine a larger sample of firms, possibly including 
international firms, to obtain greater statistical power. This would allow for a cross-
cultural comparison of decoupling amongst firms in different industries and geographic 
location. Based on our findings, important areas for future research also include a better 
understanding of additional antecedents to decoupling of climate change discourse and 
action. As suggested previously in the literature (Westphal and Zajac, 2001) executive 
leadership, and experiential learning and social awareness predict decoupling, and it is 
likely that leadership values as well as participation in industry networks are important 
factors related to climate action, however they did not predict climate decoupling in our 
study. It would also be interesting to examine why there is often a lack of connection 
between the CEO or higher level executives’ climate discourses and middle-management 
actions related to climate change, e.g. further explaining mechanisms underlying 
decoupling. Finally, building on our findings and those of Seong-Gin (2008) one could 
further analyze the effectiveness of voluntary programs in reducing decoupling, and 
whether early joiners to programs like EPA climate leaders are less likely to decouple 
than those that join later.  
Having established predictors of decoupling in this chapter, the following 
chapters turn examine of the logics and underlying mechanisms of climate change 
response and decoupling.   
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Appendix 2.1: Climate Leaders Survey Questions 
Company name  
 
In which region is your company headquartered?  
Africa  
Asia  
Europe  
Middle East  
North America  
Oceania  
South America  
 
Sector. Select one:  
Automobiles  
Chemical  
Electric Power Company- N. America  
Electric Utility-International  
Integrated Oil and Gas  
Metals and Mining and Steel  
Multi-Utilities and Unregulated Power  
Other Sector:  
 
Position Title  
 
Employee since  
 
Gender  
Male  
Female  
 
Highest educational level attained  
High school  
BA/BS  
MA/MBA  
PhD  
 
What are the top environmental issues affecting your company? (Rank the top three, with 
1 indicating the highest ranked, 2 indicating the middle ranked, and 3 indicating the 
lowest ranked)  
Biodiversity loss/endangered species  
Climate change/global warming  
Deforestation  
Population growth  
Water, air and soil pollution  
Other:  
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What are the top environmental issues of interest to your stakeholders? (Rank the top 
three, with 1 indicating the highest  
ranked, 2 indicating the middle ranked, and 3 indicating the lowest ranked)  
Biodiversity  
Climate change/global warming  
Deforestation  
Population growth  
Water, air and soil pollution  
Other:  
 
Do you have a person/department/committee responsible for climate change issues? If 
yes, please indicate the size of this  
No specialized person or department  
Small (1-5 persons)  
Medium (6-10 persons)  
Large (more than 10 persons)  
Multiple departments work together  
No  
Yes, can be found at/from:  
department/committee  
 
Does your company produce a public report of climate change practices?  
 
Do the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change merit action by:  
No Yes I don't know  
Governments?  
Corporations?  
Your corporation?  
Individual consumers?  
 
Does your business face any of the following risks related to climate change? (Select all 
that apply)  
Physical  
Regulatory  
Consumer  
Other:  
Competitive advantage  
Cost savings  
Energy efficiency  
Product innovation  
Reputation  
Other: 
 
Are there opportunities for your business related to climate change? (Select all that apply)  
Physical  
Regulatory  
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Consumer  
Other:  
Competitive advantage  
Cost savings  
Energy efficiency  
Product innovation  
Reputation  
Other: 
 
When will your company be affected by climate change?  
It never will be  
It already is  
Within the next 2-5 years  
Within the next 10-20 years  
Far into the future  
 
How often does the topic of climate change come up in executive meetings?  
Never  
Rarely  
On a regular basis  
Every meeting  
 
How is your company addressing climate change? (Select all that apply)  
Office energy use reduction/use of recycled materials  
Business travel reduction  
Technological changes  
Innovative products  
Manufacturing innovation/ energy reductions  
Changes in supply chain (e.g. which companies you network with/receive products from)  
Environmental advising committee/department has been set up  
Networking/sharing best practices with corporate and non-corporate practioners  
Participation in voluntary reporting practices  
Donations to environmental advocacy groups  
Registering project emissions savings and offsets  
Conducting system-wide greenhouse gas emissions inventory  
Measuring greenhouse gas emissions against a baseline  
Setting future greenhouse gas targets  
Other:  
 
What has motivated, or will motivate your company to address climate change? (Rank 
the top three, with 1 indicating the highest ranked, 2 indicating the middle ranked, and 3 
indicating the lowest ranked)  
Regulations  
Penalties/fines  
Changing production/technology costs  
Stakeholder concern  
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Reputation  
Societal concern  
Competitive advantage  
Personal interest  
Consumer demand  
Recognition  
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements: (Completely agree, 
Somewhat agree, Do not agree)  
Climate change and how to respond to it is one of the biggest challenges this company 
faces.  
This company is taking all of the appropriate steps to address climate change.  
This company is committed to integrating climate change into its business strategy.  
The business strategy enacted by this company will successfully mitigate the effects of 
climate change.  
 
Does your company engage in partnerships with other organizations (corporations, 
nonprofits, government or academic institutions) interested in climate change issues? If 
yes, list:  
No  
Yes  
 
If you answered yes to the above question, why does your company engage in these 
partnerships?  
Avoid regulation  
Alleviate stakeholder concern  
Reputation  
Competition advantage  
Personal interest  
Consumer demand  
Recognition  
 
Do you, personally, believe climate change is happening?  
Yes  
No  
I don't know  
 
What do you think climate change is a result of?  
Natural processes  
Human activities  
A mix of natural and human activities  
I don't know  
 
How worried are you, personally, about climate change?  
Not at all worried  
Somewhat worried  
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Very worried  
 
Who is responsible for managing the effects of climate change? (Select all that apply)  
Every individual  
Local government  
Federal government  
Individual businesses  
 
Are you, personally, doing anything to limit the effects of climate change? (Select all that 
apply)  
I am not doing anything  
I have energy efficient technology in my home  
I drive an energy efficient car/take public transportation/walk/bike  
I recycle  
I donate money to environmental groups  
I buy products from companies I think are environmentally friendly  
Other:  
 
How would you rate your knowledge of climate change?  
Poor  
Okay  
Good  
Excellent  
 
How much do you trust that your government is making intelligent and responsible 
policy decisions regarding climate change?  
I don't trust it at all  
I somewhat trust it  
I have some reservation, but trust it for the most part  
I completely trust it  
 
If you would like to receive results of the survey please provide your name and email 
below. All results are confidential.  
May we contact you with follow-up questions?  
Yes  
No 
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Appendix 2.2: Climate Leaders Interview Questions 
Date:  
Time:  
 
Contact Details: 
 
 
Company Name:  
 
In which region is your company headquartered: 
Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
Middle East 
North America 
Oceania 
South America 
 
Sector. Select one: 
Automobiles 
Chemical 
Electric Power Company- N. America 
Electric Utility-International 
Integrated Oil and Gas 
Metals and Mining and Steel 
Multi-Utilities and Unregulated Power 
Other Sector: 
 
Size of company (Annual Revenue): 
Position Title:  
 
Employee since: since December 
Gender:  
 
Highest Educational level attained: 
High School 
BA/BS-Business Admin 
MA/MBA 
PhD 
 
Questions:  
 
1. Does your company have an environmental policy? Is it a formal (and advertised) 
policy or an informal position? What are the most pressing issues for your 
company? 
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2. Is your company constrained by environmental regulations? If so, in what ways? 
 
Interviewer prompt: If climate change does not come up in #1 answer, ask #3 
 
3. How does climate change fit into your company’s stance on the environment?  
 
4. Does climate change affect your company? What are the opportunities or risks  it 
has created for your company (be specific)? 
 
5. Describe your corporation’s climate change strategies and goals? 
 
6. How would you describe the climate related impacts of your company? (From 
basic office practices to production emissions to associated 
businesses/materials/production, etc) 
 
7. Describe any mechanisms (in-house committees, designated personnel, external 
monitors/auditing, certifications, publications) in place to oversee your climate 
related activities.  
 
8. What has motivated, or will motivate your company to address climate change? 
 
9. Does your company engage in partnerships with other organizations 
(corporations, nonprofits, government or academic institutions) interested in 
climate change issues? Why? 
 
10. Do you feel like your company has all of the information and resources needed to 
adequately address pressing climate change issues? Where do you receive your 
information? 
 
11. Do you share your climate related impacts with your stakeholders? How? 
 
12. How do you feel about your company’s overall position and actions towards the 
climate change issue? Are they adequate? Areas for improvement? 
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Chapter 3 
 
The formation of multiple institutional logics: An examination of corporate climate 
change reporting 
 
 
With Sara Soderstrom, Assistant Professor, Organizational Studies and Program in the 
Environment, University of Michigan 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies are increasingly expected to respond to societal and governmental 
calls for action on the issue of climate change, and are addressing the issue with a 
diversity of actions as discussed in the previous chapter. For example, corporations may 
choose to offset carbon-dioxide emissions, make efficiency improvements, and/or 
develop new products with lower carbon footprints.  A growing number of companies 
strategically address climate change and leverage their sustainability reports to discuss, 
promote, and/or defend their activities in this area (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010). Thus, these 
reports provide insight in the way organizations understand sustainability issues such as 
climate change (Hirsch, 1986, Westphal and Zajac, 2001, Fiss and Zajac, 2006, 
Lammers, 2011) and the logics, or patterns of practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and 
rules (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008), that underpin their actions to address these issues.  
Organizational responses to climate change provide a unique context for studying 
the evolution of logics.  Sustainability reports are shaped by the underlying logics and 
over time can be used to evaluate changes in logics and the corresponding organizational 
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actions (Scott et al., 2000). In this study we examine the logics organizations enact when 
they discuss climate change challenges in their sustainability reports.  We further 
evaluate the relationship between the logics and actions that are taken to address climate 
change.  We explore these relationships over time as addressing climate change emerges 
as a legitimate corporate action. This work contributes to our understanding of how 
multiple logics are formed, compete and transform. We also begin to address how these 
logics are influenced by external organizations, how they are translated into action, and 
suggest the need for future research in this area.  
Having established an understanding of the constructs underlying corporate 
response to climate change through a study of the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(E.P.A.) Climate Leaders Program in the previous chapter, this study expands our 
understanding of these constructs through an examination of broader population of 
corporate sustainability reporters.   
THEORY 
Institutional Logics and Change 
Logics are patterns of practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules that 
structure organizations (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999, Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  They 
are available to organizations and individuals to elaborate and enact (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991). Further, logics can be observed at the level of “organizations, markets, 
industries, inter-organizational networks, geographic communities and organizational 
field” (Nigam and Ocasio, 2010: 825). Institutional logics provide order and guide 
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behavior within particular contexts: they shape which behaviors are considered by 
restricting choices to a specific area (Zucker, 1977). They inform perceptions of 
legitimacy that determine which actions are successful or failures within a particular level 
(Rao et al., 2003, Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). In this way, logics influence which issues 
are attended to by organizations and what strategies organizations use in addressing these 
issues (Scott, 1995, Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). 
Organizational fields can form around issues, such as climate change. Analyses of 
organizational logics structuring the field of climate change can reveal the ways in which 
organizational responses to climate change impact cultural and institutional norms 
(Hoffman, 1999).  Often, within a field, a dominant logic reinforces the status quo and 
limits heterogeneity in organizational behavior. Behavior or choices that do not align 
with the dominant logic are perceived as illegitimate or incorrect and sanctioned 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  This encourages organizations to act in alignment with 
the dominant logic.  
However, there is not always one dominant logic. Pluralistic organizations operate 
across multiple institutional fields and therefore face multiple logics (Kraatz and Block, 
2008).  These multiple logics can coexist in tension with each other, supported by distinct 
groups and interests over long periods of time (Dunn and Jones, 2010). Alternatively, this 
co-existence can be managed through the development of collaborative relationships 
between groups that are in accordance with both logics (Reay and Hinings, 2009, Heinze, 
2010). 
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In this study, we focus on how logics form around a specific issue rather than on a 
group of key organizations. When new issues emerge, organizations shape and elaborate 
upon logics as they work to develop the patterns of practices and rules to govern behavior 
in response to the issue.  Multiple logics may emerge and events that occur around the 
issue can lead to cognitive realignment and change in the logics (Nigam and Ocasio, 
2010).  We focus on the issue of climate change and explore whether a dominant logic 
exists within companies addressing climate change or if multiple logics compete or 
complement each other. In this way, our attention is on the current logics being enacted. 
These logics can either be entirely new logics or evolutions of existing logics previously 
structuring the company.   
CONTEXT 
Climate change context including key facts about contemporary causes and 
perceptions, is provided in the introduction. Therefore in this section, we will narrow our 
focus to provide context around climate change reporting. 
For many corporations, the starting point for addressing the climate issue is 
baseline data collection and reporting. There are several approaches for reporting climate 
impact, actions and progress. Most notably, these include sustainability reports based on 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines and the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) (CDP, 2014, GRI, 2014). Despite their prominence these reporting mechanisms 
remain voluntary, however increasingly governments and stock exchanges around the 
world are requiring mandatory reporting (KPMG, 2013). Due to their voluntary nature, 
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company reports vary greatly in their content and depth of coverage. Since reporting is 
voluntary, corporations have some agency in how they discuss climate change issues in 
their sustainability reports. The practices, values, and assumptions they highlight signal 
the underlying logics of climate change. However, we recognize the limitations to using 
reports to identify logics as discussed below. 
GRI is regarded as the preeminent framework for nonfinancial, e.g. sustainability, 
reporting and used globally by a variety of organizations (Brown et al., 2009a, Brown et 
al., 2009b). Established in 1997 by Ceres, a coalition of environmentalists and investors, 
and the Tellus Institute, GRI is an Amsterdam based nongovernmental organization 
(NGO). GRI develops nonfinancial reporting guidelines including reporting principles 
and performance indicators using a stakeholder process with participation of all sectors of 
society. GRI has defined two options for reporting in accordance with its guidelines: core 
and comprehensive both with required indicators communicating environmental, social, 
economic and governance performance (GRI, 2014).  The newest guidelines (G4) include 
specific climate change indicators such as EC2: Financial implications and other risks 
and opportunities for the organizations activities due to climate change (GRI, 2014). 
In recent years, the production and dissemination of sustainability reports has 
increased as reporting gains broader legitimacy (Kolk, 2003). Globally the reporting rate 
amongst the largest 250 companies has remained stable around 93 percent in the past few 
years, signaling a strong isomorphic pressure amongst some of the largest international 
companies (KPMG, 2013). Companies can also choose to formally submit their report to 
GRI, and the number of GRI-reporting companies has increased dramatically over time. 
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Amongst the largest 250 global firms GRI reporting is nearly universal with 82 percent of 
firms referring to the GRI guidelines (KPMG, 2013).   
METHODS 
Data 
We collect all available sustainability reports from 1997-2010 for 20 randomly 
selected companies who a) participate in the Global Reporting Initiative in 2010 or b) 
were listed on the Fortune Global 2000 list from 2010. This provides us with a set of 
companies that are explicitly engaged in the sustainability reporting community (GRI) as 
well as top international companies (Fortune Global 2000) across diverse geographies 
and industries. For this study we selected companies representing a diversity of 
headquarters locations and industries amongst each group as described below and 
illustrated in Figure 3.1.  The sampling approach constrains our insights to companies 
that are issuing sustainability reports; however, given the number of companies issuing 
these reports and our interest in the publically evolving communications and 
understandings of this issue, we believe that the focus on public documents, even if not 
completed by all companies, is appropriate.  
We use three approaches to uncover potential distinctions in sub-samples for our 
study on logics of climate change.  First, by focusing on GRI vs. non-GRI sustainability 
reports, we can evaluate whether or not companies that actively participate in 
sustainability initiatives (e.g. GRI) leverage different logics to address climate change 
than those who issue sustainability reports but do not actively participate in these forums 
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(e.g. Fortune 2000 companies that are not GRI reporters).  Second, we select companies 
that have issued reports over a longer time period (e.g. 5 years), and evaluate the change 
of logics for those target companies using reports from years 2003, 2006 and 2009.  
Third, to ensure that our sample is representative, we compare companies who were early 
adopters in sustainability reporting (e.g. issued reports prior to 2004) and those who are 
followers in sustainability reporting (e.g. issued reports only after 2007).  Combined, 
these approaches to sampling provide insight into adoption and evolution of climate 
change logics. Our final sample was for 19 companies as one of the randomly selected 
Fortune companies did not issue a sustainability report. 
Figure 3.1.  Sampling Approach (company name, headquarters location, industry) 
Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) 
Berkeley Group (United 
Kingdom, Real Estate) 
New Clicks Group (South 
Africa, Retail) 
Hennes Mauritz (Sweden, 
Retail) 
Ecologic Designs, (U.S., 
Textiles and Apparel) 
Pacific Hydro (Australia, 
Energy) 
Vodacom (South Africa, 
Telecommunications) 
GRI and Global Fortune 
2000 
Banco de Sabadell (Spain, 
Banking) 
Baxter (U.S., Health care 
equipment and services) 
EnCana (Canada, Oil and 
Gas Operations) 
IBM (U.S., Software and 
Services) 
K+S (Germany, 
Chemicals) 
SCA-Svenska Cellulosa 
(Sweden, Household and 
Personal Products) 
AMR (U.S., Transportation) 
ChunghwaTelecom (Taiwan, 
Telecommunications) 
 
Global Fortune 2000 CPFL Energia (Brazil, 
Utilities) 
General Mills (U.S., Food, 
Drink and Tobacco) 
 
Inmarsat (United Kingdom, 
Telecommunications) 
Progress Energy (U.S., 
Utilities) 
Shoprite Holdings (South 
Africa, Food Markets) 
 Early Adopters  Late Adopters  
 
 
78 
(Issue  first report prior to 
2004) 
(Issue first report on or after 
2007) 
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Coding 
We use content analysis techniques to evaluate climate change logics and 
strategies. In total we coded 41 reports for 19 companies. Content analysis was 
performed using Altas.ti software. The authors coded several reports together to identify 
emergent logics. Most companies discuss climate change using a variety of terms in an 
opening statement or letter from the CEO and as part of an environmental section focused 
on energy and/or climate actions. The text around the following terms were coded and 
considered relevant to climate change: climate, energy, carbon, global warming. We 
developed a sense of relevant constructs related to companies’ views of climate change 
based on earlier data collection efforts (Charmaz, 2006).  In particular, the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (E.P.A.) Climate Leaders Program study in the previous chapter 
provided the basis for these constructs. This prior study informed our in depth coding and 
analysis. By looking at a sample of firms beyond the Climate Leaders this study expands 
findings from the previous chapter and revealed a conservation logic. We used inductive 
coding to identify which logics were prevalent in the data and what characteristics were 
associated with each logic. We developed ideal-type versions of each logic based on the 
organizational understandings that are communicated in the sustainability reports.  
RESULTS 
Four climate change logics emerged through coding. They are, in order of 
frequency of occurrence: efficiency, opportunity, risk avoidance and conservation. In 
Table 3.1 we use ideal types as a means of highlighting the defining characteristics of 
each logic.  Examples of each logic are shown in Table 3.2. We discuss each logic below.  
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Table 3.1 Description of ideal type logics 
Dimensions of 
Logic 
Efficiency Opportunity Risk-Avoidance Conservation 
Basis of Mission Address climate 
change actions as 
much as possible 
within constraints 
of current business 
activities 
Lead market by 
developing 
approaches for 
addressing climate 
change that are 
proactive and 
innovative 
Avoid any 
regulatory or 
market risks or 
penalties 
Protect the 
environment and 
conserve natural 
resources 
Focus of 
Attention 
Current processes New technology, 
processes and/or 
markets 
Regulations and 
market constraints 
Impact on the 
natural 
environment 
Basis of Strategy Use incremental 
improvements to 
get environmental 
improvement 
Transform 
organizational 
actions to address 
climate change 
Avoid and 
mitigate 
regulatory and 
market risks 
Protect and 
conserve the 
environment 
Sources of 
Legitimacy 
Previous 
organizational 
actions; cost 
avoidance 
New revenue 
streams and 
approaches to 
improving 
environmental 
performance 
Laws and 
regulations 
Environmental 
stewardship 
Sources of 
Expertise 
 
Process/ operations 
experts; 
Environmental, 
health and safety 
experts 
RandD, 
entrepreneurs; 
CSR/ 
Sustainability 
office 
Government 
regulators; 
Compliance 
office; Finance 
Environmental 
scientists and 
activists; CSR/ 
Sustainability 
Office 
Logics of 
investment 
Limited capital 
commitment; 
Process redesign 
focus 
Capital committed 
to new and novel 
processes/ 
products 
Capital committed 
to risk prevention 
Capital committed 
to the environment 
Role of the 
Environment 
Cost Source of 
competitive 
advantage 
Risk and 
constraint 
Finite resource that 
should be protected 
Role of Business 
in Society 
Minimize negative 
impact within 
financial 
constraints 
Lead in finding 
solutions; 
Improving quality 
of life 
Comply with 
regulation; 
perform strongly 
for shareholders 
Protect the 
environment 
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Table 3.2 Examples of logics from sustainability reports 
Logic Example Quote 
Efficiency Reducing Energy Use and Associated Greenhouse Gas Emissions: In 2003, Baxter 
achieved a savings and cost-avoidance of approximately $3.9 million. On a per-unit-of-
production-value basis, the company improved overall company energy efficiency an 
additional 3 percent from 2002 to 2003. Baxter, 2003 
 The energy strategy for Inmarsat Global’s principal place of operations in London 
continued to focus on our consumption of electricity. During 2009, the Business 
Environments Department delivered a 9.4% saving in electrical usage compared to 2008 
which reduced our CO2 emissions by 302,897 kg. Further savings will be achieved in 
2010 when the project to install the new high efficiency gearless passenger lifts is 
completed.  Inmarsat, 2010 
 Everyone needs to do their part to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We are no 
exception. We are finding ways to continuously improve energy efficiency and lower 
our carbon footprint across our operations. Hennes Mauritz, 2009 
Opportunity Received Carbon Reduction certification from the Carbon Trust for FLEXBUMIN 
[Albumin (Human)] – the first and only albumin therapy in a flexible, plastic container, 
and the first and only medical product to receive this certification.  Baxter, 2009 
 We are one of North America’s largest producers of natural gas — one of the cleanest 
burning fossil fuels (our portfolio is 78 percent gas-weighted). We believe we have an 
opportunity to help satisfy the growing North American demand for energy by 
supplying a cleaner burning transition fuel while new technologies emerge and 
renewable energy markets develop.  Encana, 2006 
 IBM’s Global Innovation Outlook, which provides a forum for thought leaders from 
around the world to discuss key challenges facing business and society, is a perfect 
example of the creative steps needed to confront global problems like climate change. 
And IBM is moving forward with a groundbreaking initiative that seeks to harness and 
share intellectual property rights that advance environmental solutions. This effort has 
the potential to mine untapped value, unleash creative power and accelerate the 
development and dissemination of technologies that protect and improve the 
environment.  IBM 2006 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
Logic Example 
Risk Avoidance We consider climate change an important reason for why our business operates the way 
it does. There are many risks associated with climate change and the impact it has on 
business operations and particularly the cost of doing business. While our operations do 
not directly contribute any major source of change to our climate, we do recognize that 
our natural resource consumption is one area our business can increase sustainability. 
Ecologic Designs, 2008 
 While these steps are important, our business and the planet still face considerable risks 
from climate change. Anticipated regulatory changes mean that we will face changing 
energy policies which may delay renewable energy investment and reduce or even 
remove renewable energy incentives. Our planet may also face permanent physical 
changes which could affect wind patterns and water availability or increase the 
likelihood of extreme weather events.  Pacific Hydro, 2009 
 After the flood on August 8th, 2009, “climate change” was officially included in our 
“performance and risk management” evaluation system. Significant risks are all listed in 
Chunghwa Telecom’s annual operation plan and are subject to target monitoring and 
performance evaluation for constant verification and feedbacks. Chunghwa Telecom, 
2009 
Conservation We have a responsibility to our customers and communities to be good stewards of the 
natural environment. That’s why we’re working to conserve natural resources, reduce 
emissions and increase efficiency, and develop advanced alternative and renewable 
energy solutions. Year after year, we strive for continual improvement on behalf of our 
customers, the environment and the future we share. Progress Energy, 2009 
 Deforestation in the world is one of the greatest contributing factors to climate change, 
but the forest’s significance in solving the problem has been overlooked. Trees are 
unique insofar as they are renewable and absorb carbon   dioxide. The growth in SCA’s 
well managed forests exceeds harvesting, which means that they absorb 2.6 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide net on an annual basis. This almost corresponds to the carbon 
emissions from SCA’s entire production. If all the forests in the world were managed in 
an equally responsible manner, we would be a large step closer to resolving the climate 
issue. SCA, 2009 
 Energy conservation is a major component of IBM’s climate protection program 
because the release of CO2 by utility companies that power our facilities represents the 
greatest potential climate impact from our operations. IBM, 2006 
 
 
83 
Efficiency 
Under an efficiency logic, corporations focus on addressing climate change by 
improving the efficiency of their current processes.  Environmental improvements are 
coupled with financial improvements as justification for their behavior.  Corporations in 
this logic focus on incremental change that aligns with their current business processes. 
This logic is apparent in the quote below from Ecologic Designs that discusses their 
approach to climate change: 
Carbon credits are only a band-aid step towards a more sustainable solution, to 
build our own factory that we control. Spending money on offsets is not the best 
use of our limited funding. We choose to invest in making our current processes 
more efficient. Ecologic Designs, 2008 
Ecologic Designs dismisses carbon credits as a short-term solution and instead 
focuses on improving the efficiency of their current processes.  Similarly, CPFL Energia 
notes a long-term commitment to an efficiency logic as they highlight their focus on 
mitigating the negative effects of current processes and leveraging efficient operations. 
Even before climate change was on the global agenda, the CPFL Group was 
already investigating the overall environmental impact of its operations, 
developing strategies for mitigating the same and carrying out its operations with 
maximum environmental efficiency. CPFL Energia, 2009 
 
 
Opportunity 
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A separate logic emerged around climate change as an opportunity for revenue 
generation by the corporation.  This logic is characterized by a focus on innovation and 
new business opportunities that develop from addressing climate change.  Further, there 
was often a focus on leadership and proactive management of climate change.  The quote 
below, from Banco Sabadell, is an example of the opportunity logic. 
Banco Sabadell wishes to foster research and development of a sustainable energy 
model. It is with this goal in mind that the bank invests in and finances projects 
which use energy sources that are renewable and non-polluting. Since its first 
operation in this area in 1992, the group has provided the sector with funding, 
direct investment and brokerage services, placing it in a leading position in Spain. 
Banco Sabadell, 2009 
The focus on research and development as well as investment in sustainable 
energy in this quote characterize the opportunity logic. 
Risk Avoidance 
Under the risk avoidance logic, companies situate actions to address climate 
change in response to current or potential regulations, market constraints and 
occasionally physical risk. They view climate change as a potential risk to their business 
– either because of regulatory limitations to business, market changes due to resource 
constraints, reputational damage, or increased natural environment disasters such as 
flooding.  The example below from Shopright highlights that they are concerned about 
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future regulations and customer demands and therefore are considering climate change 
responses.   
The Group recognises the need to pay attention to the issue of carbon by 
developing an understanding of the magnitude of its carbon footprint, failing 
which it risks falling behind the general corporate response and compliance with 
possible future carbon-related legislation. The Group also risks potential 
reputational damage amongst customers and investors. Shopright, 2010 
Conservation 
The conservation logic focuses on the protection of the natural environment and 
corporate participation in this process.  In this logic, companies refer to environmental 
issues broadly and take ownership as environmental stewards.  This is shown in the logic 
below. 
The protection and conservation of native flora and fauna at our operational sites 
is of great importance to us. Biodiversity is vital to a healthy environment: it 
supports our food supply, can protect coastlines and limit erosion, helps to sustain 
fresh water supplies and can help to protect against the effects of climate change. 
Pacific Hydro, 2009 
In this statement, Pacific Hydro refers to both local conservation at the 
operational sites and global issues such as biodiversity. There is an implicit acceptance of 
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the science that supports climate change and the outcomes that occur under climate 
change.  Pacific Hydro also takes a position of responsibility to address these issues. 
In the field that has emerged around the issue of climate change, there is not a 
dominant logic, but four distinct logics. We found that most companies used multiple 
logics in their sustainability reports as shown in Table 3.3. However, the overall 
distribution of the logics is not consistent across companies, with, for example, some 
having a greater focus on efficiency and others having a greater focus on opportunity.  
Corresponding to a companies’ logic focus is the way they perceive the role of the 
environment. As shown in Table 3.1, in the efficiency logic the environment is viewed as 
a cost that must be minimized. Conversely in the opportunity logic the role of the 
environment is as a source of competitive advantage and new revenue streams. While the 
risk avoidance and conservation logics tend to compete, these logics have a more 
complementary view of the role of environment as a constraining resource.  However, the 
risk avoidance logic focuses on how to protect the business from this constraint while the 
conservation logic focuses on how the company can protect this limited resource.  
Table 3.3 Frequency of different logics by corporation 
 Year Pages 
Count 
of 
Logics 
Logics/ 
Page 
Efficienc
y 
 
Opportunity 
Risk 
avoidance 
Conserv-
ation 
GRI , Early 
Adopters         
Berkeley Group 
200
3 28 2 0.07 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
200
6 38 8 0.21 50.0% 12.5% 37.5% 0.0% 
 
200
9 87 21 0.24 19.0% 23.8% 57.1% 0.0% 
Clicks Group 
200
3 5 0 0     
 
200
6 4 1 0.25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 200 12 0 0     
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9 
Hennes Mauritz 
200
3 61 3 0.05 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
 
200
6 17 0 0     
 
200
9 167 3 0.02 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
GRI, Late 
Adopters         
Ecologic 
Designs 
200
8 52 3 0.06 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
PacificHydro 
200
9 44 9 0.20 0.0% 55.6% 33.3% 11.1% 
Vodacom 
200
9 56 2 0.04 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
GRI and Fortune, 
Early Adopters         
BancoSabadell 
200
6 79 7 0.09 57.1% 28.6% 0.0% 14.3% 
 
200
9 191 23 0.12 34.8% 52.2% 13.0% 0.0% 
K+S-2003 
200
3 36 3 0.08 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
 
200
6 86 15 0.17 46.7% 20.0% 26.7% 6.7% 
 
200
9 144 16 0.11 50.0% 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
Baxter 
200
3 10 2 0.20 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
200
6 44 9 0.20 77.8% 11.1% 0.0% 11.1% 
 
200
9 24 10 0.42 60.0% 30.0% 0.0% 10.0% 
SCA 
200
3 74 8 0.11 50.0% 37.5% 12.5% 0.0% 
 
200
6 70 29 0.41 41.4% 17.2% 34.5% 6.9% 
 
200
9 78 42 0.54 35.7% 38.1% 21.4% 4.8% 
Encana 
200
4 34 5 0.15 40.0% 40.0% 20.0% 0.0% 
 
200
6 54 16 0.30 43.8% 37.5% 12.5% 6.3% 
 
200
9 13 1 0.08 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
IBM 
200
3 132 2 0.02 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
 
200
6 76 14 0.18 7.1% 42.9% 21.4% 28.6% 
 
200
9 50 14 0.28 50.0% 14.3% 0.0% 35.7% 
GRI and Fortune, 
Late Adopters         
AMR 
200
9 65 9 0.14 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Chunghwa 200 83 14 0.17 7.1% 14.3% 78.6% 0.0% 
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Telecom 9 
Fortune, Early 
Adopters         
CPFL Energia 
200
3 111 1 0.01 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
200
6 173 4 0.02 25.0% 75.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
200
9 173 7 0.04 71.4% 14.3% 14.3% 0.0% 
General Mills 
200
4 41 0 0     
 
200
6 47 1 0.02 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 
200
9 59 3 0.05 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 
Fortune, Late 
Adopters         
Inmarsat 
201
0 5 1 0.20 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Progress 
Energy 
200
9 16 6 0.38 16.7% 50.0% 16.7% 16.7% 
Shopright 
201
0 31 5 0.16 60.0% 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
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Besides having multiple logics in different parts of the sustainability reports, some 
companies used multiple logics within individual statements about climate change.  In the 
below quote from Berkeley Group, climate change is discussed as both a risk and 
opportunity. 
Climate change is at the top of the nation’s environmental agenda. This presents 
both strategic risks and opportunities to us as a business, and is increasingly being 
studied by investors interested in the long-term effects of climate change on the 
value of businesses.  Berkeley Group, 2006 
As another example, Baxter refers to key aspects of the conservation, efficiency, 
and opportunity logics. 
Global climate change is harming the planet’s web of life and the natural 
environment. Baxter demonstrates leadership by reducing emissions, supporting 
sustainable energy alternatives, promoting cross-industry initiatives, and engaging 
in public policy debate. Baxter, 2006 
These co-occurrences were observed most often between the efficiency and 
opportunity logics. Even though the risk or conservation logics co-occurred at times with 
the efficiency and/or opportunity logics, they did not co-occur with each other.  Table 3.4 
shows the percentage of co-occurrence between each logic.  Figure 3.2 depicts the logic 
landscape visually. 
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Table 3.4 Co-occurrence of logics within individual coded statements 
 Total 
Counts 
Co-occurrence (Percent of Total) 
 1. Efficiency 2. Opportunity 3. Risk 
avoidance 
4. Conservation 
1. Efficiency 129 - 12% 7% 4% 
2. Opportunity 92 16% - 10% 4% 
3. Risk avoidance 75 12% 12% - 0% 
4. Conservation 23 22% 17% 0% - 
 
Note: this table is read across each row.  For example, 12% of the 129 counts of efficiency logic 
co-exist with the opportunity logic, 7% co-exist with the risk avoidance logic, and 4% co-exist 
with the conservation logic. 
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Figure 3.2 Logic co-existence 
 
 
 
The efficiency and opportunity logics show some co-existence both with each other and the other 
logics of risk avoidance and conservation, as shown by the overlapping part of the circles.  The 
conservation and risk logics are exclusive of each other. 
Note: The size of the circle represents the frequency of logic usage.  The overlap represents co-
occurrences of the logics within sustainability reports. 
There are also a few general trends in the data.  Companies who were in both GRI 
and the Fortune 2000 generally had greater discussion of climate change (p<1%, t-test of 
codes/report).  Companies that were only in the GRI had a greater proportional focus on 
risk compared to the other companies (p<10%)4. Across all companies, the focus on 
climate change was greater in 2006 and 2009 than in 2003 (p<1%).   The reports had a 
greater proportion of conservation logic in 2006 (p<10%) than in 2003 or 2009.  Further, 
                                                
4 This is likely due to GRI’s emphasis on risk reporting and mitigation. For example, several GRI 
performance indicators (1.1, 4.9, 4.11 and EC2 respectively) require companies to disclose 
environmental risks, governance of environmental risks, application of the precautionary 
principle when addressing the organizations’ approach to risk management and financial risks due 
to climate change (GRI, 2014). 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while not significant (only p<15%), reports in 2009 were trending towards a greater 
proportion of risk logic. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Our results reveal four logics often co-existing within corporate sustainability 
reports: opportunity, efficiency, risk avoidance, and conservation.  Each of these logics 
focus attention and action on specific areas and, if a dominant frame, would limit which 
actions were considered to address climate change.  For example, a company that 
operated only under the efficiency logic would focus on efforts that improved the 
efficiency of current technologies and processes and miss potential opportunities for new 
products or strategies. 
The co-occurrence of multiple frames within individual reports provides the 
companies with a broader repertoire of potential actions (Swidler, 2001).  For example, 
the efficiency and opportunity logics, when merged, allow a company to consider choices 
around both efficiency and innovation, rather than just one aspect. Given the critical 
nature of climate change, these multiple logics acting inclusively are an effective 
mechanism to enable corporations to address this issue.  On the other hand, the risk and 
conservation logics are more exclusive and competitive and do not co-occur within 
statements in the reports (Table 4) and rarely co-exist within the full report (only 7 
reports of the total, see Table 3).  Therefore, actions such as environmental protection 
that are associated with the conservation logic would not be considered by companies 
associated with the risk logic.  
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Potentially, the emergent nature of the field of companies addressing climate 
change allows for this many logics to operate at one time.  In this case, over time, a 
dominant logic, or more homogeneous merged logic, may develop.  However, we believe 
this has not yet occurred. If this had already occurred, we would expect to have seen a 
consistent increase in one of the logics over the time frame of our study, and we did not 
see this change.  In fact, the two most frequent logics, efficiency and opportunity, did not 
significantly change over this time.  Instead we suggest that the pluralistic nature of this 
field – each company is part of multiple fields driven by different industries and 
geographies – enables companies to balance multiple logics.  Further, the complexity, 
and ambiguity around climate change logics also provides more flexibility in corporate 
approaches and strategies.  In other words, there is not one clear legitimate action and 
therefore companies have many options to consider that could be adopted without 
sanction.   
Even so, three of the four climate logics, efficiency, opportunity, and risk 
aversion, appear to use accepted business norms, such as cost savings and innovation, to 
gain legitimacy. The conservation logic is the most unique and counter to the business 
norm of prioritizing shareholder returns. The lack of traditional business legitimacy may 
explain why the conservation logic is the least frequent. Despite this, we believe there are 
a few potential explanations for the prevalence of the conservation logic. First, companies 
facing regulatory or stakeholder scrutiny might take a stewardship approach and draw 
attention to actions that go beyond compliance to avoid harsher regulation or stakeholder 
pressure.  It is also possible that the conservation logic reflects a distinction in leadership 
values or corporate culture, as is often the case in hybrid organizations that are mission 
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driven (Hoffman et al., 2011). These explanations also provide potential insight into why 
the risk and conservation logics tend to be mutually exclusive.  
The level of corporate attention to climate change increased significantly between 
2003 and 2006 and then remained relatively constant.  This correlates with an increase in 
public attention and stakeholder demands for corporations to address climate change.  It 
would be interesting to further evaluate how certain events and trends relate to corporate 
reporting.  For example, reports in 2006, usually published in 2007, reflect a greater 
proportion of conservation logics than the other years.  This could be in response to 
external attention on climate change such as the release of “The Inconvenient Truth,” an 
increase in extreme weather related events such as Hurricane Katrina, and a Bush 
administration era emphasis on conservation. On the other hand, reports from 2009 
reflect an increased focus on the risk logic.  This correlates with a greater public 
contention and divide about climate change (Hoffman, 2011), as well as in the election of 
the Obama administration and the potential for new climate legislation.   It is interesting 
that while the logics that underpinned corporate communications did change at this time, 
the total frequency with which they discussed climate change did not decrease. Thus, 
corporations are not reacting to broader conflict and debate around climate change by 
ceasing to address it in their sustainability reports.  
 What does this say about the future of corporate climate change logics generally 
and the role of organizations in legitimizing climate actions in the near future? As 
referenced earlier, during the period of our study the frequency of logics used in 
sustainability reporting changed, however the focus on climate change generally 
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increased, despite an uncertain future. Perhaps organizations might play the role of broker 
that Hoffman (2011) posits is necessary to bridge the public schism in beliefs about 
climate change?  Already, corporations appear to avoid taking sides, and move away 
from the “skeptical” and “convinced” logics characterized by Hoffman (2011). Rather, 
corporations are both actively shaped by and shaping public opinion in a way that allows 
for the new, and multiple logics and the potential of a future in which companies are key 
actors in addressing climate change.   
Limitations and Future Research 
Our study is primarily qualitative and empirical in nature, and as such does have 
limitations.  Primarily, we are limited by the small sample size from making statistical 
inferences. Furthermore, report length and structure varied by company. In particular, 
there was a shift to online reporting in the mid 2000s with shorter printed reports or 
summary reports available in pdf format. This means that we might have missed 
additional detailed information related to climate change included only in an online 
version of the sustainability report. We also encountered language barriers for certain 
reports that were not available in English and had to remove one report from our sample 
for this reason (Banco Sabadell was only published in Spanish in 2003).   
In general, it is also important to acknowledge that there are limits to what we can 
surmise from sustainability reports as representing the deeper logics of the 
company.  Certainly these reports are designed with a specific audience in mind, and 
uncertainty remains regarding whether reporting reflects actual firm behavior or 
represents a form of public relations or “ceremonial conformity” (Cerin, 2002; Kolk and 
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Pinkse, 2010; Fonseca, 2010).  According to Matisoff et al. (2014; Delmas and Blass, 
2010): 
Recent findings suggest that improved disclosure and management are correlated 
with higher toxic releases and lower environmental compliance, suggesting that 
improved disclosures may not correlate with improved environmental 
performance. 
Interestingly, what appears to be more indicative of coupling is the dominant 
logic used in each report. It would be interesting to further examine in future studies 
whether reporters who espouse logics of opportunity are more likely to couple discourse 
and action as would be predicted by the study of Climate Leaders’ participants.  
Due to the small sample size for this study, we were also limited in our ability to 
evaluate the role of different organizational fields in influencing the most prominent logic 
for a company.  It would be worthwhile to further explore whether the issue of climate 
change supersedes or influences other organizational fields. As Hoffman (1999) argues, it 
is useful in this case (as with other environmental cases such as in the U.S. chemical 
industry’s evolving environmental practices) to conceptualize and analyze an 
organizational field as formed around the issue of climate change rather than on specific 
corporations, markets or technologies. However, each of the companies that address 
climate change is also situated in other organizational fields based on their industry, 
geography, etc.  A larger scale study could explore if the field that forms around the issue 
of climate change affects how other organizational fields, such as industry and 
involvement in groups like GRI, influence climate change logics. Further, we observe 
these four logics across different geographies and a larger, quantitative study can provide 
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more insight into the effect of cross-national logics on corporate actions (Thornton and 
Ocasio 2008).  
Now that this study has defined four logics that underpin corporate actions around 
climate change, it would be worthwhile to leverage larger, longitudinal datasets to more 
effectively evaluate how the logics interact over time.  We propose that the efficiency and 
opportunity logics can be mutually supportive while the risk and conservation logics 
compete and conflict.  More nuanced insight into how these logics emerged as climate 
change reporting was initiated and institutionalized would provide greater insight into 
how and when different logics compete or co-exist. A larger dataset might also illuminate 
other logics that did not seem to be present in this study and which might still motivate 
some climate action. 
The GRI has been instrumental in the institutionalization of sustainability 
reporting (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010, Brown et al., 2009a); however it’s effectiveness in 
broader goals of transparency and empowerment of stakeholders is still uncertain 
(Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010, Levy et al., 2010). Because some companies develop a 
sustainability report but do not submit it to GRI, there is an opportunity to further 
evaluate what, if any, benefits companies gain by GRI participation and how it affects 
their climate performance.  Bazillier and Vauday (2011) hypothesize that the issuance of 
a sustainability report without the submission to GRI acts as a form of 
greenwashing.  Perhaps challenging this hypothesis, our study showed that non-GRI 
companies had a greater proportion of opportunity logic in their communications about 
climate change.  If this corresponds to the actions that these companies take, this would 
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infer that GRI constrains focus on climate change away from innovation and 
opportunities, and that companies who do not participate in GRI may evaluate and 
implement more innovative approaches – or at least discuss them more in public 
communications. Studying the co-evolution of the GRI guidelines themselves and the 
logics observed in the sustainability reports could help provide insight around this. It 
would be interesting to use a larger scale study to understand more about how and when a 
third-party group, such as GRI, is critical for adoption and institutionalization of 
sustainability logics and when their actions may constrain corporate actions. For the time 
being, however, a finer grained ethnographic approach can yield further insights, and 
complement this analysis of how multiple logics related to climate change are formed, 
compete and transform over time within and amongst companies and how these logics 
are influenced by external organizations and translated into action.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Changing Corporate Cultures: Ford Motor Company’s Response to Climate 
Change 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 On October 5, 2000, in a move that surprised many people inside and outside of 
the company, Bill Ford, Chairman of Ford Motor Company and Ford family member, 
gave a speech at the fifth Annual Greenpeace Business Conference in London. Even 
more surprising than an automotive executive speaking at a Greenpeace5 conference was 
the content:  
 
There is perhaps no more challenging an issue, and certainly none that is 
raised with as much frequency or passion in my discussion with 
environmentalists, than climate change. 
I am a businessman, not a scientist. We worked with uncertainty every 
day. The essence of business success is to reduce uncertainty to an 
acceptable level, and then to act. Competitive advantage comes from 
acting with good judgment in a situation where this is uncertainty and risk. 
So as a businessman I ask, what do we know about the risk? Is there 
                                                
5 Greenpeace is a prominent environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) known for their anti-
corporate campaigns and actions. One of their most high profile corporate campaigns occurred in 1995, just 
five years prior to this speech, against Shell. As part of its campaign against ocean dumping, Greenpeace 
activists occupied the Brent Spar. Brent Spar was an oil platform that Shell planned to dump in the Atlantic 
Ocean after it was no longer operational (Greenpeace.org, 2014). 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sufficient evidence to make a decision, to take action? The answer is 
absolutely yes. 
Society’s assessment may change in the future as the science develops, but 
the present risk is clear. The climate appears to be changing, the changes 
appear to be outside natural variation, and the likely consequences will be 
serious.  
From a business planning point of view, that issue is settled. Anyone who 
disagrees is, in my view, still in denial. We at Ford Motor Company have 
moved on. 
 
 Ford’s public acknowledgement of climate science and the need for action was 
exceptional at a time when the automotive industry and industry in general were taking 
an oppositional response to climate change.  But fast forward to 2005; I was working in 
the Corporate Citizenship office in Dearborn, struggling with the fact that the company 
was plagued  by an inconsistency of words and actions attracting criticism from external 
audiences and it was not until nearly 10 years later, in 2008, that the company published 
its “Blueprint” plan. By that time, I was working on a comment for the Journal Current 
Anthropology, summarizing elements of the Ford experience I had shared at the School 
for Advanced Research in Santa Fe  (or SAR) when they collaborated with the Wenner 
Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research to host a seminar on “Corporate Lives: 
New Directions in the Corporate Social Form.” 
 The 2008 Ford Climate Blueprint aligned these words with actions by committing 
Ford’s largest climate impact, its products, to a climate stabilization curve of 450 parts 
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per million (ppm) of atmospheric carbon dioxide6. But before I consider whether Ford’s 
actions have been dramatic or timely in the context of climate challenges, let me also note 
that this case raises several questions that are critical for understanding the role of the 
corporation in society. Among other central questions, what prompted Ford to step 
outside of industry norms and “break the silence” on the climate issue? Why was there 
initially a decoupling of Ford’s words and actions? How, when and why did these words 
eventually become actionable inside the company? Why has Ford been able to respond to 
climate change when many companies still struggle to do so? 
 In this chapter I draw on institutional ethnography and institutional theory along 
with theories of corporate change to understand Ford’s response to climate change over 
time, and its movement from symbolic to more substantive action. This chapter considers 
the evolution of Ford from within as it seeks to create environmental and social change 
while also creating long-term value for the company.  Findings are used to develop a 
model of change that both expands and refines previous theory. Previous theories often 
view culture change related to sustainability “as the result of external jolts that lead to 
crisis and questioning” (Hoffman and Ocascio, 2000; Weick and Quinn, 1999), others 
have proposed more gradual shifts based on liminal experiences (Howard-Grenville, 
2011). As discussed in the first chapter there is often a “say-do” gap, or decoupling, in 
corporate climate action and words; closing this gap and moving towards action is the 
next phase. I advance a model of change from decoupling to coupling, and symbolic to 
substantive action that is emergent, ongoing and pluralistic, resulting from multiple 
                                                
6 450 parts per million (ppm) is the threshold for the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide 
recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to avoid significant climate 
change, specifically a 2 degree Celsius temperature rise and corresponding ocean rising (IPCC, 2013). The 
Blueprint plan is described in detail in the results section. 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interactions within the firm, with stakeholders, and external conditions that are 
characterized by friction.  
 I also examine the microdynamics and drivers of this change, from market 
opportunity to science, responding to Weber and Dacin’s  (2011 pg. 295) call for a “focus 
on microdynamics of institutions that will yield insights into the role of culture and 
institutional creation, maintenance and change.”  
 This study also contributes to our understanding of corporate responses to climate 
change and why some companies go beyond compliance when responding to 
sustainability issues. We “know little about why individual corporations behave the way 
they do in the environmental context, about why some companies, but not others, choose 
to move beyond compliance, or what motivates them to do so” (Gunningham et. al 2003 
pg. 135). Furthermore, there is considerable variation among company responses to 
climate change (Levy and Rothenberg, 2002) and these responses have undergone a 
transformation in recent years.  Kolk, Pinkse and Levy (2008) describe this 
transformation, asserting that “until the 1990s business generally neglected the issue, but 
over the years firms moved from an oppositional political response toward preparation 
for a carbon-constrained future, displaying a wide range of strategies”.  Hoffman has 
emphasized that (2005, pg. 39): “Today, many companies still see climate change as a 
scientific or social issue. Yet, the reality is that it is becoming strategic in nature.” While 
“the literature has devoted many efforts to categorize and describe the different types of 
organizational strategic responses to global warming, there is still a lack of understanding 
of the motives leading the firms to adopt such strategies and of how the institutional field 
 
 
107
react to and reward these strategies” (Misani et. al 2012, pg. 10).  And, these strategies 
are not always implemented.  
 This chapter first reviews the literature on institutional ethnography and change (a 
review of the literature on institutional theory and climate change can be found in the 
previous chapters), following this Ford as the setting, data collection and analytic 
methods are described. In the results section I present a model of change, which is 
discussed along with theoretical and practical implications of this study, future research 
suggestions and limitations in the discussion and conclusion. 
 
 
THEORY 
 
The theoretical foundations of this study lie at the intersection of cultural and 
institutional analysis. In this section, I provide an overview of the relevant literature 
focused on corporate ethnography and culture change. A review of the literature on 
institutional theory can be found in the previous chapters. 
 
Ethnography as Method and Theory 
At its core, “social anthropology is a body of knowledge about human societies 
and… can be used in a common sense way to solve social problems” (Pritchard, 1946, p. 
92). This statement appears increasingly salient today as scholars from a variety of fields 
incorporate anthropological method into their work simultaneously challenging and 
redefining its scope and logic (Hardin 2011 b; G. E. Marcus, 1998; G. E.  Marcus and 
Fischer, 1986). Foremost among these methods is ethnography. Classically defined, 
ethnography is “inscription” as the core of “thick description” (Geertz, 1973). Hardin 
provides a more detailed and nuanced definition: “Ethnography, as a word, combines two 
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significations of abstraction. One suggests the classificatory logics inherent in many 
human ways of organizing social worlds, and particularly those devised during western 
expansion in the latter half of the twentieth century (ethnic; ethnonyms; ethnology; 
ethnocentric). The other suggests the production of images and text (graphic; 
iconography; monograph) used to describe different cultural practices across the globe. 
Referring thus to a very basic practice of describing and interpreting social worlds, the 
term links anthropologists of various schools, within the subfield of social/cultural 
Anthropology, which is distinct from the discipline’s other fields of archeology, linguistic 
anthropology and biological or physical anthropology” (Hardin 2012, p. 13).  
In this sense, ethnography is both a method and theoretical framework with 
unifying focal elements including culture, power, meaning and practice (Emerson, Fretz, 
and Shaw, 1995; Hardin 2011 b). Its core unifying construct, culture, has many 
definitions. One useful definition provided by Geertz construes culture as a pattern of 
meanings represented and recreated through the actions and communications of members 
of a group (Geertz, 1973). Distinctive elements of ethnography include fieldwork, 
participant observation, extension of observation over time and space, extending from 
micro-processes to macro forces, and extension of theory, e.g. anthropologists don’t start 
with theory (Abbott, 1992; Bernard, 2002; Burawoy, 2000; Emerson, et al., 1995). And, 
the goal of ethnographic fieldwork is often “indigenous meaning”, e.g. understanding 
what the experiences being observed mean to the actors involved (Emerson, et al., 1995).  
Ethnographies of actors beyond the traditional focal point of anthropological 
inquiry -“local communities”- are proliferating. The result is a multitude of institutional 
and multi-sited ethnographies taking as their point of departure fieldwork that is situated 
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within a particular organization (such as a high-technology or garment manufacturer) or 
linked through discrete cultural activities (such as bio-prospecting, genetic engineering 
and product liability law) respectively (Bamford, 2007; Hayden, 2003; Howard-
Grenville, 2007; Jain, 2006; Uzzi, 1997).   This is indicative of the ways in which 
anthropology “continues to become transformed into a tool increasingly critical for 
today’s changing world. Two transformations continue to be central - the proliferating 
practices that constitute the doing of ethnography in this age of global change, and the 
increasingly interdisciplinary borrowing of its techniques.” (Hardin 2012, p. 9). 
Ethnographic monographs have moved from Malinowskiesque studies of villages 
and kinship-ties to institutional ethnography of the workplace, prison, and hospital 
(Burawoy, 2000). Multi-sited ethnographies have long been exploring the linkages of 
discrete economic and cultural activities such as bio-prospecting, genetic engineering and 
product liability law (Bamford, 2007; Hayden, 2003; Jain, 2006). An important purpose 
of these multi-sited ethnographies is to “efface the macro-micro dichotomy itself as a 
framing rhetoric for ethnography that seriously limits ethnography’s possibilities and 
applications in the context of so-called postmodern conditions of knowledge” (Marcus, 
1998, p. 35).  However, it should be noted that some argue for the maintenance of the 
fine-grained ethnographic method, and see this transformation as regretful: “it is deeply 
unfortunate that some anthropologists have repudiated both anthropology’s empirical 
roots and its historic mission of bearing witness to the richness and diversity of the non-
western ‘other’” (Lee, 1998, p. 46).   
 
Corporate Actors as Ethnographic Actors 
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 Business, and in particular corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability 
practices, is one field among many that have adopted ethnographic methods. 
Management theorists point to the need to go beyond large-N studies to understand the 
contextual and cultural nature of organizational dynamics (Hoffman, 2001b; Howard-
Grenville, 2007; Van Maanen and Barley, 1984). Yet the ethnography of corporate actors 
is still relatively young. Beginning in the 1970s applied anthropologists began working 
within corporations, while today the focus has shifted considerably to the analysis of 
emerging market and global environmental practices (Aguilera, 1996; Hardin, 2011 b; 
Hart, 2005; Howard-Grenville, 2002). This new phase reflects a nascent dialogue among 
anthropologists regarding the corporation as a social form, and a movement away from 
extreme views of the past critiquing or lauding corporate accomplishments. Indicative of 
this trend was the first jointly sponsored Wenner-Gren and School of Advanced Research 
seminar in August 2008 which brought anthropologists and business practitioners 
together to discuss corporate practices and forms and their role in society (Hardin 2012).   
 
Themes in Contemporary Ethnography of Corporate Actors 
Anthropology’s focus on discourse in relation to practice uniquely positions it to 
enhance the management literature’s historical focus on tools and techniques in several 
ways. As a form of cultural critique anthropology promotes self-critical reflection that 
promotes reexamination of taken for granted assumptions, and its methods reveal power 
struggles and expose rhetoric and sweeping generalizations about globalization, for 
example (Howard-Grenville, 2002; Latour, 2004). A recent cross-fertilization of 
anthropology and management in the literature reflects promising methodological and 
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theoretical approaches in the ethnography of corporations. Throughout these works there 
are several commonalities. The first is an emphasis on understanding the established 
cultures inside (and outside) of corporations and how to mobilize employees in the face 
of new sustainability challenges (Howard-Grenville, 2007; J. Van Maanen, 1988). The 
second is the influence of broad economic, market and social conditions on corporate 
actions- the flows and networks of global connections (Tsing, 2005; Ong, 2006;).  
Finally, these works often bypass the nation state, or even see culture as disconnecting 
from the state with the growing influence of the corporate form (Appadurai, 1997). 
 While the richness of the literature defies true thematic classification, approaches 
to the ethnography of corporate actors can be grouped into five themes reflective of their 
underlying aims: ethnography from within/ethnography of occupations; ethnography of 
new/ideal organizational arrangements; ethnography on the colonizing nature of the logic 
of efficiency; ethnography of identity and subject formation/issues of power; and 
ethnography of global connections.  
Ethnography from within/ ethnography of occupations 
The focus of this body of ethnographic works seeks to understand occupations 
and culture from within corporations, which has been obscured from view in the 
traditional management literature. Drawing on the foundational work of Margaret Mead 
for inspiration, VanMaanen’s ethnographic work focuses on occupational communities 
such as the police force as an alternative to the organizational perspective. He argues that 
from an organizational perspective people are seen to regard careers in terms of mobility 
within Chandler’s administrative hierarchy, and that each position is associated with 
prestige, power, etc. VanMaanen develops the occupational community as an alternative 
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frame of reference which is central to the individual’s self-image and transcends 
divisional and hierarchical boundaries (Burawoy, 2000). Within this framework the 
organization can be viewed as "sets of sometimes issue-specific coalitions, each 
exhibiting varying degrees of stability and overlapping memberships" (Van Maanen and 
Barley, 1984, p. 335).  As related to the corporate social responsibility movement, Conley 
focuses on the occupational community of CSR professionals “as an evolving global 
cultural entity, loose but coherent, and complete with its own rituals and language” 
(Conley, 2011; Van Maanen and Barley, 1984). 
Mosse also directly abandons the conceptions of ‘field’ vs. ‘home’ (Hart, 2005). 
In a personal and self-reflective account of his work as a consultant for the Indo-British 
Rainfed Farming Project (IBRF) for rural Bhil communities in western India during the 
1990s, Mosse seeks to unravel the relationships between aid policy and practice in a 
development context, e.g. “not whether, but how development projects work; not whether 
a project succeeds, but how ‘success’ is produced ”(Mosse, 2005, p. 8).  Fundamentally 
he is interested in interpretation, and characterizes the interactions of consultants, donor 
agencies, aid workers, and aid recipients through invocations and descriptions of “hidden 
transcripts” and “friction” (Mosse, 2005; J. Scott, 1990). Through an understanding of 
this complex web of perspectives Mosse comes to his central proposition: “development 
interventions are not driven by official policy, but by the exigencies of organizations and 
the need to maintain relationships” (Mosse, 2005, p. 103).   
Of particular relevance to this study is previous work on corporate culture change 
and response to contentious issues (a nice overview of which is provided by Weber and 
Dacin (2011) in their introduction to a special issue on the cultural construction of 
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organizational life and therefore not provided here). Using in depth observation of the 
core group incorporating environmental considerations at a high-technology 
manufacturer, Howard-Grenville, focuses on the ways in which cumulative actions lead 
to environmental change. She argues that using a cultural lens to take an inward focus 
when assessing an organization’s decisions to undertake environmental actions is 
important because organizational cultures are rarely monolithic or static, and therefore it 
is important to understand the various conflicting systems of meaning (Howard-
Grenville, 2007). Several factors are believed to influence change: regulatory 
requirements, investor pressures, competitive pressures, institutional norms, 
technological innovation, and stakeholder/community demands (Hoffman 1999; Porter 
and van der Linde 1995; Reinhardt 1999). However, even when influenced externally, 
internal factors, e.g. culture, “shapes whether and how the external conditions are 
regarded as problems as well as the appropriate solutions” (Dutton and Ashford 1993 p. 
398). According to Howard-Grenville (2007 p.11) “manager commitment, perception, 
leadership, organizational culture and subculture and structures all matter.” 
Ethnography of new/ideal organizational arrangements 
 Several recent ethnographies also explore the importance of ethnographic 
research to understanding new or “ideal” organizational forms and arrangements that 
emphasize inclusivity, and a shift from a focus on tools and techniques to ideology. 
Bostrom and Garsten remind us that in a globalizing world choosing between the ‘make 
or buy’ decision (e.g. transaction cost economics) popularized by Coase and Williamson 
is also about expanding or restricting the scope of accountability (Boström and Garsten, 
2008).  They focus on the ways organizations organize to meet demands of 
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accountability, and the process by which ideas about accountability are translated from 
discourse to organizational form through CSR practices (Boström and Garsten, 2008). 
Ethnographers have also explored issues of corporate accountability and expanding 
responsibility in relation to the aftermath of Bhopal and American injury law:  “American 
injury culture is produced and consumed in a global economy, one in which injury an risk 
can also be outsourced to poorer nations who are willing to use pesticides and child 
labor” (Fortun, 1999, p. 3; Jain, 2006). 
In an empirical test of Granovetter’s conception of embeddedness, Uzzi draws on 
ethnographic fieldwork from 23 firms in the garment industry as well as statistical 
network analysis (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). He argues that there are varying 
degrees of embeddedness- and that one can be underembedded as well as overembedded. 
He concludes: “embeddedness increases economic effectiveness along a number of 
dimensions that are crucial to competitiveness in a global economy-organizational 
learning, risk sharing, and speed to market- perhaps underscoring the growing importance 
of embeddedness as a logic of economic exchange” (Uzzi, 1996, p. 94).  However, there 
is a threshold: “optimal networks are not composed of either all embedded ties or all 
arm’s length ties, but integrate the two” (Uzzi, 1996, p. 94) 
In another industry level analysis, Howard-Grenville uses participant observation 
and interviews of the semiconductor manufacturing industry as it developed new rules for 
PFC emissions reduction. Her ethnographic work illuminates how actors and their 
interpretation of environmental challenges changed over time, and the resulting changes 
in industry and corporate rules and structures (Howard-Grenville, 2002).  
Ethnography on the colonizing nature of the logic of efficiency 
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Recent ethnographic works focuses on the corporation as a colonizing social 
form. This body of literature explores how the logic of efficiency and the business case, 
signature of corporations, are “coming to colonize the goal of environmental conservation 
and sustainable development” (Hardin 2011). Ethnographers explore the ways in which 
environmental NGOs such as Wildlife Conservation Society or World Widlife Fund, and 
tribal governments such as the Royal Bafokeng Nation or the Seminole Nation, to use 
two examples, are and are not distinct from corporate actors (Comaroff, 2008; Cattelino, 
2008; Hardin 2011). In the case of the Seminole Nation, Cattelino argues that cultural 
identity is maintained through market mechanisms such as casinos and the acquisition of 
the Hard Rock Café chain (Cattelino, 2008).  Hardin (2011) problematizes the ways that 
environmental NGOs are displacing, emulating and collaborating with corporate actors to 
achieve conservation measures, and argues that these flows are reciprocally 
transformative of both sectors, in what she terms “collective contradictions” that belie the 
tension between commerce and conservation (Hardin 2011).  
Not only are corporate norms and cultural forms perceptible in spheres previously 
deemed distinct from business, but they are also being, themselves, internally 
transformed. In direct reference to the management literature on institutional 
isomorphism, e.g. the tendency towards mimetic convergence with the goal of survival 
via the attainment of legitimacy, Welker and Wood focus on the “iron cage” of 
shareholder value in relation to socially responsible investment (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Welker and Wood, 2011). They ask if the adoption of business case rhetoric by the 
socially responsible investment community represents a convergence towards the 
traditional shareholder value logic of managerial capitalism (Welker and Wood, 2011).  
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Finally, Schwittay provides a multi-sited ethnography looking at how pressures 
from outside corporate structures come to bear on corporate cultures. Specifically, she 
chronicles how Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives (specifically Hewlett-
Packard's e-Inclusion base of the pyramid program) in Costa Rica and HP's headquarters 
in Palo Alto, California to enable the extension of corporate forms as a framework for 
addressing issues of poverty in emerging markets (Schwittay, 2011). She critiques the 
base of the pyramid ("bop") strategy as marketization of poverty without attending to the 
underlying structure of poverty. Schwittay implies that these programs have a longer 
shelf life in powerpoint at HP than in reality leaving the reader to ask: what does this 
suggest about the bop strategy, and more generally our own apparent complacence with 
the spread of capitalism as a means to address societal problems? She argues that 
embedding poverty alleviation efforts within local cultural norms is crucial, and that as a 
result there is not a one-size-fits all bop program that companies can adopt  (Schwittay, 
2011).  
Schwittay’s points are hardly new;  Stuart Hart, one of the original founders of the 
“bottom of the pyramid” approach devotes three chapters of his book Capitalism at the 
Crossroads to the topic of developing what he calls “native capability.” And while such 
analysis does not consider the possibility that “natives” such as Seminole or Bafokeng 
might advance new modes of corporate structure and strategy, still it is fair to say that the 
interface of organizational studies, ethnography, and environmental sustainability 
remains underdeveloped relative to the promising overlap in the substantive concerns of 
scholars conducting empirical research within each of these intellectual niches, in order 
 
 
117
to generate new conceptual frames. How such studies are shaped by or might shape 
deeper social theoretical traditions, is another question. 
Ethnography of identity and subject formation/issues of power 
Foucauldian notions of power/knowledge and subjectivity in relation to the 
diffusion of the corporate form also provide an important complement to more 
institutionally oriented literatures, allowing for the incorporation of questions about 
technology, material objects, relational power and social agency. Neo-institutionalist 
studies of management all too often neglect such broader, deeper concerns (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Foucault, 1977, 1979, [1978] 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
In an historical and legally based ethnographic analysis of different objects from 
cigarettes to airbags and hamburgers, Jain focuses on human object interaction and the 
privatization of interests in health and welfare. Her work takes seriously “the ways that 
commodity design harbors assumptions about sociality, behavior, and human action” and 
presents injury claims in light of their roles in governmentality (Jain, 2006 p. 4).  
Ethnographic consideration of subjectivity is also unique in its consideration of 
non-human actors such as nature. Coronil’s historical ethnography depicts the ways in 
which nature, and oil more specifically, is a driving force of state transformation and 
subjectivity in Venezuela because of its materiality (Foucault, [1978] 1991). Hayden 
explores the making of neoliberal subjects through a depiction of the public-private 
networks of bioprospecting and their various interactions with nature from roadside 
settings to markets and scientific labs (Coronil, 1997).  
Ethnography of global connections 
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Often inseparable and intertwined with ethnography of subjectivity are 
ethnographies of global connections. The ethnographies are not focused on a single 
corporation, but rather take as their point of departure issues of globalization and the 
spread of capitalism. They are, therefore, pluralistic and comparative in nature examining 
simultaneously the general and specific, and the ways in which global and local identities 
are produced and reproduced (Hayden, 2003; Rees, 2001). General anthropological 
theories of global cultural processes focus on the tensions, disjunctures and convergences 
between economic, cultural and political sectors of globalization, often with attention to 
material elements and visible manifestations of these processes such as Disney or 
McDonald’s (Appadurai, 1997 ; Fox, 2002). However, some anthropologists see such 
global ethnographies as a  “theoretical impossibility” for a discipline and method founded 
on understanding human interaction, events, and the particular (Berger, 2002).  
  In Rough Waters: Nature and Development in an East African Marine Park 
Walley analyzes a “social drama” among Chole island residents, WWF, private investors 
and national government officials during the development of the Mafia Island Marine 
Park in Tanzania in the 1990s (Burawoy, 2000). Walley argues that through an 
understanding of conflict overt time power relationships are illuminated that challenge 
current assumptions about globalization: “In contrast to assumptions in commonplace 
narratives of globalization, the channels through which power came to be expressed in 
this contemporary international project-one overtly concerned with “community”-were 
not new ” (Walley, 2004, p. 135). Rather Walley suggests that historical dynamics with 
international and national origins- through trade with India, Persia, and Indonesia, as well 
as Arab slave traders and German and British colonial rule-have been shaping community 
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life on Chole for centuries, just as they are shaping contemporary social drama (Walley, 
2004).  
Tsing suggests that the global and local are mutually constituted through friction 
that creates new forms of power and cultural identity.  She defines friction as “the 
awkward, unequal, unstable and creative qualities of interconnection across difference” 
(Walley, 2004, p. 4). Her exploration of friction is grounded in a multi-sited ethnography 
that travels between rural communities in the rainforests of South Kalimantan, to 
Indonesian nature enthusiasts in the city, to international conservation NGOs and climate 
change modelers (Tsing, 2005).  
Finally, in her ethnographic study of Malaysia, Ong proposes “graduated 
sovereignty” as a framework for understanding the transfer of authority from the state to 
private actors, and the ways in which this neoliberal system promotes hybrid forms of 
governance (Tsing, 2005). As an extension of this conceptual framework, Partridge 
examines ethical practices at a New York based high-end clothing firm to understand the 
ways in which “corporate power negotiates state sovereignty, and how it is producing 
subjects that are outside of the logic, responsibilities, rights, and participation implied by 
a nation-state centered citizenship” (Ong, 2006).  
Of particular relevance to this study are the themes of ethnography from within/ 
ethnography of occupations and ethnography of new/ideal organizational arrangements. 
The literature underlying each of these themes provides a useful departure point for 
understanding the process of change at Ford. While the other themes are less applicable, 
they also provide useful points of comparison and a discussion of corporate ethnography 
would not have been complete without acknowledging their presence. 
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SETTING AND METHODS 
 
 
 Ford Motor Company (referred to as Ford throughout this chapter) is one of the 
world’s largest manufacturers of automobiles, and is ranked in the top 100 largest 
economies of the world (above many countries) generating annual revenue of $146.9 
billion in 2013 (Institute for Policy Studies, 2000; Ford Motor Company, 2014). 
Headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan, Ford has 186,000 employees and operates 65 
plants worldwide. The company’s automotive brands include Ford and Lincoln, and it 
provides financial services through Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford Motor Company, 
2014).   Ford has historically defined itself as a manufacturer of cars and trucks, and in 
recent years as the originator of North America’s best selling vehicle, the F-150. Ford 
was also instrumental in bringing the Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) concept to market, 
embraced by American consumers but criticized by environmentalists and safety 
activists.  
 Ford prides itself on a heritage of corporate social responsibility since its 
inception in 1903. Although some of his practices were considered controversial, Henry 
Ford, the company founder, is often recognized both as a technological and social 
innovator who provided affordable transportation for the masses. And, with this increased 
personal mobility came positive economic and social benefits like greater access to 
relatives, employees, raw materials, medical attention, and education. His implementation 
of a $5 per day wage in 1914 (almost double the pay of other auto workers) led to more 
satisfied and efficient employees on the line, as well as less turnover in the factories.  
Henry Ford is also credited with instilling a strong environmental ethic in the company, 
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for example by reusing wood shipping crates in the actual vehicle production. This has 
led to a corporate culture that sees itself as innovative as well as socially and 
environmentally conscience.  In fact, in the early stages of the sustainability office’s 
formation and work, employees frequently invoked the company’s innovative origins and 
history of environmental and social values as guideposts for success. According to the 
former Director of the Sustainability Office, Deborah Zemke (2003), “At Ford, we 
believe that the thread which weaves across the past, present and future is corporate 
responsibility.  Ford is a family, in every sense of the word, and our sense of social 
responsibility has always begun at home”.  
 However, in conflict with the company’s historical emphasis on corporate social 
responsibility is the fact that the company is also one of the most serious contributors to 
greenhouse gas emissions, releasing an estimated 300 to 400 million metric tons of 
carbon annually (Ford Sustainability Report, 2013)7. In general, automobiles are 
becoming increasingly associated with negative consequences such as increased 
pollution, congestion, greenhouse gas emissions, and accidents. By 2050 it is expected 
that there will be 2 billion cars on the road globally (nearly double the number of cars on 
the road today) exacerbating these problems (WBCSD, 2001). 
Sustainability at Ford 
Both because of the scale of its impact on contemporary rates of climate change, 
and its proactive history of action on sustainability matters, Ford provides an ideal setting 
                                                
7 This estimate includes emissions from Ford’s facilities, current-year vehicles and emissions from all Ford 
vehicles more than one year old on the road.  In 2010 the company emitted an estimated 342 million metric 
tons (Mmt) of greenhouse gas emissions. In more detail, 5 mmt of greenhouse gas emissions came from 
manufacturing facilities, 29 mmt came from new vehicles and 329 mmt came from vehicles on the road. 
Ford updates this estimate every 5 years, and plans to do so again in 2015. According to the company, “it is 
not possible to give a more precise value because of uncertainties in the number of Ford vehicles in the on-
road fleet and how many miles these vehicles traveled.” (Ford Sustainability Report, 2013) 
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to study why, when and how change is enacted in practice. A more detailed account of 
Ford’s historical and contemporary sustainability and climate actions are discussed below 
in the results section. However, as a point of background knowledge it is useful to 
understand the quality of sustainability activities generally at Ford.  
Ford’s contemporary sustainability activities began with the creation of a 
sustainability office in 1999 by William Clay Ford Jr., great-grandson of Henry Ford and 
Chairman of the company. The office was originally known as the Corporate Citizenship 
office, and was primarily responsible for interfacing with Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), sustainability reporting, climate change and developing a human 
rights and HIV/AIDS program.  The Corporate Citizenship office was located within 
Ford under a vice-president responsible for policy and philanthropy. In 2005 the office 
formally became the Sustainability office and subsequently reported to the newly 
appointed Senior Vice-President of Sustainability, Safety and Environmental 
Engineering. Internally this signified senior executive recognition of the growing 
importance of sustainability as well as a mainstreaming of the Sustainability office- e.g. 
alignment of the Sustainability office with the mainstream business organizations such as 
product development. The overarching objective of the Sustainability office is to incubate 
and deliver business solutions that add long-term value to society, the environment and 
the bottom line in addition to its original activities.  Ford’s own definition of 
sustainability is “a business model that creates value consistent with the long-term 
preservation and enhancement of environmental, social and financial capital” (Ford 
Sustainability Report, 2013). (However, based on interviews it is unclear whether this 
definition has real significance in daily practice). 
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Ford has been recognized as a leader in sustainability issues, and as a pioneer of 
sustainability reporting through the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Among several 
other awards, Ford was ranked first on Interbrand’s prestigious list of the 50 Best Global 
Green Brands in 2014 for its innovative approach to sustainable manufacturing, as well as 
transparency and disclosure particularly in the area of sustainable manufacturing (Ford 
Motor Company, 2014). Ford gained the distinction of being the first automotive 
company to adopt a Human Rights Code of Working Conditions in 2003 and 
subsequently to endorse the United Nations Global Compact. Ford has also been listed on 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and FTSE4Good Index for nearly ten years8.  Ford 
was also ranked as the most carbon efficient of the “big three” auto manufacturers based 
on Trucost calculations using the companies’ carbon disclosures and calculations of their 
supply chain greenhouse gas emissions (Montoto, 2012). 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 
I conducted seven months of ethnographic research between September 2011 and 
March 2012. An ethnographic case study is well-suited to study Ford’s response to 
climate change, as it is a complex and sensitive topic rife with the possibility for 
regulation and accusations of greenwash. Such case studies are useful for expanding and 
refining theory as well as revealing alternative explanations for company behavior (Yin 
2003; Weick 2007).  
I gained access to the Company through permission of senior personnel, e.g. 
gatekeepers in the Sustainability Office as well as legal permission through the Office of 
                                                
8 The Down Jones Sustainability Index and FTSE4Good Index are two of the most prominent socially 
responsible investment indices. They screen companies based on environmental, social and governance 
criteria prior to inclusion. 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the General Counsel. Within the company I established myself in a participant-
observation role with peripheral membership. I could not expect to be less than a 
peripheral member due to my previous work experience in the sustainability office at 
Ford. As a Ford employee from 2002 through 2007, I was an embedded observer, 
inextricably intertwined in the process as a result of my personal connections to my field 
of study.  As with other “ethnographies from within,” I aim to write a multi-positioned 
dissertation from the vantage point of someone who has worked inside Ford and the 
sustainability field. It is important to acknowledge that “mine is an interested 
interpretation, not a scientific judgment…ultimately, the objectivity of my analysis 
cannot be that derived from standing above the fray or of suppressing subjectivity, but 
rather that which comes from maximizing the capacity of actors to object to what is said 
about them (to raise concerns, insert questions and interpretations)” (Mosse, 2005 p.12). 
Therefore, I have circulated this draft to the key individuals involved in this project for 
critical comment and have incorporated their feedback in several cases. On a practical 
note, my previous experience at Ford and the formal and informal connections that I 
made during that time allowed me to gain trust and access that might have otherwise been 
difficult to obtain given the sensitive nature of the topic. Furthermore, I understand the 
issues in question intimately, and have a sense already of the internal tensions and 
debates on such issues. Through my previous experience I gained a deeply contextualized 
understanding of the company culture, key players and the issue which provided a useful 
vantage point for analysis. 
Data were primarily derived from semistructured interviews, and supplemented 
with documents and meeting notes. 
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Semistructured Interviews: 
During this period I conducted 30 interviews with 31 individuals (one interview 
included multiple individuals), as well as several follow-up conversations via email. I 
interviewed 21 Ford employees in the U.S. and Europe from offices including 
Sustainability and Vehicle Environmental Matters (SVEM); Environmental Health and 
Safety (EHS); Marketing, Governmental Affairs, Corporate Affairs, the Chairman’s 
Office, Product Development, Supply Chain, Office of the General Counsel (OGC), 
Investor Relations and the Scientific Research Lab. Employees interviewed held 
positions at the level of manager, director, vice-president and chairman. In addition I 
spoke with four retired or past Ford employees. I identified key informants in a variety of 
departments that are core to addressing climate issues based on my previous experience 
at Ford as well as the recommendations of those interviewed. I also interviewed six 
external participants who have worked closely with Ford as advisors, consultants or 
interested Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) with sustainability and climate 
change experience. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours, and were on 
average just over an hour in length. Most interviews were conducted in person with the 
exception of participants who are located outside of Michigan or abroad. The tone of 
most interviews was relaxed, and very open. All interviews were taped (with the 
exception of two interviewees who requested not to be taped), and I took notes and then 
transcribed portions and included more descriptive, extensive notes at a later time. The 
focus of the interviews was on participant’s roles and experiences related to the 
Company’s climate change efforts over time. I asked interviewees several guided but 
open ended questions about their responsibilities related to climate change; whom they 
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worked with (inside and outside Ford) to address the issue; why, when and how climate 
became an actionable issue for them as individuals and for the company; and important 
climate related actions by Ford (see Appendix for a full list of guiding questions). To 
maintain anonymity and protect interviewees’ identity, identifiers have been changed and 
quotes are only broadly associated with the interviewees position. 
Meeting Notes: 
Interviews were supplemented by attendance at bimonthly Global Sustainability 
Planning Team (GSPT) meetings from December 2011 to March 2012. The GSPT is a 
global group of managers and directors tasked with developing and implementing Ford’s 
climate change and fuel economy strategy. Their work is significant because it is shared 
with a group of vice-presidents, the Sustainability Mobility Group (SMG), for decision 
making and alignment purposes and reported to the CEO, Alan Mullally, on a weekly 
basis at a Thursday morning meeting reviewing progress against the business plan, the 
Business Plan Review (BPR). Any additional matters requiring special discussion or 
attention are shared with the CEO at a separate Special Attention Review (SAR).  My 
role during these meetings was as an observer; I took notes, and observed interactions 
and points of discussion or tension. Through these meetings I gained an understanding of 
the day to day work that was being done to address climate change including issues that 
were and were not going well, future plans and concerns and inter-departmental and 
regional dynamics.   
Documents 
I also collected and reviewed archival data including documents from 
interviewees as well as publicly available documents. Documents included all Ford 
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sustainability reports published since 1999, a Ford climate change report, Ford proxy 
statements, press releases, internal memos, presentations, email communication between 
Ford employees and between Ford employees and NGOs, speeches given by Ford 
executives and news articles. Documents were used to fill in historic or knowledge gaps 
in my data, and to check for consistency and accuracy among interviewees. 
Theory development was an iterative process of moving between data and 
analysis (Staudenmayer et al. 2002). Initial analysis involved reading my interview notes 
and documents for recurring themes as well as listening to interview recordings. Further 
content analysis and coding was done using newer programs, along with the time honored 
inductive process of allowing themes to emerge from the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
I was particularly interested in themes related to processes and drivers of change related 
to climate related actions, and when these actions were perceived as substantive vs. 
symbolic.  During the coding process, I also created a time line of key events based on 
interview feedback and a review of documents. The timeline includes significant internal 
and external climate change related events and actions at Ford. Clearly technology and 
technological innovation is an important component in Ford’s climate change response, 
but I am not interested in exploring that here. Rather I will take the technology as a given, 
and look at the people and processes behind the climate related discourse and actions. I 
chose this as a point of departure because I would argue that the automotive technology 
largely exists to address climate change, making the behavioral and cultural aspects 
related to Ford’s transformation more interesting for analysis.  
 
RESULTS 
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 Data analysis allowed me to observe at a fine-grained level, a process of change 
that was neither primarily motivated by external jolts nor comprised of mundane, 
everyday occurrences. (Hoffman 2001; Howard-Grenville, 2010).  Although external 
factors do matter, and the processes that result in change eventually become and are even 
sustained by mundane events, it was not necessarily or initially so.  Drawing on data 
examining why, when and how change was enacted at Ford, I developed a model in 
which friction emerged as a key element leading to change as depicted below in Figure 
4.1. I also offer an account of how actions moves from symbolic to substantive through 
this change process.  Interestingly the analysis reveals an inverse relationship between 
friction and substantive action. This suggests that symbolic actions early in the change 
process that do not yet reflect internal alignment around contentious issues such as 
climate change are likely to reveal themselves through the friction that they create. This 
relationship would be interesting to explore in future research.  
 The model reveals how in the course of a decade a changing response to climate 
change was manifested through issue acceptance, early action, recognition of Ford’s role, 
opening up to opportunity and eventually internal alignment around the issue coupled 
with scaling of solutions. Essentially the climate change went from a “nice to know” 
issue to one that was strategic and finally became an internalized part of the corporate 
culture. A myriad of external influences and occasional jolts are present throughout the 
change process from the beginning. These include market pressures, scientific 
understanding of the climate issue, consumers, the media, regulation or the threat of 
potential regulation and civil society or NGO influences (Hoffman 2001a; Howard-
Grenville, 2010). For example, one such “jolt” was the increase of gas prices in 2008 to 
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nearly $4.00 a gallon which temporarily drove consumers to purchase smaller vehicles. 
However, these external influences have been explored elsewhere, and are not the real 
focus of this study. In the awareness and early action phases Ford began to accept the 
science of climate change, and respond to the issue through reporting and early goals 
(that were not connected with the company’s broader priorities or strategies).  
 This phase was championed by the CEO and Chairman, Bill Ford and a small 
team in the then Corporate Citizenship Office, and was supported and externally 
validated by NGOs.  This resulted in the greatest period of friction surrounding Ford’s 
response to climate change, because actions were not connected directly to the 
company’s products or operations. The result was internal resistance and external 
frustration because of the perceived disconnect between the company’s words and 
actions. Eventually sophistication of scientific understanding and improved modeling led 
to a better understanding of Ford’s contribution to and role in addressing climate change. 
Beginning in 2005 Ford began to calculate its contribution to greenhouse gas emissions 
every five years including facilities, current vehicles and all Ford vehicles on the road 
(Ford Sustainability Report, 2013). Complementing this scientific modeling, was a 
growing understanding of the market opportunities inherent in developing a product 
strategy based on a fleet of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles. This led to development 
of processes and governance structures that were aligned with corporate priorities and 
goals, and measured and reported against. At this point climate change had been 
internalized at Ford as part of the culture, and a continual refinement of Ford’s role, 
opportunities and related alignment was supported by mundane or liminal events 
(Howard-Grenville, 2010). But to understand this process of change it is useful to start 
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from the beginning. Therefore I began my analysis with an examination of why, when 
and how climate change became an actionable issue at Ford. I also provide more detailed 
examples revealing the underlying mechanisms characterizing Ford’s changing response 
to climate change below. 
 
Figure 4.1 Model of Change 
 
 
  
While many companies espouse concern over climate change today, and have 
climate strategies and goals, Ford has been recognized within the automotive industry as 
a pioneer and leader for its climate change response. Ford’s response to climate change is 
notable especially when compared to its industry peers and General Motors in particular. 
Both Ford and GM occupy a similar market identity, geography and face similar 
regulatory pressures and so would otherwise be expected to respond similarly to issues 
such as climate change (Davis and Greve 1997; Hoffman 2007; Marquis 2003; Marquis 
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et al. 2007; Zuckerman 1999). During the 1990s, Ford, and the rest of the auto industry 
acted as climate deniers and skeptics, and largely used debates over science and 
economics to block climate action related to the Kyoto Protocol. However, within the 
course of a decade Ford had begun to take a notably different stance. Ford became the 
first auto manufacturer to recognize the science of climate change and leave the Global 
Climate Coalition (GCC), an industry coalition lobbying against climate science, and 
eventually developed a product plan linked to climate stabilization. (A more detailed 
description of this event and a timeline of events is included in the appendix.) Several 
employees remarked about this change, and it is summarized nicely in this quote: 
 
There has been a transformation…you always have degrees of believers [in 
climate change]. You now have a company of people who believe that the 
way we do business today is part and parcel of who we are and what we 
stand for while that never used to be a general feeling…people thought 
working for Ford was special because of a sense of giving back to the 
world, and that hasn’t gone away but it has become more robust by looking 
at process and production as something that we can truly develop in a way 
that is industry leading in a thoughtful way that prevents the kind of 
pollution and waste that took place in the past. In a matter of a decade 
we’ve done almost a 180 in our thinking and approach [to climate 
change].—Ford manager  
 
So why did Ford take this unique position in relation to its industry peers, and 
industry in general? There are some motivating factors that function as drivers in Ford’s 
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changing stance towards climate change. Interviewees described several drivers of Ford’s 
changing stance towards climate change. The top drivers are internal alignment/governance 
structures, leadership, market competitiveness, science and the influence of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). These drivers are described in detail below, along 
with a table including all of the drivers mentioned by interviewees and counts for the 
frequency of mentions (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 Drivers of Change 
Driver  Count Percent 
Internal alignment/governance 
structures 
19 63% 
Leadership 19 63% 
Market competitiveness  17 57% 
Science 14 47% 
NGO influence 14 47% 
Potential regulation/regulation 
in Europe 
11 37% 
Global focus 7 23% 
Cost of vehicle ownership 3 10% 
Vehicle CO2 performance 2 6% 
Energy efficiency 2 6% 
Investors/shareholder 
resolutions 
1 3% 
 
 
Tied as the most important motivators of change, are the related drivers of internal 
alignment/governance and leadership (63 percent). Interviewees mentioned the necessity 
of leadership on the climate issue at the CEO level as well as the importance of the 
directorship of the sustainability office.  
 
We brought in people who were more far-reaching and less traditional. We 
changed the management. We brought in people with a global picture, 
people who had a better understanding of the globe and about global 
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responsibility and global battle grounds. You can look at Alan [Mulally, 
CEO], and Jim Farley [Executive Vice-President and President Europe, 
Middle-East and Africa] coming in at the very top…and I think this makes 
a big difference. It is very different from people in 2006 saying 10 miles 
per gallon is okay…Jim Farley and Alan have allowed people to challenge 
assumptions more and that is an important piece.—Ford manager 
 
In 2006 you have the arrival of Alan Mulally and you have a chairman and CEO 
who are likeminded, so you have most senior level of management pulling in the 
same direction. That let Alan turn Derrick Kuzak [Global Product Chief] and PD 
[product development] loose using scientific modeling developed cooperatively 
between BP, us and NASA using variables for economic, atmospheric modeling 
and we created inputs for the light duty segment from light truck to b cars…we 
started doing scientific analysis to find out what does our contribution need to be 
to stabilize 450 ppm by 2050.—Ford manager 
 
The good news in the directorship of this [sustainability] office is that you had 
Debbie [Zemke] who broke a lot of ground and eggs…then Niel [Golightly] starts 
enhancing relationship and he’s a good communicator and then you go to John 
[Viera] who has experience at core of business and he knows the challenges…so 
when we make the commitment to talk science and technology you have the guy 
(the director) to do that.—Ford manager 
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Different leaders [in the sustainability office] at different times made a big 
difference…Debbie [Zemke] was willing to take the arrows at the time. Niel 
[Golightly] came in and was a great collaborator and communicator on a common 
agenda. And then John [Viera] came in who had credibility with the research and 
development world. We lacked engineers on the team, We were trying to raise 
issues without enough of a technical underpinning. –Former employee 
 
 
However, interviewees also repeatedly mentioned that leadership alone was not 
enough, and that real change did not happen at Ford until this leadership was supported 
with a strong governance structure for addressing climate strategy and implementation. 
Several participants reflected on the way that climate change was now integrated into job 
descriptions, product plans and daily operations where it had previously been project 
based and ad hoc.  
 
In 2008 when Alan [Mulally] appointed me and put sustainability in the job title it 
solidified that this was mainstream and real. [Describing the governance 
structure]…The sustainability mobility governance we took over in 2009 as part 
of trying to get this integrated into the company…We meet twice a month 
reviewing proposals [for climate progress and implementation]. We also look at 
anything related to CO2 plan, zero emission vehicles, fuel economy…We review 
all of these things and get buy in. From there we have a marketing and PR and 
community relations plan…We also have governance at board level where we 
meet…So have top of house and every day operational governance.-- Ford 
executive 
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The change of my role, shows also the change and power in climate change over 
time at Ford. I started 3 years ago reporting to corporate communications and now 
things have become more central. We have green, quality, smart and safe 
pillars…“Green” is becoming more important for us so it is my job to describe the 
green vehicle and manufacturing piece. It used to be more project based and is 
now more integrated.—Ford manager 
 
Mentioned as the second most important driver of climate response was market 
competitiveness (57 percent). This is not surprising as the importance of opportunity as a 
predictor of coupling is noted in the first study, and the logic of opportunity was 
prevalent in our study of sustainability reports. Opportunity as a driver has also been 
noted in other studies (Hoffman, 2007; Howard-Grenville 2010). In this circumstance 
employees noted the ways in which market opportunity spurred action, and how the 
company’s product plans were based on being competitive in a market what now valued 
fuel efficiency. Employees also noted the importance of “selling” climate change 
internally as a business issue. 
 
The bigger driver [for climate action] was competitive advantage and fuel 
economy was a differentiator… and fuel economy translates into CO2. We could 
market   fuel economy. –Ford director 
 
Now there is more science behind climate change and we’ve figured out that its 
good for business…We aren’t just saying these things to keep NGOs and Sister 
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Pat quiet we’re doing it because if we do it it will help the business and be good 
for shareholders. It all comes back to economics.—Ford manager 
 
Before every 3 months would have a new plan, and there is still some churn…but 
now that commitment [to climate change and fuel economy] is internalized and 
we are going to be fuel economy leaders. We own it and we deliver it, we’ve 
simplified the metrics. Now we are tracking a critical few metrics…The 
[Blueprint] Plan is not just fuel economy, its just fixing the business.—Ford 
manager 
 
Bill Ford was the biggest driver…but the biggest enabler that encouraged people 
to listen was couching it [climate change] in business terms.—former Ford 
executive 
 
 
Science and NGO influence are mentioned as the third most important driver of 
Ford’s response to climate change (47 percent). Interviewees described how Ford’s 
climate strategy is science based, and how science had guided strategy formation based 
on a goal of contributing the company’s fair share towards stabilization of atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide.  
 
Ford’s [climate action] was not driven by regulation…There are 3 things that 
drive CO2 strategy…science and stabilization, the competitive set and what 
customers need in terms of fuel economy and policies and regulation… By 
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science driving us it guarantees that we are competitive…because our goal is to 
be a fuel economy leader.—Ford executive 
 
We are not moving due to legislation, we are moving on our own ground. 
Our path is more driven by our internal research with a glidepath for all 
regions…We know what is reasonable and needed and we are working towards 
that, and if we are ahead of legislation so be it, and if legislations is tougher we 
would wonder if it is needed. [Defining “reasonable and needed”]…temperature 
should not be increased more than 2 degrees, which means 450 so it is 
scientifically based.—Ford manager 
 
The basis of the [Blueprint] plan was a high level management decision that we 
should bring together people in policy and research and product and 
manufacturing to get together to figure out what we should do about climate 
change, and what would be a rational targets. That was in early 2000…We looked 
at CO2 targets adopted by government bodies and there was quite a range of 450 
to 550 ppm being discussed as reasonable targets to avoid the worst impacts of 
climate change…so initially we thought of adopting targets in that range. In the 
end we settled on 450 ppm and that is what the Blueprint is based on…Choosing 
450 ppm is a scientific decision really…a lot of organizations have adopted a 
target of no more than 2 degrees Celsius [temperature increase] above pre-
industrial and that is the basis of our thinking as well. And the precise amount to 
avoid a 2 degrees rise is still uncertain…a lot of organizations think that if we 
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stabilize at 450 we will avoid this…At current it is 391 ppm, and it used to be 
280…It is a reasonable target of what needs to be done and that target might need 
to be adjusted up or down. It may turn out that we need to have a higher number 
or a lower number. But at least for this decade, for right now 450 is a reasonable 
target.—Ford manager 
 
This [Blueprint] plan is different because of its scientific basis…It was an effort 
from a few of us to do the work and look ahead and convert scientific information 
into practical planning.—Ford manager 
 
 
Despite periods of conflict, NGOs were cited as providing important external 
perspective, research, inspiration, resources and knowledge necessary to address climate 
change. Employees also stated that it is unlikely that one company or even one sector 
alone will deliver climate change solutions, and therefore working in partnership with 
NGOs has become increasingly important. 
 
As much as I hate to admit it the 1-2 punch that the NGOs gave us was 
effective…East coast [NGOs] had more constructive dialogues while the west 
coast [NGOs] were campaigners…I’ll never forget a conversation with Dan 
Becker [Sierra Club Director] …We were sipping on a cup of coffee…I asked 
“Why do you always pick on us?” and he said: “We throw a rock at GM and hear 
nothing back. But you’re more rewarding to pick on.”—former Ford executive 
 
They [NGOs] wouldn’t be getting the reaction they got [if they didn’t have any 
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influence]…where there is smoke there is fire…they were creating friction and 
heat…Although its tempting to say we didn’t need that much stress and conflict to 
change…-- former Ford manager 
 
When we were developing scientific model we brought in technical NGOs to 
validate what we are doing. We used the technical NGOs to see if our 
assumptions were right. They also gave credibility and enhanced our image by 
endorsing our [Blueprint] plan. They were a player in court of public opinion.—
Ford manager 
 
NGOs were helpful in signaling to us that the issue [climate change] had 
importance and was likely to be long lived and bringing the pressure. Even though 
we were making all of this money on SUVs and trucks we had to keep an eye on 
where this was going.—former Ford executive 
 
Its [engagement with NGOs] had a tremendous impact…When we had the first 
stakeholder engagement in 2000 we invited outside NGOs…We hardly knew 
these people but after spending 3 days with them we made climate change, human 
rights policy as 2 critical objectives that Bill [Ford] endorsed…So from the very 
beginning they made an impact. I think the reason why we were so successful 
[was this engagement]…I think that’s really important. I’ve been in this company 
for 28 years, we look at this as car guys. If we didn’t meet with these people we 
would think they [customers] wanted muscle cars.—Ford manager 
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The process of change described above, occurred over the course of more than a 
decade, however Ford’s initial awareness of climate change began in the 1970s. The 
timeline in Appendix 4.3 provides some of the key dates and milestones related to Ford’s 
climate change actions along the journey.  Prior to 2008, most of these events represent 
important although incremental steps characterized by decoupling and frequent internal 
and external friction. In 2008 Ford publishes its “Blueprint Plan” and its actions move 
from symbolic to substantive as climate strategy and discourse are finally linked with 
product performance. (A more thorough account of how this occurred is offered below). 
A few examples, discussed in detail below, provide insight into how the process 
of change occurred at Ford. The common theme throughout these examples is the often 
intense friction that transpired along the way, leading to a model of change as described 
above. Particularly in the early days of Ford’s climate response (beginning around 2000 
as described in the timeline), this change was characterized internally as a battleground 
between departments, and between Ford of Europe and North America. Externally 
conflict with NGOs and regulators was also common. This friction resulted from the 
uncomfortable tensions created internally as response to climate change was counter to 
the company’s institutional inertia. However, beginning around 2006, climate change is 
seen as an important competitive global battle ground and a strategic imperative. At this 
time there is also increasing alignment between Ford’s strategy and external conditions 
such as demand for smaller vehicles and concerns regarding fuel economy driven by the 
price of gasoline. Employees commented on the difficulty of the process, and its 
antagonistic nature. 
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We had a real cultural problem on our hand that needed to change in addition to 
vehicles. We needed to make more sustainable vehicles and also change the 
mindset and roles as it related to sustainability.—External interviewee 
 
I don’t want to make it seem too negative here…but to me I don’t want to seem 
like Ford has got climate change and it’s a no brainer. It has been a very tortuous 
journey and process…We are doing ourselves a disservice if we paint it as easy or 
evolutionary…Its been a battle every step of the way, but its true that the 
company is embracing the need to be more fuel efficient because of market 
demands, and we have changed our brand so green is part of brand DNA.—Ford 
manager 
 
But we’ve come such a long way both in addressing the issue [climate change] 
and how we talk about it and work with it…Its tremendous to see the 
sophistication that has developed around that process and how its become such an 
acceptable way of how we think. People have done an admirable job of making it 
work well within the company, whereas early on it was antagonistic.—Ford 
manager 
 
 
I elaborate on a few events from the timeline above as characteristic examples, or 
perhaps they are more appropriately referred to as “battles,” from different phases of the 
change process. Examples are from the period of the corporate citizenship office’s 
founding, Ford’s decision to leave the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), the publication 
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of Ford’s first Corporate Citizenship Report, early fuel economy goals and standards and 
finally the formation of the “Blueprint Plan.”  
 
Awareness: Sustainability Office Formation 
As described above, the office that is primarily responsible for climate change and 
more broadly sustainability strategy and implementation at Ford is the Office of 
Sustainability and Vehicle Environmental Matters. This office was created and 
championed by Bill Ford shortly after he became Chairman in 1999. The first director of 
the Office, Deborah Zemke (2003), described his motivation in these terms: 
 He recognized that corporate responsibility was no longer about Foundations and 
charitable donations.  They are important, of course, and Ford is a committed 
leader in philanthropic activities.   But Bill saw corporate responsibility as who 
we are, what we offer in the marketplace and how we conduct our business.  
 
The office began as the Corporate Citizenship Office reporting to the Vice 
President of Governmental Affairs, and later became the Sustainable Business Strategies 
Office which reports to the Vice President for Sustainability, Environment and Safety 
Engineering.  Today the Vice President for Sustainability reports directly to the CEO, so 
the office continues to enjoy a direct connection to company executives.  
The office began to address climate change with the help of external advisors following a 
stakeholder dialogue in which climate change was addressed as one of the top three 
issues that stakeholders were most concerned to see Ford address.  Deborah Zemke 
(2003) describes this process as a painful but important turning point for the company:  
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Late in 1999, we asked John Elkington’s company, SustainAbility, to help assess 
our strengths, weaknesses, and long-term risks in the context of Sustainable 
Development and CSR.   Part of the process involved exposing senior Ford 
leaders to a cross-section of stakeholders--it led to some unusual gatherings and 
the discussion was not without its pain!   But the lessons learned, and fed back to 
the board in 2000, were a turning point for us. 
 
From the beginning, the four full-time employees in the office encountered 
tensions working within the company despite the support they were receiving from Bill 
Ford.  Several quotes from employees illustrate how the office operated, and how the 
employees in the office perceived their role within the company during these early days 
as “internal activists” with “one foot in the company and one foot out” (Gelhaus, 2003). 
They viewed their primary role as looking for signals of societal change that would 
impact Ford. Many of these signals were “read” through relationships with external 
advisors and NGOs. One of the former managers in the office described the relationship 
with NGOS: “they are like a canary in a coal mine- a signal for change. We want to give 
them the legitimacy they deserve” (Gelhaus, 2003). 
As internal activists, or tempered radicals, the employees often found themselves 
at odds with other offices and particularly with the policy, or Governmental Affairs 
Office (ironically since they reported to the same vice president) that was reticent to 
endorse any changes that would lead to the “slippery slope” of increasing fuel economy 
standards (Meyerson and Scully, 1995).  The director describes these early days as "less a 
straight journey than a jagged trail.” The tension became so severe that the director of the 
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office was often accused of siding with NGOs at the expense of the company, and 
eventually was asked to retire.  However, because she was willing to “walk the plank,” 
she broke significant ground and raised awareness of the climate issue that paved the way 
for future directors to focus on connecting the climate issue to the business.  
 
We had a healthy tension...what we had was a situation where we had advisors 
coming in and telling us where the industry should be heading…Debbie walked 
the plank because she was at the end of her career. She was getting painted into 
that corner as well, “you’re aren’t looking out for the business”…but she was 
more reading weak signals and putting together evidence…The other crazy 
dynamic was Bill Ford…his name is on the building, he’s a visionary but couldn’t 
do it [drive climate action] because the company was so big and of all of the 
politics and fiefdoms—former Ford manager 
 
We [the sustainability office] were a grain of sand in the oyster…we were  
the irritant…Our relationship with the business was making the point of view of 
the scientists and NGOs of the east coast—former Ford executive 
 
 
Early Action: Leaving the global climate coalition 
 
Some of the early actions of the sustainability office were regarded internally as 
difficult changes for the company, however as the Director, Deborah Zemke (2003) says 
the real difficulty (and associated conflict and decoupling) came during the process of 
following through.  
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Some major shifts in our thinking on Climate began in 2000:We announced that 
we accepted the science of Climate Change and would address the issue 
responsibly and proactively. We withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition—
the first auto company to do so.  We signed up to CERES and its principles of 
environmental responsibility. We published an initial assessment of our 
Greenhouse Gas emissions not only for our plants but also for our products which 
are the principal source of our Climate impact. Those changes were relatively 
easy compared with the follow-through. 
 
I will examine briefly the decision to leave the Global Climate Coalition. As 
described previously, the GCC was an industry coalition focused on fighting the science 
of Climate Change, and specifically making sure that no action was taken on the Kyoto 
Protocol. However as new scientific evidence emerged, the company, and in particular, 
Bill Ford became uncomfortable with the GCC’s position. Ford’s decision to leave the 
GCC made it the first auto company to do so, and it’s departure was followed shortly by 
General Motors and Chrysler. The group subsequently became defunct.  As described by 
a former executive, the move was not without controversy: 
 
The issue of the [Global] climate coalition evolved. There was a lot of skepticism 
early on and a lot of uncertainty. The CEO, Alex Trottman, was not convinced it 
was an issue. Even if you were convinced it was not clear what the policy action 
should be. Given the seriousness of the problem there was uncertainty about what 
policy actions to take. In terms of how Ford changed, the science started to 
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become more clear…Ford’s management started to get concerned that GCC was 
on wrong side of the issue…Bill ford becoming chairman was a big factor, 
because he was uncomfortable with the old view [of climate change]….We waded 
into that and to extricate ourselves externally was hard… It was not hard to 
change internally. It was hard to change externally because of politics. We had to 
tell politicians and a lot of Senators felt that they had gone out on a limb and now 
we were sawing off the limb…When we announced it [leaving the GCC] that was 
the end of the GCC. –former Ford executive 
 
 
From an external perspective this time period was also full of tension: 
 
Early on these conversations [about climate change] were fairly 
adversarial…During that time all auto makers were part of the Global Climate 
Coalition. That was the state of things during the Kyoto period. I have one 
anecdote…by the mid90s I was based in DC and making regular trips to 
Detroit…There was one striking plane ride home for me…The plane was full of 
auto lobbyists…I thought if this plane went down the world would be a better 
place…there was a lot of hard ball lobbying…--External interviewee 
 
 
Role Recognition: Reporting 
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Two important moments in Ford’s evolution towards recognizing its role in 
addressing the climate challenge manifested themselves as (often bitter) conversations 
regarding SUV fuel economy. 
Ford released its first sustainability report (then corporate citizenship report) in 
2000. (As an important point of context, prior to this time Ford had been relatively silent 
on the issue of climate change, and a seventy page internal report examining 
environmental issues facing the company first mentioned climate change on page 58). 
The report featured a fairly innocent looking two-page spread discussing the 
environmental and safety concerns associated with SUVs. The result, however, was 
viewed internally as a “media firestorm” with coverage in the Economist and New York 
Times. While the report had been circulated to executives for review, for most it sat on 
their desk and went unnoticed until after its publication attracted media attention. 
Subsequently the Director of the office was called in front of the executives and board for 
what she called a “public flogging” (Zemke, 2003).  As described by one employee, the 
initial process of reporting was “bumpy” and the sustainability office itself was seen as 
“an annoying nat in the company:” 
 
It [reporting] was hard at first because people didn’t really understand our 
[sustainability] office. Information was largely seen as proprietary and they didn’t 
understand why we were interested, it was bumpy—Ford manager 
 
I started in February of 2000 and in May of that year at our annual meeting we put 
that [discussion of SUV environmental impacts] into our first sustainability 
report…The process [for reporting] was very rudimentary and challenging. We 
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were like an annoying nat in the company…It was 2 pages out of 100 plus pages 
in the report questioning the greenness of SUVs,,,The New York Times did an 
article in the paper the next morning saying Ford was questioning itself. This 
largely brought attention to our office and it was bumpy and a less ideal way of 
bringing attention…although it was ultimately effective in forcing a lot of 
attention on the office and forcing recognition [of climate change] even if in a 
stressful way…In hindsight its something that in some ways has to happen in big 
organization to draw attention to issues that are considered important and that we 
should be focused on even though they are seen as more societal issues…but you 
can’t separate yourself as a global company from these societal issues because 
they are part of business—Ford manager 
 
 
Early reporting was also important because it was through the reporting process 
that Ford first calculated and shared its estimated contribution to greenhouse gas 
emissions as mentioned above. And by 2006 the company published a standalone climate 
change report in response to a shareholder resolution (which was eventually withdrawn). 
This marked an important turning point where climate change now became less 
threatening and something that could be spoken about internally according to 
interviewees. 
 
 
That [climate change] report was a turning point in the industry in terms of 
making climate change less threatening…Before there was no way that 
“cockimamy” theory of climate change was good for the industry. The turning 
 
 
149
point was that you can talk about climate change without world falling apart.—
former Ford executive  
 
Fuel Economy Goals and Standards 
 
Another important moment in the early stages of Ford’s recognition of its role 
was its first goal aimed at addressing climate change. Ford’s “25 in 5” goal was a 
commitment to reduce fuel economy of SUV’s by 25 percent in five years by 2005. This 
was later followed by a “hybrid commitment” to increase production of hybrids to 
250,000 by 2010. However, as recounted by employees these commitments were not tied 
to the business or measurable performance objectives, and they were ultimately not met.  
 
[Ford received] so much attention for setting the target and then criticism for 
missing it…People were mad internally because it didn’t reflect internal culture 
and goals and priorities…It may have been ahead of consumer demand—former 
Ford manager 
 
Despite their visionary nature, the effect of not meeting the 25 in 5 goal was 
deteriorating credibility among NGO’s, government and employees with little 
improvement in fuel economy or climate change emissions. This began a series of years 
of strained relations between NGOs and the company due to perceived greenwashing, 
including tense conversations over increasing fuel economy standards and a series of 
campaigns. Several of these campaigns personally attacked Bill Ford, including a full 
page New York Times ad featuring Bill Ford with a Pinocchio nose.   
 
That [25/5] was such a disaster not because Ford failed to keep the 25/5 
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commitment…It was because of the way we communicated that we weren’t going 
to keep commitment. If we had gone around to all the NGOs to talk to them about 
why we were falling short it would have made a difference…we could have 
gotten them all onboard….but some PD guy in a off hand way at an auto show 
mentioned this…--Ford manager 
 
A lot of NGOs hung [Ford’s] reputation on 25/5…as soon as we pulled the plug 
in a clumsy way that put them in an untenable position with their constituents.—
former Ford executive 
 
 
Opportunity and Alignment: Blueprint Plan 
 
A markedly different example is that of the development of Ford’s Blueprint Plan. 
Development of the plan involved moving beyond Ford’s recognition of its role in 
addressing climate change, into recognition of the opportunities involved and eventually 
implementation beginning with the establishment of governance structures and scaling of 
technology. The Blueprint Plan is aligned with Ford’s goal of contribution to climate 
stabilization (at 450 ppm) and is based on modeling of vehicle contributions to emissions 
as well as market and regulatory trends (Ford sustainability Report, 2013). The process 
for developing this plan is described by an executive. 
 
 
We were able to come up with CO2 targets in near, mid and long term and it was 
really that that set up what we needed to deliver with out product.  We are aiming 
for 30 percent improvement in CO2 performance by 2020 from a 2006 baseline, 
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and 80 percent by 2050. The research team came up with the CO2 targets based 
on IPCC. We worked with a cross functional team of PD [product development], 
planning and researchers and the sustainability office to say if we know targets 
which technologies could we put into our vehicles and what are the projected 
costs of those technologies.—Ford executive 
 
This structure and accountability for implementing the plan is supported by 
Ford’s sustainable mobility governance team. Broadly described it is a portfolio approach 
comprised of multiple technologies. This team includes a manager and director level 
group, the Global Sustainability Planning Team (GSPT), which reports to a vice president 
level group, the Sustainable Mobility Governance (SMG). Progress towards the Plan is 
shared with the CEO at weekly Business Plan Review (BPR), meetings.  
 
The important thing is in regions where we have regulations it [the Blueprint 
Plan] allows us to plan longer term. It is about “what are we for” instead of what 
are we fighting…If regulations don’t align than at least we have an anchor, if 
regulations get more stringent than it becomes more onerous… [Previously] We 
had just been so busy with planning the next 2 or 3 years, and meeting CAFE… 
we never had anything that was 5 years out more…I likened it to my 8 year old 
who hadn’t learned to ride a bike yet because he kept looking at his feet.—Ford 
manager 
 
While there is occasionally friction over regional performance (particularly in 
Asia Pacific where rapid growth is accompanied by a lack of regulation) this plan has 
been embraced internally. It has also been shared and widely supported by the external 
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community including policy makers, NGOs and socially responsible investors.  
 
There was a shift in how staff was approaching it [climate change]…people who 
had previously been confrontational were able to develop working 
relationships…It is a very ambitious plan… I have some technical nitpicking on 
assumptions about biofuels, but it is a useful sophisticated analysis.—External 
interviewee 
 
 
Following the development of this product plan, Ford has also developed a plan to 
address the carbon dioxide emissions from manufacturing which represent 2 percent of 
Ford’s overall emissions contributing to climate change. An employee describes how 
Ford’s actions were driven by opportunity, and how in some cases implementation of this 
plan even involves requiring actions that may not meet the typical one year payback 
period for energy efficiency projects. 
 
Last year we developed a global CO2 strategy [for manufacturing], we got a team 
from around the world to look at opportunities and what competitors were doing 
and arrived at a CO2 glidepath. We looked at stabilization at 450 ppm and worked 
with RIC [Ford’s research center]. The goal is 30 percent per unit improvement 
from 2010 to 2025 and 70 percent by 2050. We developed a strategy and 
reviewed with every vice president of manufacturing globally…we’re building a 
lot of plants right now, so why be short sighted?Ford’s payback for a normal 
project is 1 year, on rare occasions an exception will be made and a 2 year 
[payback] will be done. Energy efficiency criteria will typically meet a 1 year 
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payback but sometimes we just require. –Ford manager 
 
 
Collectively, this analysis also provides insight into when corporate actions are 
symbolic vs. substantive. In this context I define substantive action as that which 
scientifically based in climate stabilization and connected to corporate strategy, core 
business practice and products.  I compared the way that actions were described and 
climate response was enacted (or not) prior to and after 2006. As seen in the timeline and 
described by an interviewee, 2006 was an important year and marked the point when 
Ford’s climate response became strategic. 
 
2006 was a turning point…Initial acceptance [of climate change] was driven 
pretty brilliantly by Debbie [Zemke] like calculating total use emissions of Ford 
fleet…Debbie made many enemies but put this in global context…awareness and 
initial acceptance [of climate change] really began in 2000 but was not actionable 
really until 2006…at that point it shifted from reputational, and “nice to know” to 
strategic…it [change] has to be slow in industry where 3 years [to develop a 
product] is fast and 5 to 7 years is normal.—External interviewee 
 
Table 4.2 provides indicators of symbolic and substantive actions based on 
interviewees characterization of Ford’s actions over time.  This table can be read as a 
kind of “diagnostic test”. For example actions are more likely to be symbolic if they are 
risk driven or regulatory driven, while they are more likely to be substantive if they are 
opportunity or science driven.  
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Table 4.2 Indicators of Symbolic vs. Substantive Action 
 
Symbolic Substantive Quote or Example 
Risk driven  Opportunity driven  See quotes above regarding 
opportunity and market 
competitiveness 
Regulatory driven Science driven Before 2004 it [addressing 
climate change/fuel 
economy] was all about 
regulations… Regulatory 
environments were the 
historic driver…not to go a 
great deal beyond 
compliance because it 
added cost and consumers 
did not value it.—Ford 
executive 
Primarily a function of 
corporate communication 
Reflected in job 
responsibilities and 
embedded in day to day 
operations throughout 
company 
It [Blueprint Plan] became 
embedded into capital 
allocation, and our strategic 
plan…its embedded into 
day to day operations- 
That’s when you know 
you’ve gone from research 
to reality.—Ford executive 
Not aligned with corporate 
goals, priorities or strategy 
(or these are lacking all 
together) 
Aligned with corporate 
goals, priorities and strategy 
[Initially] Reporting was 
not aligned with corporate 
goals.—Ford manager 
 
 
Lack of governance Clear governance structure See quotes above regarding 
governance 
Not measured or reported Measured and reported  See quotes above regarding 
reporting.  
 
 
 
One of the most telling “tests” of the substantive nature of Ford’s climate action 
post 2006, is that employees repeatedly confirmed that Ford would adjust its strategy and 
continue to “do its share” to meet climate stabilization goals even if scientific consensus 
later suggested that 450 ppm was not enough.  When asked, “Would Ford considering 
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adjusting its plan to meet a 350 or 400 ppm goal if needed?” employees responded 
affirmatively. 
 
 
If someone came back and said 400 or 350 ppm was compelling we would take a 
look. Now at least we have the tools to understand how it would translate to 
business and if we could remain in business. I guess at that point we would have 
some grounds to challenge the policy makers to say we think for our industry to 
be what people want it to be, you have to look at other sectors like air travel and 
power generation. –Ford manager 
 
This [450 ppm] is institutionalized, there is a process in place and we are doing 
something. It [progress toward the Blueprint plan] gets reviewed every week by 
top executives especially if it is red [meaning off track]. If another IPCC report 
comes out we will adjust the 450 ppm number. We have a process in place, which 
makes adjusting easier. This is different from 25/5 because its not a separate plan, 
it’s the plan.—Ford executive 
 
 
However, Ford’s climate response and “Blueprint Plan” is not without its critics. 
Interviewees mentioned concerns that Ford’s plan does not include embedded carbon 
dioxide in the vehicle materials, and is highly reliant on consumer preferences rather than 
trying to drive market demand.  
I do think the company is committed to the Blueprint, but if the price of oil went 
down to $2 gallon how much effort would be put into this? Would we put more 
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effort into trucks? We have gone from the Excursion to CO2 strategy in a short 
time.--Ford manager 
 
Finally, it is also interesting to briefly describe interviewee demographics, as 
climate change is a topic that elicits a variety of strong personal reactions. Interviewees 
spanned the spectrum of viewpoints on climate science. Some participants were self-
described as having a personal passion for the issue while others claimed relative 
ambivalence. As well as being part of their job description, those with a personal passion 
for the issue were addressing climate change through actions in their personal life. 
Ambivalence was characterized by the attitude that as long as addressing climate change 
and fuel economy were good for the business and there was consumer demand than it 
could not hurt. Others believed climate change was happening but were not worried 
because it wouldn’t have material impacts in their life and/or they didn’t have children.  I 
only interviewed one climate skeptic who believed climate change was happening, but 
was not convinced it was primarily from human causes. A few quotes bring these 
demographics to life.  
 
Climate change is definitely happening, and I am really happy that we have as a 
company a clear statement that addresses climate. In the south of Europe you 
already see that especially in Spain the summers are really hot and dry and it is 
really obvious that something is changing. I have two children, I explain to them 
something is happening. I am also purchasing green energy, but not for the 
heating system. I am heating my house with renewable resources, simply 
wood…It is something I think about when I purchase other goods, for example I 
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don’t need strawberries in winter.—Ford manager  
 
I personally switched my electricity provider to one with 100 percent renewable 
electricity. I am biking to the office…At work you have a contribution, but also 
needs to be personal.—Ford manager 
 
I have a passion for this [climate change]…Capitalism can’t survive unless it 
internalizes externalities. The only way mankind can survive if we factor in 
consequences now and in the future. I want my kids and grandkids to live in a 
world that is socially equitable…I do act as though CO2 is important to me 
but I don’t drive most fuel efficient vehicle.—Ford manager 
 
I can only approach it [climate change] from what I read in the media and it 
suggests strongly that it is happening…I don’t question that there seems to be 
enough opinion that it is real…At the end of the day where I’m coming from is if 
we can do the right thing for customers and the environment than doing it for 
whatever reason is okay.—Ford manager 
 
I’m not worried about climate change because it won’t have a material impact in 
our lives and I don’t have kids.—Ford manager 
 
I think climate change is happening. I’m not convinced that it is solely caused by 
human interaction…If you look at localized weather last winter it was really cold. 
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I’m a little skeptical because we’ve had periods of warming in other times…I’m 
waiting for more definitive view on things…The other view is…It makes dollars 
and cents to pay attention to this [climate change]. Because if you’re not you’re 
going to pay for it with lost customers and you can’t stay in business with lost 
customers.—Ford manager 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Bill Ford is often quoted saying, “a good company delivers excellent products and 
services, a great company delivers excellent products and services and strives to make the 
world a better place.” This analysis illuminates the internal conflicts and tensions and the 
sometimes protracted process of change involved in this “striving.” 
 This chapter both offers a theory of change, and chronicles Ford’s response to 
climate change and how and why over the course of a decade the company moved from 
issue acceptance, to recognition of their role and finally opening up to opportunity and 
scaling of solutions while moving from symbolic to substantive action throughout the 
process. The change model that emerges is characterized by friction, as well as indicators 
of substantive and symbolic action that builds upon and refines previous theories 
(Hoffman 2001a; Howard-Grenville, 2010).  
 While some argue that this change process and Ford’s response to climate change 
was business as usual, this is different than other corporate initiatives because of its 
significant generative impact internally as well as on an industry level. Because Ford’s 
(and the auto industry’s) products are its largest contribution to greenhouse gas emissions 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions is therefore tied at its core to Ford’s products they 
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were simultaneously creating new, inescapable “rules of the game” for the industry 
(Friedman, 1970, p. 126). The most notable example of which was the moment when 
Ford became the first automotive company to leave the Global Climate Coalition 
signaling that they were done fighting over the science of climate change. Within months 
General Motors and Chrysler both left the GCC as well, essentially meaning the end of 
the group.  Ford’s commitment to improve the fuel economy of its SUVs (although 
ultimately not achieved) was also met with similar commitments and press releases from 
other automotive companies promising to do the same or better.  Internally addressing 
climate change substantively has had a generative impact on the company as well, 
allowing the company to credibly address other sustainability challenges such as human 
rights, conflict minerals and water internally and amongst its industry peers. According to 
an executive: 
I’m really proud of the progress we’ve made in the last few years and how people 
see sustainability as part of the company. It has allowed us to look at human 
rights, water, congestion, minerals…There is a lot more work to do in the future 
and having the opportunity to lay it out gives us a good view of the future…It is 
broader than climate change… its the triple bottom line, environmental, social and 
economic.—Ford executive 
 
 For practitioners in the sustainability field, this case represents a study of the early 
stages of the transformation of corporate America with respect to climate challenges 
(Hoffman, 2001b). Ford’s actions signal a level of transparency and responsiveness that 
was previously unprecedented by corporations, particularly on contentious issues such as 
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climate change. If this trend is applicable in nature across sectors and future social 
movements, it might inform implementation of future climate legislation and voluntary 
initiatives as well as sustainability issues more broadly. For example, it suggests that 
governments, NGOs and investors should focus their attention on leading companies that 
are responding to climate change to affect industry change. It also suggests that when it 
comes to encouraging substantive climate responses, that market opportunity, science and 
NGO influence will have a greater impact than threats of risk. For those intrapreneurs or 
“tempered radicals” working from within to create change, this study emphasizes the 
importance of leadership support, developing governance structures and speaking in the 
language of business opportunity rather than risk (Meyerson and Scully, 1995).  
 This study also builds on the work of the previous chapters. This analysis 
provides a better understanding of the mechanisms and tensions underlying decoupling 
and logics, and how these affect performance leading to substantive or symbolic action. It 
leads to the questions: what logics does Ford prescribe to over time? And, are certain 
logics associated with decoupling? Based on this analysis, we see Ford move from logics 
of conservation and risk to an opportunity logic over time corresponding with a more 
substantive response to climate change. This suggests that risk and conservation logics 
are more likely to be associated with decoupling, while an opportunity logic is likely to 
be associated with coupling or substantive action. This would be an interesting area for 
future research.  
 
Limitations and Future Research  
 
Ethnographic work is well suited to understanding complex, dynamic and 
sensitive topics such as corporate response to climate change. However, there are 
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methodological limitations. This study does share several of these limitations, leading to 
interesting opportunities for future research. First this study examines a single 
organization and issue. While this close attention to context in a single setting reveals 
underlying mechanisms and tensions it does impact generalizability. Future studies could 
compare multiple issues or look across similar organizations to better understand 
changing corporate response to sustainability issues such as climate change. 
Sampling problems in ethnographic fieldwork can result from the nonrandom 
selection of a small number of subjects. It is also difficult to generalize results based on 
small sample sizes. I maximized variability in sampling through investigation of multiple 
employees’ perspectives on climate response from varying departments and managerial 
levels, as well as retired and past employees. Interviews with external participants and 
observers of the change also provided additional perspective. Future research could 
involve interviews or surveys with employees in other similar companies, and/or with 
additional employees at Ford. Semi-structured interview results are also susceptible to 
reactivity among interviewees, particularly on sensitive topics such as climate change and 
green washing. There is also the problem of receiving selective information from 
informants.  To check for bias I examined alternative explanations to my interpretations 
through colleagues, feedback from respondents and by searching for negative evidence. I 
attempted to avoid bias by establishing or building upon previous rapport with company 
employees to minimize reactivity, looking for inconsistencies between informants, and 
checking informants reports against available company records (Singleton and Straits, 
1999).   
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It would also be interesting to examine the generative capacity of this change 
process and its rippling effect internally on the way other sustainability issues are 
addressed as well as the way the industry was impacted. Drawing on ethnography in 
conjunction with large sample network data would allow for an analysis of the effects of 
tie content and structure on institutional change.  More specifically, combining these 
methods would provide a better understanding of the structure and quality of social ties 
among organizations, and how these ties shape access to opportunities for innovative 
institutional change, such as response to climate change (Uzzi, 1996). And, by linking 
organizational and field level analyses, I would also expect that a more substantive 
response to climate change will reflect the dominant institutional logics, e.g. belief 
systems, as shaped by institutional entrepreneurs in the climate change field (Hoffman, 
2001b). Furthermore, the use of two dissimilar methods allows for triangulation and 
strengthens the ability to compare and interpret the results of both the network analysis 
and ethnographic fieldwork9 (Singleton and Straits, 1999).  
Conclusion 
 
As atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide continue to rise and scientists 
report that the we are crossing new thresholds of global temperature rise (IPCC, 2013), 
the elephant in the room remains: Are Ford’s actions enough? And do they make Ford a 
“sustainable” corporation? 
                                                
9 Triangulation describes how the “use of multiple, independent approaches to a research question can 
enable an investigator to ‘zero in’ on the answers or information sought” (Egon G.  Guba and Yvonna S. 
Lincoln, 1982; Singleton and Straits, 1999). 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While significant, it is likely that given the scope of the challenge Ford’s current 
climate actions can only be considered incremental improvements. This is a reality that 
the company has begun to acknowledge in recent years. Bill Ford recently gave a TED 
talk on the topic of sustainable mobility, and has been quoted as saying: “After 100 years 
of evolution, the automobile industry is on the edge of a revolution, responding to the 
increasingly urgent need for new mobility solutions that have dramatically lower 
environmental impacts” (Ford, 2011). Is this an overly optimistic view of the industry, or 
is Ford yet again in the early stages of change? The salient question then is to what extent 
(and how quickly) the company can embrace a transformation to a post-Fordist Ford 
focused on providing sustainable mobility solutions10, rather than continuing to view 
itself primarily as a provider of cars and trucks?  
  
                                                
10 Mobility is “principally a means of improving accessibility”, although it is not the only means of 
improving accessibility (WBCSD, 2001). For mobility to be sustainable it must improve accessibility with 
minimal negative environmental, social, and economic consequences. The World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development has defined sustainable mobility as “the ability to meet the needs of society to 
move freely, gain access, communicate, trade, and establish relationships without sacrificing other essential 
human or ecological values, today or in the future” (WBCSD, 2001).  To a certain extent, what actually 
constitutes sustainable mobility can differ depending on location (Octopus, 2006; MTE, 2004; WBCSD, 
2001). 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Appendix 4.1 Ford Interview Questions 
 
Interview brief: 
 
• Recording and notes 
• Consent form signed 
• Date 
• Time 
• Length of Meeting 
• Location of meeting 
• Name of participant 
• Title 
• Department 
• Tone of meeting 
 
Semi-structured interview sketch  
 
Your role and network, or the people you work with… 
1. What is your role at Ford, and how does it relate to climate change? 
 
 
2. With whom do you work directly on climate issues at Ford? With whom do you work 
directly outside of Ford? Who do you benchmark? e.g. for creation of products/services, 
for strategic advice or for policy implementation, etc.? 
 
 
3.  To whom do you turn for advice, new ideas, new information, research, inspiration, 
resources, knowledge, etc?  
 
 
4. How has engagement with other organizations regarding climate change transformed or 
altered Ford’s internal practices and perceptions? 
 
 
5. What are the outcomes/consequences of Ford’s engagement with multiple organizations 
related to climate change? When are they advantageous? disadvantageous? …e.g. power, 
information, diffusion, altering markets 
 
 
6. How often does the topic of climate change come up in meetings? Executive meetings? 
Examples of recent meetings… 
 
 
Firm Identity, or how people view Ford… 
7. When it comes to climate change, how do you see Ford? Your colleagues? E.g. what is 
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the general firm attitude towards climate change? How has this changed over time? Are 
there multiple views of Ford? 
 
 
8. When it comes to climate change, how is Ford seen by people outside the company for 
instance environmentalists? Policy makers? Customers? Shareholders? Investors? 
Regulators? Others? e.g. leader, laggard, technology focused, leadership driven, 
scientifically driven, etc? Are there multiple views? 
 
 
9. Why do people see the company in this way? E.g. Leadership, employees, external 
stakeholder pressure, affiliations, lobbying? 
 
 
10. How and why has this view of Ford changed over time? And, who has impacted this 
change? 
 
 
Firm Actions… 
11. Why, when and how climate became an actionable issue for them as individuals and for 
the company? Timeline, key milestones? 
 
 
12. Current climate related actions by the firm? As they relate to your job in 
particular…Important past actions? Planned, future actions? 
a. Nature of these actions: time commitment, resources, linkages to overall firm 
strategy and goals and sustainability strategy and goals, incentives, top-down or 
bottom-up, influence of leadership, competitors, investors, regulators, consumers, 
NGOs, science, other stakeholders, etc.?  
 
13. How is the possibility of climate related action impacted by relations with other 
organizations? 
For example…How important is it to publicly report on climate change commitments and 
progress? What is the impact of reporting? How does GRI/CDP affect the possibility for 
action related to climate change? 
 
 
14. Are Ford’s climate actions symbolic or substantive? How has this changed over time?  
 
 
15. How is Ford’s “Blueprint” different than “25/5”? 
 
 
16.  Do you believe Ford will meet its goals this time for 450 ppm? What if the goal is 
reduced to 350 or 400 ppm? 
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17. How do you reconcile what lobbyists were doing while Bill ford was saying what he is 
saying about being a sustainability leader? 
 
 
18. Why was ford able to get out ahead on Human Rights instead of Climate Change? What 
is the difference between these issues? 
 
 
19. What is the impact of the recent financial difficulties of the auto industry on Ford’s 
climate change work? 
 
20. What does change in governance both with your position and Board name change mean? 
 
 
21. Who championed EV? Bill Ford was hybrid escape… 
 
Personally… 
22. Do you, personally, believe climate change is happening? Is it human related? Will sea 
level rise? Temperature change? 
 
23. How worried are you, personally, about climate change? 
 
24. Are you, personally, doing anything to limit the effects of climate change?  
 
25. Where do you go for your information on climate change? 
 
26. Do you trust scientists? Policy makers? Companies? 
 
27. Will climate change impact the economy? Ford? 
 
 
Demographics…(only if you are comfortable answering) 
 
28. Sex 
 
29. Age 
 
30. Political affiliation 
 
31. Length of time at Ford 
 
32. Can I come back with additional questions? 
 
33. Other people to talk to? 
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Appendix 4.2 External/NGO Interview Questions 
 
Interview brief: 
 
• Recording and notes 
• Consent form signed 
• Date 
• Time 
• Length of Meeting 
• Location of meeting 
• Name of participant 
• Title 
• Department 
• Tone of meeting 
 
Semi-structured interview sketch  
 
Your role and network, or the people you work with… 
34. What is your role as it relates to Ford, and how does it relate to climate change? 
 
 
35. With whom do you work directly on climate issues at Ford?  
 
 
36. How has engagement with other organizations regarding climate change transformed or 
altered Ford’s internal practices and perceptions? 
 
 
37. What are the outcomes/consequences of Ford’s engagement with multiple organizations 
related to climate change? When are they advantageous? disadvantageous? …e.g. power, 
information, diffusion, altering markets 
 
 
Firm Identity, or how people view Ford… 
38. When it comes to climate change, how do you see Ford? Your colleagues? E.g. what is 
the general firm attitude towards climate change? How has this changed over time? Are 
there multiple views of Ford? 
 
 
39. When it comes to climate change, how is Ford seen by other people outside the company 
for instance environmentalists? Policy makers? Customers? Shareholders? Investors? 
Regulators? Others? e.g. leader, laggard, technology focused, leadership driven, 
scientifically driven, etc? Are there multiple views? 
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40. Why do people see the company in this way? E.g. Leadership, employees, external 
stakeholder pressure, affiliations, lobbying? 
 
 
41. How and why has this view of Ford changed over time? And, who has impacted this 
change? 
 
 
Firm Actions… 
42. Why, when and how do you think climate became an actionable issue for them as 
individuals and for the company? Timeline, key milestones? 
 
 
43. Current climate related actions by the firm? As they relate to your job in 
particular…Important past actions? Planned, future actions? 
a. Nature of these actions: time commitment, resources, linkages to overall firm 
strategy and goals and sustainability strategy and goals, incentives, top-down or 
bottom-up, influence of leadership, competitors, investors, regulators, consumers, 
NGOs, science, other stakeholders, etc.?  
 
44. How is the possibility of climate related action impacted by relations with other 
organizations? 
For example…How important is it to publicly report on climate change commitments and 
progress? What is the impact of reporting? How does GRI/CDP affect the possibility for 
action related to climate change? 
 
 
45. Are Ford’s climate actions symbolic or substantive? How has this changed over time? 
Why is Ford’s “Blueprint” different than “25/5”? 
 
46.  Do you believe Ford will meet its goals this time for 450 ppm? What if the goal is 
reduced to 350 or 400 ppm? 
 
47. How do you reconcile what lobbyists were doing while Bill ford was saying what he is 
saying about being a sustainability leader? 
 
 
48. Why was ford able to get out ahead on Human Rights instead of Climate Change? What 
is the difference between these issues? 
 
 
49. What is the impact of the recent financial difficulties of the auto industry on Ford’s 
climate change work? 
 
 
 
 
 
169
Personally… 
50. Do you, personally, believe climate change is happening? Is it human related? Will sea 
level rise? Temperature change? 
 
51. How worried are you, personally, about climate change? 
 
52. Are you, personally, doing anything to limit the effects of climate change?  
 
53. Where do you go for your information on climate change? 
 
54. Do you trust scientists? Policy makers? Companies? 
 
55. Will climate change impact the economy? Ford? 
 
 
 
Demographics…(only if you are comfortable answering) 
 
56. Sex 
 
57. Age 
 
58. Political affiliation 
 
59. Length of time at Ford 
 
60. Can I come back with additional questions? 
 
61. Other people to talk to? 
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Appendix 4.3 Timeline of Key Climate Change Related Events at Ford 
 
Date Event Notes 
late 1970s 
Awareness of 
climate change 
begins in research 
divisions at Ford 
Climate change does not penetrate the Board 
room; Ford's primary concern is local air 
quality and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) pressures. Helen Petrauskas, Ford vice 
president is quoted saying, "Climate change did 
not require a step function change in strategy" 
(Levy and Rothenberg, 2002). 
1970s 
Ford is a climate 
denier at this point 
in time   
Late 
1980s to 
early 
1990s 
Ford becomes a 
climate skeptic at 
this point in time; 
Executives in the 
Ford research lab are 
characterized as 
climate critics 
however a few 
employees in the 
research lab are 
beginning to look 
into climate change 
seriously   
1989 
Ford hires a climate 
scientist   
early 
1990s 
CEO, Alex Trotman 
emphasizes high 
cost of action in the 
face of uncertainty 
regarding climate 
change 
This quote from a Ford manager is indicative of 
the view of climate change accepted throughout 
the company at this time, "We have followed 
the science as a company and we would like to 
see more science and less hot air! What we'd 
like to see is good science driving good policy." 
(Levy and Rothenberg, 2002) 
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Ford joins the 
Global Climate 
Coalition (GCC) 
Gas is $1 gallon; consumers are not concerned 
about fuel economy and want larger vehicles; 
Action on climate change is unlikely in the U.S. 
as the Senate is unlikely to ratify Kyoto (and 
the GCC is lobby against Kyoto ratification). 
1993 
Car talk committee 
convened 
Car talk is a committee of NGOs and 
automotive companies coming together to try to 
reach a consensus on CAFE policy; No 
consensus is reached during this period 
November 
1998 
Deborah Zemke, 
Director, and Bill 
Ford, Chairman, 
begin working on a 
"corporate 
citizenship" agenda. 
Corporate 
Citizenship office is 
subsequently created 
The agenda includes principles, engagement, 
transparency, accountability for Ford's impact 
in the world. Deborah has a background in 
Human Resources (HR) and ultimately 
becomes Director of the Corporate Citizenship 
Office 
December 
1998 
Deborah Zemke, 
Director, and Bill 
Ford, Chairman, 
meet with Bob 
Massie, head of 
Ceres 
Signals beginning of dialogue with NGOs. At 
this meeting Ford agreed to eventually endorse 
the Ceres principles and become a pilot test 
company for the Global Reporting initiative. 
(For several years Ford had received a 
shareholder resolution requesting endorsement 
of the Ceres Principles. The company resisted 
because of its stance on climate change and it 
did not want to issue an environmental report). 
January 
1999 Ford leaves GCC 
Leaving the GCC was a major step to signal 
that Ford was going to stop fighting over the 
science of climate change. GM and Chrysler 
followed ford in leaving the GCC. 
April 
2000 
Bill Ford speech at 
Ceres conference: 
Ford endorses the 
Ceres Principles   
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May 2000 
First Corporate 
Citizenship Report 
issued at Annual 
Shareholder Meeting 
in Atlanta. 
The report led to what Ford called a "media 
firestorm" including articles in the New York 
Times and Economist because of two pages 
describing safety and environmental issues 
related to SUVs. 
June 2000 
Deborah Zemke, 
Director, reports to 
the President's 
Strategy Council 
(the PSC included 
CEO, Jac Nasser and 
top executives) on 
Corporate 
Citizenship Strategy; 
subsequently 
updates 
Environmental and 
Public Policy 
Committee (EPPC) 
of the Board of 
Directors  
This is the start of the company's substantive 
discussions on climate change; Ford also begins 
climate modeling this year 
July 2000 
Jac Nasser, CEO, 
announces that Ford 
is committing to 
improving the fuel 
economy of its SUV 
fleet by 25% over 5 
years   
August 
2000 
Stakeholder dialogue 
to set strategic 
priorities for 
corporate citizenship 
Three issues were highlighted: human rights, 
climate change, and influencing Wall Street to 
take a longer term view of the importance of 
these issues. The dialogue makes news in the 
Wall Street Journal and New York Times. This 
also marked the beginning of the crisis over the 
Firestone tires on Ford Explorers that consumed 
the company for many months. 
October 
2000 
Bill Ford gives a 
major speech at 
Greenpeace Annual 
Business Conference 
in London "breaking 
the silence" on 
climate change   
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October 
2000 
Ford, BP and 
Princeton develop 
Climate Mitigation 
Initiative partnership 
for long term climate 
solutions   
December 
2000 
Deborah Zemke 
provides year-end 
review and 2001 
action plan to PSC 
Jac Nasser, CEO asks: "Is climate change a 
major environmental issue for Ford?" 
2000 
Ford gives $25 
million to 
Conservation 
International to 
establish a Center 
for Environmental 
Leadership in 
Business  
Bill Ford serves on the Center's executive 
Board  
June-
October 
2001 
Series of 
presentations by 
Deborah Zemke, 
Director, to the PSC 
and EPPC of the 
Board on the 
strategic importance 
of climate change; 
Half-day executive 
offsite is also held to 
discuss approach to 
achieving 
greenhouse gas 
reductions 
Focus of the presentations: "Setting Ford's 
Strategic Direction for Climate Change" and 
"Why Climate is a critical, urgent issue for 
Ford" 
October 
2001 
Bill Ford becomes 
CEO 
Environmental Quality Office manager notes 
the difference of Bill Ford's approach to 
environmental issues, "There is a new sheriff in 
town" 
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October 
2001-
March 
2002 
Ford and Alliance of 
Automobile 
Manufacturers 
fighting increase in 
CAFE standards 
Damaging to Ford's reputation amongst NGOs; 
Ford begins to face campaigns from Sierra Club 
focused on the company's "lack of 
technological progress over the course of its 
100 years" (the campaign claims that Ford has 
not improved fuel economy since the Model T); 
Ford's commitment to the Ceres Principles is 
questioned and Bill Ford makes a personal trip 
in July 2002 to Ceres to reconfirm Ford's 
commitment to environmental performance 
May 2002 
Product 
Development gives a 
presentation to the 
Office of the 
Chairman and Chief 
Executive (OCCE) 
stating that little 
progress has been 
made to reduce 
greenhouse gas 
emissions and little 
is projected over the 
next 5-7 years   
June 2002 
Ford delays release 
of 3rd corporate 
citizenship report 
due to CAFE and 
Sierra Club conflicts   
July 2002 
Ford announces it 
will stop producing 
the Excursion 
(Ford's largest SUV 
that is disliked by 
the environmental 
community because 
of its poor fuel 
economy and related 
greenhouse gas 
emissions) 
Ford later announced in October 2003 that it 
would continue to produce the Excursion 
raising questions of trustworthiness amongst the 
NGO community 
September 
2002 
Ford included in the 
Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index 
and FTSE4Good for 
the first time; Ford 
also responds to the 
This marks the beginning of Ford's interaction 
with the investment community on the topic of 
climate change and sustainability in general 
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CDP (formerly the 
Carbon Disclosure 
Project) for the first 
time 
March 
2002 
Ford becomes an 
early participant in 
carbon markets.  
Ford is one of the first companies to join the 
U.K. Emissions Trading Scheme. Ford, along 
with the City of Chicago and 11 other 
companies, also founds the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX) in 2003. Both of these are 
voluntary programs. In 2005 Ford begins 
participation in the mandatory EU Emissions 
Trading System.  
December 
2002 
Ford receives a 
shareholder 
resolution on climate 
change from Sister 
Patricia Daly from 
the Interfaith Center 
on Corporate 
Responsibility 
Ford worked with ICCR to get the resolution 
withdrawn; Sister Pat told the media "Ford set a 
new standard in transparency and corporate 
governance" 
April 
2003 
Ford states that it 
will not meet its "25 
in 5" SUV 
commitment at New 
York Auto Show NGOs are disappointed and mad 
May 2003 
Ford begins to face 
campaigns from 
Rainforest Action 
Network (RAN) and 
Bluewater Network 
because of CAFE 
positioning and 
failure to meet 
"25/5" commitment 
These campaigns include full-page ads in the 
New York Times of Bill Ford with a pinocchio 
nose and coffins claiming that Ford's vehicles 
are resulting in deaths due to our reliance on 
foreign oil and resulting conflict in the Middle 
East 
July 2003 
Bill Ford sends a 
memo to vice-
presidents asking 
them to develop mid 
to long term 
strategies for climate 
change   
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2004 
Niel Golightly 
appointed Director 
of the Sustainable 
Business Strategies 
Office (formerly the 
corporate citizenship 
office) 
Niel has a background in communications 
within Ford, as well as working in the 
Chairman's office with Bill Ford. 
  
The Hybrid Escape 
(Ford's first hybrid 
vehicle) is released 
for the 2005 model 
year to North 
American markets 
 Development of the hybrid is championed by 
Bill Ford however receives resistance internally 
from the marketing department 
  
Ford and United 
Auto Workers begin 
lawsuit in California 
and Vermont related 
to regulation of CO2 
(AB1493).    
2005 
Ford executives go 
to California for an 
NGO dialogue with 
RAN and Bluewater 
Network regarding 
their campaigns 
targeting Ford's 
environmental 
performance   
  
Ford receives 
another shareholder 
resolution on climate 
change from Sister 
Patricia Daly from 
the Interfaith Center 
on Corporate 
Responsibility.  
Ford worked with ICCR to get the resolution 
withdrawn based on publication of a climate 
change report 
2006 
Standalone report on 
climate change 
published 
Publication of this report was a turning point 
because it made climate change "less 
threatening" by focusing on the business case 
for climate action 
2007 
Ford joins U.S. 
Climate Action 
Partnership 
(USCAP), an 
industry coalition 
proposing policy 
solutions to climate 
The group recommends a cap and trade 
program, but is defunct by 20011 due to lack of 
political appetite for climate legislation 
 
 
177
change.  
  
John Viera 
appointed Director 
of the Sustainability 
Office 
John was previously an engineer within product 
development. Before coming to the 
sustainability office he was the Chief Engineer 
for the Expedition and Navigator (two of Ford's 
least fuel efficient vehicles) 
  
Sue Cichke named 
Group Vice 
President of 
sustainability 
appointing directly 
to CEO Alan 
Mulally 
This appointment signals important changes in 
leadership and governance related to 
sustainability at Ford 
2008 
Ford publicly shares 
its "Blueprint Plan" 
for doing their share 
to stabilize carbon 
dioxide at 450 ppm 
The Blueprint Plan is science based strategy 
that is supported by vehicle technology and 
alternative powertrain and fuel actions. This 
plan was reviewed by NGOs and policy makers 
during its development and was well received 
  
Ford climate 
scientists give 
presentation about 
how to respond to 
climate skeptics   
  
Board of Directors 
Environmental and 
Public Policy 
Committee (EPPC) 
committee changes 
name to 
Sustainability 
Committee 
This change reflects "the evolution of its 
responsibilities and the company's challenges 
and opportunities" (Ford Sustainability Report, 
2013) 
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2009 
Creation of new 
governance 
structures at the 
executive and 
managerial level to 
oversee strategy 
development and 
implementation of 
the Blueprint Plan 
The senior level team, Sustainable Mobility 
Governance (SMG), is led by the Vice 
President of Sustainability and reports to the 
CEO on a weekly basis. The managerial level 
group is called the Global Sustainability 
Planning Team (GSPT) and reports to the 
SMG. 
2010 
Ford announces 
manufacturing 
climate strategy 
Ford's goal is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions from manufacturing facilities by 30 
percent per vehicle produced from 2010 to 
2025, based on the company's stabilization 
commitment 
2011 
President Obama 
announces "One 
National Plan" 
aimed at increasing 
fuel economy of 
vehicles and 
reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions 
The new standards require an average fuel 
economy standard of 35.5 miles per gallon 
(mpg) in 2016 and projected 54.5 mpg by 2025. 
This plan is supported by Ford, the UAW, the 
environmental community and state 
governments. It represents a compromise after 
the legal battles beginning in California over 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from 
vehicles and grants the Environmental 
Protection agency more authority for the first 
time (previously the National Highway Traffic 
and Safety Administration (NHTSA) was the 
sole authority on fuel economy) 
2008-
present 
Implementation and 
progress towards 
Blueprint Plan   
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Returning to the central question and the title of this dissertation, the findings 
from these studies suggest that while change has occurred and corporate responses to 
climate change are rapidly shifting towards substantive action, there is still much myth 
and ceremony.  In other words, legitimacy is still being sought and created via myths and 
ceremonial activities, including the creation of corporate narratives that fit within larger 
socially accepted scripts related to climate change (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 The first study in this dissertation articulates when firms are likely to decouple 
climate change discourse and actions through an examination of Environmental 
Protection Agency Climate Leaders participants.  In the second study I build upon the 
first study and on existing work related to logics, using sustainability reports to examine 
the underlying logics of corporations addressing climate change. Finally, I present a case 
study of Ford Motor Company and their journey from symbolic to substantive climate 
change response to better understand the mechanisms and tensions underlying such 
change. Findings are used to develop a model of change that is emergent, ongoing and 
pluralistic, resulting from multiple interactions within the firm, with stakeholders, and 
external conditions that are characterized by friction. 
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 Together these studies make both theoretical and practical contributions. Broadly, 
the studies in this dissertation contribute to previous theories in the body of institutional 
theory relating to decoupling, symbolic action and the formation of logics as well as the 
theories of institutional ethnography. Individual theoretical contributions are discussed in 
the previous chapters. Collectively they inform our understanding of how climate change 
has become a legitimate business issue and how companies are (or are not) addressing 
this issue.  
Throughout the dissertation the themes of science and market opportunity are 
pervasive motivating factors that predict substantive climate action, while risk and 
regulation tend to be more indicative of decoupling. This provides a more nuanced 
understanding to previous work that has found that companies are shifting their focus 
from risk management to exploring new green business platforms (Hoffman, 2007). 
This suggests that companies are opening up to the possibility of innovation and market 
opportunity driven by climate change and responding with action, whereas previously 
risk and the lack of regulation created an uncertain climate that drove symbolic response. 
This might explain the prevalence of myth and ceremony related to corporate response to 
climate change, as much of the early discussion of climate change was presented as risk 
and threats of imminent regulation instead of presenting business opportunities. It is only 
recently that the tone of the conversation has really changed to focus on these 
opportunities. These findings also make it even more surprising that climate change 
remains such a politically divisive issue in the U.S. given the scientific consensus on the 
topic, and that corporations are espousing the opportunities related to climate change and 
asking for legislation on the topic to “level the playing field.” 
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 These findings also provide additional insight into different forms of myth and 
ceremony. Interview findings from the Climate Leaders and Ford studies suggest that 
there is a distinction between myth and ceremonial activity that is greenwashing (i.e. an 
intentionally deceptive public relations exercise) and symbolic (i.e. necessary, and 
important although incremental climate action). While greenwashing is an extreme form 
of myth and ceremony and definitely occurs, symbolic responses to climate change 
appear to be more common and often results from difficulty following through on climate 
goals and strategies. Corporate practitioners mentioned that they were unprepared for the 
scale of the challenge related to responding to climate change and the amount of 
institutional inertia that they were up against. The former director of corporate citizenship 
at Ford was told, "Deb, I don't know if you are just naïve or courageous" by a colleague 
characterizing her efforts to drive climate action (Zemke, 2003).  
Considering an organizational perspective is of particular importance when 
studying contentious social issues such as climate change.  During the twentieth century 
organizations, and corporations more specifically, became the dominant structure in 
society (Perrow, 1991).  According to Perrow, “ organizations are the key to society 
because large organizations have absorbed society. They have vacuumed up a good part 
of what we have always thought of as society, and made organizations, once a part of 
society, into a surrogate of society (Perrow, 1991 p. 726). By examining a present day 
environmental issue with urgent significance and policy implications given the 
contribution of industry to climate change, this study responds to calls for organization 
theory to address contemporary societal issues, and to link such studies to policy and 
education (Gladwin, 1993; Padro, 2014; Stern & Barley, 1996).  
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Future Research   
  Future research might consider a network analysis examining the relationships of 
firms, their suppliers and other stakeholders in the organizational field of climate change. 
The current trend is towards a networked organizational form with diffuse boundaries, 
and hybrid governance schemes including diverse networks of public and private actors 
are proliferating (Cashore, 2002; G. F. Davis & McAdam, 2000; R. W. Scott & G. F. 
Davis, 2006; W. R. Scott & G. F. Davis, 2006b). In addition, more firms are looking 
beyond their own boundaries, beyond what they control directly to what they influence, 
to better understand climate impacts, risk and opportunities within their supply chain. 
Furthermore, it is estimated that supply chain greenhouse gas emissions can contribute a 
significant amount of a firms’ total emissions. For example, Trucost calculates that 
Ford’s supply chain contributes 87 percent of its total emissions (Montoto, 2012). An 
analysis beyond the organizational level, might also illuminate the formative and 
sustaining roles that climate networks are playing in corporate response to climate change 
and how they are encouraging substantive action at the field level.  
  A large scale, quantitative examination of corporate reporting and performance 
using sustainability reports and responses to the CDP11 (formerly the Carbon Disclosure 
Project) could also provide insight into the topics of decoupling and indicators of 
substantive vs. symbolic action, as well as providing interesting industry and 
geographical comparisons (CDP, 2014). Prior research has found a correlation between 
                                                
11 CDP asks companies to disclose greenhouse gas emissions, risks, opportunities and management 
strategies in a publicly available questionnaire posted to their website. The CDP began with 35 institutional 
investors with $4 trillion in assets in 2000, and has grown to 767 institutional investors with over $92 
trillion in assets in 2014. They have also expanded their focus over this time beyond climate change to a 
focus on water, supply chain and forest (CDP, 2014). 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public disclosure of environmental performance and actual environmental performance 
Cho and Patten 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; Patten, 2002; Reid and Toffel, 2009). 
However, uncertainty still remains regarding whether reporting reflects actual firm 
behavior or is merely an act of public relations (Kolk and Pinkse, 2010; Fonseca, 2010; 
Cerin, 2002). Moving beyond this debate, it would be worthwhile to further examine, as I 
have done in this dissertation, not whether but when and why reporting reflects coupling 
of discourse and action. Such research could examine a number of interesting questions: 
Which companies are likely to have better climate performance? Do CDP participants 
have more substantive climate performance? Does stakeholder engagement impact 
climate disclosure and performance (e.g. is engagement symbolic or substantive)? How 
does a firm’s view of climate science impact disclosure and performance? Does 
disclosure improve performance over time (e.g. do companies who have been reporting 
longer have improved climate performance)? 
  It would also be interesting to link this large scale examination of disclosure and 
performance to climate logics. In particular, it would be useful to understand what 
climate logics companies prescribe to over time and whether and how certain logics are 
predictors of decoupling. Based on the study of Climate Leaders participants and the Ford 
case study this is relevant because opportunity drives substantive action. Therefore, those 
companies espousing an opportunity logic should be more likely to take substantive 
action, while those with a dominant risk logic should be more likely to demonstrate 
decoupling and symbolic action. 
  Finally, expanding the findings from these studies to other sustainability issues 
would be a significant contribution to the literature. For example, does decoupling of 
climate discourse and action also predict decoupling of other sustainability issues? 
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Additional future research arising from this dissertation, and limitations are discussed in 
the previous chapters alongside their corresponding study. 
 
 
Implications 
 
The primary findings of this dissertation, namely that a belief in climate science 
and market related opportunities related to climate change are driving substantive climate 
action, provide hope that the corporate sector is finally becoming an important part of the 
solution to addressing climate change.  And this optimism and belief in opportunities 
seems to be growing in the corporate sector. During the recent events of Climate Week 
business was optimistically outspoken calling for carbon pricing either through carbon 
tax or cap-and-trade, committing to halting deforestation by 2030 and others to 100 
percent renewables for their operations by 2020 (Makower, 2014).  This is good news as 
we approach the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015, and the 
next round of negotiations towards a framework that would limit global warming to 
below the IPCC recommended 2 degrees Celsius, where a strong message from business 
to government and policy makers is crucial.   
But is there room (or time) for this seemingly unbounded optimism as the climate 
is passing new thresholds and population growth (an important driver of greenhouse gas 
emissions) is expected to reach 9 billion by midcentury? The level of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere reached a record high in 2013, and 2014 is on track to be the hottest year 
on record according to the World Meteorological Organization's annual Greenhouse Gas 
Bulletin, and the IPCC has concurred with an assessment of unequivocal warming (IPCC, 
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2013; World Meteorological Organization Greenhouse Gas Bulletin, 2014).  And, 
perhaps more importantly, will this optimism lead to real and sustained climate action?  
These remain open question, and important areas for future inquiry. While 
business is responding in a markedly different fashion to climate change compared to 
even a decade ago, there is legitimate concern that corporate actions are still generally 
necessary but incremental and insufficient. More specifically, without carbon pricing and 
binding global agreements every industry goal or action related to climate change is 
viewed positively even if it really belongs more in the “ceremonial conformity” or feel-
good category rather than reflecting substantive action. (And this is not surprising as 
companies are operating in a climate of risk and uncertainty without such agreements, 
and findings of these studies suggest that risk often tends to predict symbolic action and 
decoupling). As expressed by Frances Beinecke, president of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (Makower, 2014): 
 
The total of what has to happen is so significant — we need a global compact, we 
need national-level policies — that knitting together each of the private sector 
policies just isn’t enough to meet the challenge [of climate change].  
 
 
At this juncture, therefore, research examining climate change as a cultural issue 
is particularly relevant. This dissertation then is a call for a continued focus on problem-
centered research on sustainability challenges such as climate change.   
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